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Preface
Frontier models and efficiency measurement are closely related fields, which are cur-
rently a wide research area with plenty of applications. The first thoughts on efficiency
were documented through some management theories at the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury and from economics by authors such as John Hicks in the 1930s. In general, the
main concern was the failure to achieve the theoretical production and profits maxima.
However, it was not until the 50s when a formal definition of technical efficiency was in-
troduced in Koopmans (1951), followed by some applications of this concepts developed
in Debreu (1951) and Farrell (1957). These initial attempts provided the theoretical
basis for the introduction of robust methods of efficiency measurement through frontier
models in the late 70s. Since then, two different methodological approaches have been
widely developed and applied: nonparametric and parametric methods (see Coelli et al.,
2005; Fried et al., 2008; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, for some excellent books on these
techniques).
Nonparametric approaches are flexible but they have the disadvantage of provid-
ing, in general, deterministic inefficiency measures. The most common nonparametric
method is Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) introduced in Charnes et al. (1978). On
the other hand, parametric approaches have the advantage of introducing an error term,
which may account for measurement errors, omitted variables and functional form er-
rors. The most important parametric method is Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)
initially introduced in Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) (see
O’Donnell, 2014, for an interesting explanation of the assumptions underpinning DEA
and SFA models).
Recently, SFA has been studied from a Bayesian point of view due to some of the
attractive features of this approach such as exact inference and individual distributions
of inefficiencies, formal specification of uncertainty, easy incorporation of prior ideas
and restrictions, and computation of predictive distributions of inefficiency. Since the
introduction of the Bayesian approach to SFA in van den Broeck et al. (1994) there
have been an increasing number of theoretical studies and applications of SFA from this
perspective and it is currently a very influential approach.
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Regarding methodological issues, one of the most interesting topics in SFA literature
is the treatment of heterogeneity and its effects on efficiency estimations. The omission of
heterogeneity in stochastic frontier models has been well documented to produce biased
efficiency estimations (see Greene, 2008; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, for complete
reviews). Empirical studies have also shown relevant implications of heterogeneity in
the estimation of both efficiency levels and rankings (see Bos et al., 2009; Greene, 2004,
for examples in the health and banking sectors, respectively). Also, the location of firm
heterogeneity variables has been found to drive the estimations (see Coelli et al., 1999).
In fact, the question of “where to put the z’s (covariates)?”, as remarked by Greene
(2008), is still an open issue. This issue has been widely studied before. However,
unobserved inefficiency heterogeneity has been little explored.
Another topic that has received little attention within the frontier literature is the
persistence of inefficiency over time. Traditionally, time dependency of inefficiency has
been studied through deterministic specifications of time. In the Bayesian context, to
the best of our knowledge, only the study by Tsionas (2006) considers dynamic effects
in a frontier model, which also includes some exogenous variables representing hetero-
geneity. However, the implications of including observed covariates in these models and
accounting for unobserved sources of heterogeneity have been less explored.
In this thesis, we put forward the modeling of heterogeneity in a Bayesian context by
capturing both observed and unobserved heterogeneity in the inefficiency distribution
under static and dynamic formulations. We propose several novel specifications which
permit the identification of heterogeneity in these contexts. The first of our proposed
methods captures unobserved heterogeneity in the inefficiency by modeling a random
parameter in the inefficiency distribution. Results suggest that this method is successful
in identifying unobserved heterogeneity and that it also can be used as a way to test
the relevancy of observed covariates. Also, the location of heterogeneity is found to have
important effects on efficiency estimations which are more evident when unobserved
heterogeneity is accounted for. The second proposal captures unobserved heterogeneity
sources related to firm-specific effects of observed covariates in the inefficiency. This
is performed by modeling random coefficients in the inefficiency. It is found that al-
lowing random coefficients for the inefficiency covariates captures firm-specific effects
which remain unidentified under the regular fixed coefficients models. This specification
distinguishes properly firms in term of the effects of inefficiency drivers and separates
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unobserved heterogeneity related to these effects from efficiency. Our third proposal
relies on the framework of dynamic SFA and specifies a model that is able to capture
unobserved heterogeneity in the inefficiency persistence and unobserved technological
heterogeneity. Both unobserved effects are found to be very relevant in explaining in-
efficiency and its evolution over time. Finally, the implications of including observed
covariates in dynamic models were studied by mean of an inefficiency specification that
allows separating observed inefficiency heterogeneity from the dynamic process. The
model allows identifying those firm characteristics that may have persistence effect in
the inefficiency from those that can be rapidly adjusted. In general, location of observed
covariates is found to have important implications in the identification of inefficiency
drivers and posterior efficiency estimations.
The proposed models are implemented in very different applications such as health
performance, airlines, banking and electricity distribution and our results have important
implications for companies, regulators and policy makers in these sectors.
The inference of all the models is carried out using Bayesian methods and the Win-
BUGS software package is used for the implementation throughout. We provide the
codes used in each chapter of the thesis at the end of the corresponding chapters.
This thesis has the following structure. Chapter 1 presents an introduction to the
most important concepts on frontier efficiency, the measuring methods, SFA and its
Bayesian approach, and a literature review on the treatment of observed and unobserved
heterogeneity in SFA models. Chapter 2 presents the problem of observed heterogeneity
in SFA by analyzing the effects of including observed covariates in the frontier, and in
different parameters and distributions of the inefficiency. Chapter 3 presents the models
proposed to identify unobserved heterogeneity in the inefficiency. Firstly, by modeling a
random parameter in the inefficiency; and secondly, by allowing coefficients of inefficiency
drivers to vary randomly across firms. Chapter 4 extends the analysis of heterogeneity in
the dynamic framework by proposing two specifications: one that identifies unobserved
heterogeneity in the inefficiency persistence and in the technology and another one that
is able to separate observed heterogeneity from the dynamic behaviour of inefficiency.
Finally, Chapter 5 discusses the main conclusions, contributions and further lines of
research.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this Introduction we define the basic concepts and techniques involved in efficiency
modeling, describe the methodology of SFA, the Bayesian approach to this method, and
present a literature review on the treatment of heterogeneity in SFA.
1.1 The concept of efficiency
Efficiency is a relative concept related to the way resources are used in order to obtain
a final result. Therefore, it is closely linked with the performance of private or public
organizations in the sense that improving efficiency can lead to higher profits, more com-
petitive performance and better service provision. Consequently, efficiency measurement
is very important for making managerial and policy decisions and for the identification
of areas that can be improved.
Efficiency should be measured with respect to some objective such as maximizing
produced output, revenues or earned profits, or minimizing inputs or costs. In general,
three main types of efficiency can be measured. These are technical, allocative, and
economic efficiency. Technical efficiency is related to the quantities of inputs and outputs
employed in a production process. In this case, we can obtain either an input-oriented
or an output-oriented measure. The former assesses the quantities of inputs used to
produce a given output; while the latter measures the output levels produced with some
given inputs. These measures are then linked to the economic concept of a production
function.
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To illustrate the concept of technical efficiency, Figure 1.1 plots a single-input single-
output case, where the output (y) is represented in the vertical axis and the input (x)
in the horizontal axis. The curve is the optimal technology representing a production
frontier where every output level is produced with the minimum possible amount of
input and vice versa. Therefore, point P represents a technically inefficient firm, which
could either produce the same output level A using less input quantity, or produce more
output with the amount of input. In the first case, the distance BP is a measure of
input-oriented technical inefficiency for this firm. In the second case, output-oriented
technical inefficiency is represente by the distance DP .
Figure 1.1: Technical efficiency
Source: Coelli et al. (2005)
Allocative efficiency measures the way a firm chooses optimum input or output levels
given their prices in the market. This is associated with the ability to fulfill the marginal
conditions for a cost minimization function or a revenue or profit maximization. Finally,
economic efficiency is a concept involving both types of efficiency. To illustrate these
three concepts, Figure 1.2 shows the possible combinations of two inputs (x1 and x2) for
producing one output (y). Line AA′ is the isocost representing all the input combinations
which generate the minimum cost for the firm given the market prices of those inputs.
The curve SS′ is the isoquant representing the minimum feasible combination of inputs
generating a given output amount. Thus, a firm located at point P is both technical
and allocative inefficient, while a firm at point Q is technical efficient because it is on
the isoquant. Then, the distance PQ is a measure of the input reduction the firm should
2
1.2 Efficiency measurement
perform to be technical efficient. However, at Q the firm is still allocative inefficient
because given the input prices the firm may use a different combination of inputs which
allows it to produce the same output amount but incurring in lower costs.Then, the
distance QR is a measure of the allocative inefficiency. Therefore, only Q′ is the overall
economic efficient point, where the isoquant is tangent to the isocost.
Figure 1.2: Technical, allocative and economic efficiency
Source: Coelli et al. (2005)
It is important to distinguish the concepts of efficiency and productivity. Although
highly related, the concept of productivity is more general and, as well as technical
and allocative efficiency, it takes into account technical change, scale economies and
output mix.1 Here, we focus on technical and economic efficiency measurement, although
measures of technical change and scale efficiency are derived in the applications.
1.2 Efficiency measurement
In general, measurement techniques for efficiency are separated into two main approaches:
nonparametric and parametric.
The nonparametric approach has flexibility as its main advantage, but the main
drawback is that, in general, it provides deterministic measures of inefficiency. Under
1Technical change is related to changes in the technology that may shift the frontier. Regarding
scale economies, a firm operates at constant returns to scale if an increase of input amounts leads to a
proportional increase of the output; at increasing returns if the output increases more than proportional;
and at decreasing returns if the output increases less than proportional. As to output mix, a firm is
defined as scope efficient if it produces jointly multiple products at proportional less cost than producing
them separately.
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this approach the main methodology used is DEA. It was introduced by Charnes et al.
(1978) and the purpose is to determine which observations or decision making units
(DMU’s) are efficient in the performance of some activity. These DMU’s have common
inputs and outputs. It is important to notice that this method allows easily evaluating
multiple outputs, introducing inputs different to production factors, and using ratios or
other indicators.
In particular, in this method, the efficient DMUs compose a frontier enveloping all
inefficient observations, and technical inefficiency is measured by their distance to the
frontier. That distance is a measure of the proportion of inputs the firm might reduce or
of the proportion of output the firm might increase in order to be efficient. It is important
to remark that efficiency under DEA is considered as relative to the other units evaluated
and then it is highly sensitive to outliers. There exist two types of envelopment surfaces,
one for constant returns to scale and other for variable returns to scale. This choice
is determined a priori based on the knowledge of the sector analyzed. The application
of this method implies solving a linear programming problem and is underpinned by
the assumption that the frontier is locally linear. Its main drawback is that if outputs,
inputs and/or environmental variables are measured with error or are unobserved, as
it is usually the case, then the estimators are inconsistent (see O’Donnell, 2014, for a
discussion). Moreover, modeling environmental or heterogeneity variables affecting the
inefficiency is troublesome under this approach.2
The parametric approach uses econometric methods for the estimations. Although,
within this approach there are some deterministic methods, the most interesting char-
acteristic is that it easily allows the inclusion of an stochastic error term. The most
common parametric and stochastic method is SFA, introduced by Aigner et al. (1977)
and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). As it will be described below, its main advan-
tage is introducing an error term, which may account for measurement errors, omitted
variables and functional form errors. It also allows to model, in an easy and consis-
tent way, heterogeneity variables in a single stage (see Wang, 2002, for a discussion and
experiments).
2Traditionally, two-stage procedures have been used, where the obtained inefficiency measures are
regressed over a set of heterogeneity variables. However, this usually leads to inconsistent estimators
(see Simar and Wilson, 2007, for a discussion on this issue and a possible solution using bootstrapping).
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Recently, some methods that try to incorporate the advantages of both approaches
have been proposed. Robust and stochastic DEA-type models as introduced in Cazals
et al. (2002); Daraio and Simar ( 2005), and Kuosmanen and Kortelainen (2012), respec-
tively, are able to deal with outliers, noise and include environmental variables. However,
the robust versions do not allow for a rigorous analysis of an stochastic error term and,
as the stochastic versions, the modeling of heterogeneity factors that affect directly the
inefficiency rather than the production activity itself, is still troublesome. Other meth-
ods mixing both worlds are the Bayesian and frequentist approaches to semiparametric
SFA models (see Griffin and Steel, 2004; Park et al., 2007, respectively). These methods
allow more flexible structures for either the inefficiency or the frontier. However, at least
in the first case, modeling heterogeneity variables in a nonparametric specification for
the inefficiency component is not easy and is still an open issue.
In this thesis, we focus only on SFA given the advantages it provides for modeling an
idiosyncratic error and heterogeneity variables affecting the inefficiency. The inference of
all the models is carried out via Bayesian methods, which provides interesting advantages
for the incorporation of uncertainty and the analysis of the results that are discussed
further.
1.3 Stochastic Frontier Analysis
The SFA method is motivated by the idea that deviations from the frontier may not be
entirely under the control of the firm. This approach supposes an error term which can be
decomposed as the sum of two components. One component is the idiosyncratic random
error assumed to be normally distributed and the second component is nonnegative
and considered as inefficiency. The way the error component is divided depends on the
distribution assumption of the error component capturing the inefficiency.
As mentioned before, parametric models are based on a functional form; in particular,
the stochastic frontier models are usually derived from a production or a cost function.
As described in Section 1.1, in the first case, technical efficiency is measured while in
the second case, economic efficiency is evaluated. The former is simpler; thus, it is used
to explain below the basics of SFA (see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Both, production
and cost function models can be evaluated for cross sectional or panel data. The latter
provide more efficient estimations, and allows introducing time varying inefficiencies.
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Consider a cross section production frontier model such that:
yi = f(x1i, x2i, · · · , xki;β) · TEi, (1.1)
where yi is the total output produced by firm x1i, x2i, · · · , xki are the k inputs used by
firm i, β is the vector of technology parameters to be estimated, and TEi is the technical
efficiency of firm i. Thus, rearranging the previous equation we have that:
TEi =
yi
f(x1i, x2i, · · · , xki;β) . (1.2)
Then, technical efficiency is defined as the ratio of the observed output to the maxi-
mum feasible output. This means that if the firm is producing at the maximum, technical
efficiency is also maximum and equal to 1, otherwise it is less than 1 and some degree
of inefficiency is presented. However, in this case the frontier is deterministic because it
is not considering possible random shocks out of the control of the firm. To introduce
this, the specification of the stochastic frontier and the technical efficiency is as follows:
yi =f(x1i, x2i, · · · , xki;β) · exp(vi) · TEi (1.3)
TEi =
yi
f(x1i, x2i, · · · , xki;β) · exp(vi) , (1.4)
where, exp(vi) captures the effect of measurement errors or random shocks not controlled
by the firm.
The theoretical specification of an economic production function is y = f(L,K),
where y is the output produced, L is the amount of labor input used to produce y,
and K is the amount of capital input used to produce y. It is possible to derive this
function from a Cobb-Douglas or a Translog function. Taking logarithms to any of these
functions, the econometric model for the stochastic frontier would be:
ln yi = xiβ + i; i = vi − ui, (1.5)
where the matrix xi contains the logarithm terms of the inputs associated to labor and
capital and i is the error term which is split into two components: vi is an unrestricted
random variable and ui is the inefficiency component. Given that the technical efficiency
cant be greater than 1, ui is defined to be always nonnegative. Also, recalling the
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technical efficiency definition we have that TEi = exp(−ui). It is worth observing that
in the case of deriving the frontier from a cost function, the sign of the inefficiency
component ui is reversed given that in that case we have a minimum frontier such as
that illustrated in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.3 shows the SFA representation of a production function where it can be
observed that for firms i and j not all the distance from their observed outputs to the
frontier is attributed to inefficiency but only part of it. In the first case, the idiosyncratic
error term is negative while in the second case it is positive. This random part vi is
assumed to be normally distributed N(0, σ2v) and fulfill the classical assumptions as
the usual error under OLS. However, for the inefficiency part ui some assumption is
required given that it must be non negative. The most common alternatives proposed
in the literature for the inefficiency distribution are: half normal (Aigner et al., 1977),
exponential (Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977), truncated normal (Stevenson, 1980),
and gamma (Greene, 1990) distributions. In all the cases, vi and ui are assumed to be
independently distributed from each other and from the regressors.
Figure 1.3: SFA approach for the derivation of technical efficiency
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1.4 The Bayesian approach to SFA
The Bayesian approach to SFA was introduced in van den Broeck et al. (1994). The main
advantages in this context are the exact inference on inefficiencies especially with small
samples, the straightforward incorporation of prior ideas and restrictions, the formal
specification of uncertainty on the parameters and the model, getting a distribution of
the inefficiency for every firm, and the direct computation of the average inefficiencies
through the predictive posterior distribution of ui. Dealing with stochastic frontier
models in this context requires using numerical integration methods such as Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). In particular, the Gibbs sampling algorithm with data
augmentation as introduced in Koop et al. (1995) is used very often on the literature
of Bayesian stochastic frontiers. The implementation of these models in this framework
can be easily carried out through free software packages such as WinBUGS (Lunn et al.,
2000). The implementation of the most common SFA models in the Bayesian context
using this package is introduced in Griffin and Steel (2007).
The Bayesian formulations for the gamma, exponential and truncated normal distri-
butions are presented by van den Broeck et al. (1994). It is important to remark that the
exponential is just a particular case of the gamma distribution when the shape parameter
is equal to 1, and that the half normal is a particular case of the truncated normal when
the truncation is set at 0. The Bayesian approach assuming the exponential distribution
for inefficiencies is presented below.
Let us represent the stochastic frontier model presented in (1.5) as:
yi = f(xi,β) + vi − ui, (1.6)
where yi is the log of the output variable for the firm i, xi contains the explanatory
variables and vi, ui are the error terms as considered in (1.5).
Thus the joint distribution of yi and ui conditional on xi and the parameters is:
p(yi, ui|xi,θ) = fN (yi|f(xi,β)− ui, σ2)fG(ui|λ−1), (1.7)
where θ = (β, σ2, λ) are the parameters to be estimated, σ2 is the variance of the
composed error i and λ is the unknown scale parameter of the exponential distribution.
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From here,we deduce the following conditional density for ui:
p(ui|yi,xi,θ) = Φ−1
(mi
σ
)
fN (ui|mi, σ2)I(ui > 0), (1.8)
where mi = f(xi,β) − yi − σ2/λ. From the two previous conditional distributions the
sampling density of yi is obtained:
p(yi|xi,θ) = λ−1
Γ(1)
exp
(
−mi
λ
− σ
2
2λ2
)
Φ
(mi
σ
)
. (1.9)
Now, the likelihood function can be represented as the product of the previous den-
sities:
L(θ|y,x) =
N∏
1
p(yi|xi,θ). (1.10)
Given this likelihood function and some prior density p(θ), the posterior distribution
is:
p(θ|y,x) ∝ L(θ|y,x)p(θ). (1.11)
This distribution includes all the information about the parameters contained in the
prior and the data. However, under a frontier analysis the most important are not
the parameters but the individual efficiencies, which are measured by TEi = exp(−ui).
Therefore, the conditional posterior distributions of ui and ri are the following:
p(ui|y,x) =
∫
p(ui|y,xi,θ)p(θ|y,x)dθ (1.12)
p(ri|y,x) =TE−1i
∫
p(ui|y,x). (1.13)
The main difference from the frequentist method is that instead of conditioning over
an estimate of θ, the Bayesian approach averages out the uncertainty about θ in a
natural way by marginalizing with respect to the posterior density of the parameters.
Finally, in frontier analysis the average inefficiency is usually examined. An advantage of
the Bayesian context is that it can be obtained directly through the predictive posterior
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distribution of ui, which has the following formulation:
p(uf |y,x) =
∫
fG(uf |λ−1)p(λ|y,x)dλ. (1.14)
1.5 Heterogeneity in Stochastic Frontier Models
In stochastic frontier models, the estimated inefficiency component often includes some
firm characteristics other than outputs, inputs, or prices defined from the production
or cost function, which should not be attributed to inefficiency. These are exogenous
variables (e.g. type of ownership, GDP level in the country of operation) that have an
effect on the technology used by firms or directly on their inefficiency. If these variables
are not taken into account in the model specification, this may affect the estimation of
the inefficiencies or of the frontier significantly.
Firm characteristics can be modeled in the frontier if they imply heterogenous tech-
nologies or in the one-sided error component if they affect the inefficiency. In the former
case, covariates are directly included in the functional form and the main interest is
to model unobserved heterogeneity (see Greene, 2005). In the case of heterogeneity in
the inefficiency, covariates are usually included in the parameters of the one-sided error
distribution (see Huang and Liu, 1994).
Heterogeneity in stochastic frontier models has also been studied in the Bayesian
context. The Bayesian approach to stochastic frontiers introduced by van den Broeck
et al. (1994) presents advantages in terms of formally deriving posterior densities for
individual efficiencies, incorporating economic restrictions, and in the easy modeling
of random parameters through hierarchical structures. Hierarchical models have been
used to capture heterogeneous technologies (see Tsionas, 2002) and heterogeneity in the
inefficiency has been considered through covariates in the distribution of the non-negative
error component (see Koop et al., 1997). Modeling observed heterogeneity using non
parametric and flexible mixtures of inefficiency distributions are other interesting recent
contributions (see Griffin and Steel, 2004, 2008).
On the other hand, unobserved heterogeneity in the non-negative error component
has been very little explored in the literature from a frequentist or a Bayesian approach.
However, ignoring its existence means that heterogeneity which is not captured by ob-
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served covariates is wrongly attributed to inefficiency and consequently leads to bad
efficiency estimates.
1.5.1 Literature on Observed Heterogeneity
The original stochastic frontier model introduced by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen
and van den Broeck (1977) has the following form:
yit = xitβ + vit − uit (1.15)
where yit represents the output of firm i at time t, xit is a vector that contains the input
quantities used in the production process, vit is an idiosyncratic error that is typically
assumed to follow a normal distribution and uit is the one-sided component representing
the inefficiency and follows some non-negative distribution.
Firm specific heterogeneity not specified in (1.15) can be mistaken for inefficiency
if it is not identified. Heterogeneity can either shift the efficiency frontier or change
the location and scale of the inefficiency estimations (see Greene, 2008; Kumbhakar and
Lovell, 2000, for complete reviews). In general, when external factors are supposed to
capture technological differences and these are out of the firms’ control, heterogeneity
should be specified in the frontier. In this case, the main interest is capturing unobserved
effects. In the classical context, this has been modeled through fixed and random effects
or models with random parameters (see Greene, 2005). Bayesian approaches have been
based on frontier models with hierarchical structures (see Huang, 2004; Tsionas, 2002).
When heterogeneity is more related to efficiency and thus more likely to be under
firms’ control, then this should affect directly the one-sided error term. In the parametric
context, inefficiency heterogeneity is often included in the location or scale parameters
of the inefficiency distribution. For example, covariates shift the underlying mean of
inefficiency in Kumbhakar et al. (1991), Huang and Liu (1994) and Battese and Coelli
(1995). A reduced form of these models assumes that the location parameter of the
distribution of uit depends on vectors of covariates zit and parameters δ as follows:
uit ∼ N+(µit, σ2u)
µit = zitδ.
(1.16)
The scale parameter of the one-sided error component has also been modeled as a
function of firm characteristics. Reifschnieder and Stevenson (1991) provided one of the
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first linear specifications where this parameter varies across firms. A similar model was
proposed by Caudill et al. (1995) with the aim of treating heteroscedasticity in frontier
models. These authors found biased inefficiency estimations when heteroscedasticity
was not accounted for.3 The proposed model specifies the variance of a half-normal
distributed inefficiency as an exponential function of time invariant covariates:
ui ∼ N+(0, σ2ui)
σui = σu · exp(ziγ).
(1.17)
Although the original proposal in (1.17) was presented in a cross sectional framework,
it can be easily extended to include time-varying covariates and inefficiencies (see Hadri
et al., 2003a,b, for an extension to panel data). It is also possible to define uit = ui · g(t)
where g(t) is a function of time (e.g. the parametric function introduced by Battese and
Coelli, 1992). The specification in (1.17) has the characteristic of changing the scale of
the inefficiency distribution while preserving its shape and is referred in the literature
as the scaling property (see Alvarez et al., 2006; Wang and Schmidt, 2002). In general,
this property allows us to think about inefficiency as being composed of two parts:
uit = u
∗
it·f(zit, δ). The first component is a base inefficiency, which is not affected by firm
characteristics and captures random managerial skills, while the second component is a
function of heterogeneity variables determining how well management is performed under
these conditions. Another important feature of this property is that the interpretation of
the effects of covariates on the inefficiency is direct and independent of the inefficiency
distribution. The scaling property also holds when the inefficiency is exponentially
distributed (see Simar et al., 1994), or in a particular case of truncated normal inefficiency
where both parameters are an exponential function of firm characteristics as follows (see
Alvarez et al., 2006; Wang and Schmidt, 2002):
uit ∼ N+(µit, σ2uit)
µit = µ · exp(zitδ)
σuit = σu · exp(zitδ).
(1.18)
Specification (1.18) for the inefficiency is a variation of a previous proposal by Wang
(2002) where both the mean and the variance of truncated normal inefficiencies are
simultaneously affected by the same covariates but with different coefficients. Other
authors have also proposed heterogeneity specifications that include firm characteristics
3In a previous study, Caudill and Ford (1993) also found biased estimates of the frontier parameters.
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in the variance of the idiosyncratic error with the aim of treating heteroscedasticity in
frontier models (see Hadri, 1999).
In the Bayesian context, Koop et al. (1997) presented different structures for the mean
of the inefficiency component as Bayesian counterparts to the classical fixed and random
effects models. One of these specifications is the varying efficiency distribution model,
which includes firm specific covariates in the parameter of an exponential distribution.
These covariates link the firm effects and only the inefficiencies of firms sharing common
characteristics are drawn from the same distribution. The distribution below presents a
time invariant inefficiency that depends on vectors of binary covariates zi and parameters
γ:
ui ∼ Ex(λ−1i )
λi = exp(ziγ).
(1.19)
Since this model is intended to be a counterpart of a frequentist random effects
model, it is specified to obtain time invariant inefficiencies. However, as in the case of
(1.17), it is possible to define uit = ui · g(t) or to include time-varying covariates. Also,
it would be possible to draw inefficiencies for every firm and period of time from the
distribution with a firm specific parameter.
1.5.2 Literature on Unobserved Heterogeneity
Unobserved heterogeneity in SFA has been mainly modeled in the frontier, recognizing
the existence of unobserved sources related to heterogeneous technologies among firms.
From the frequentist approach, the most common way to include these effects is through
panel data models with fixed and random effects. In particular, Greene (2005) proposes
two models able to capture these effects and distinguish them from inefficiency: the
True Fixed Effects (TFE) and the True Random Effects (TRE) models. This author
also proposes a Random Parameters (RP) model where all the coefficients are allowed
to be firm specific. The specifications for these models are the following:
yit =αi + β
′xit + vit ± uit (1.20)
yit =(α+ wi) + β
′xit + vit ± uit (1.21)
yit =αi + β
′
ixit + vit ± uit. (1.22)
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Equation (1.20) is the TFE specification, which can be solved by creating the dummy
variables for every firm. As Greene (2005) states the problem of the possible presence of
many parameters to be estimated could be solved through the use of Newton’s method.
On the other hand, (1.21) is the TRE specification, which is a regular random effects
model where the composed error it = vit ± uit follows an asymmetric distribution.
Finally, (1.22) presents the RP specification where (αi,βi) = (α,β)+∆α,βqi+Γα,βwα,βi .
Here, ∆j is a matrix of parameters to be estimated, qi include related variables, Γj is
the covariance matrix and wj,i is a random vector parameterizing random variation.
In the Bayesian context, random effects models have also been proposed to model
unobserved technological heterogeneity. Tsionas (2002) proposed a model with the same
form in (1.22), where hierarchical structures can be easily defined in the frontier pa-
rameters. Therefore, in this case we would define the following structure of prior and
hyperprior distributions:
p(β) = fN (β¯,σ
2
β)
p(β¯) = fN (0,Σβ¯)
p(σ−2β ) = fG(aσ−2β , bσ−2β ),
(1.23)
where, β¯ is the common mean from where the firm specific variables vary randomly with
variance equal to σ2β. Similarly it is defined for α.
As previously mentioned, the case of unobserved heterogeneity in the inefficiency has
been less explored. The RP model introduced by Greene (2005) allows us to account
for random parameters in the inefficiency component. This model defines a truncated
normal distribution for the one-sided error such that:
uit ∼ N+(µi, σ2ui)
µi = µ
′
izi;σui = σu exp(θ
′
ihi)
µi = µ+ ∆µqi + Γµwµi
θi = θ + ∆θqi + Γθwθi
(1.24)
In the Bayesian framework, although not presented as a model to capture unobserved
heterogeneity, Koop et al. (1997) propose a marginal independent effects (MIED) model
that may capture in some extent unobserved sources in the inefficiency. In this case,
the inefficiency is assumed to be exponentially distributed with firm specific mean and
14
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independent priors as follows:
uit ∼ Exp(λi)
p(λi) = fG(1,− ln(r∗)) (1.25)
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Chapter 2
Observed Inefficiency
Heterogeneity in Stochastic
Frontier Models∗
This chapter focuses on the treatment of observed heterogeneity related to inefficiency.
Several models have been proposed to deal with this problem using different distribu-
tions for the inefficiency component. In general, accounting for observed heterogeneity in
the inefficiency has been found to have important consequences in efficiency estimations.
Most of these studies have described how these estimations may present biases when
relevant information about firm characteristics is omitted. However, the consequences
that using a particular heterogeneity SFA model has on the efficiency estimations and
rankings provided is still an interesting topic of study. Its understanding is key in this
area given that the final aim in most empirical applications is precisely obtaining effi-
ciency scores and comparing firms through efficiency rankings. This chapter analyzes
these effects under a Bayesian framework when observed covariates are included in dif-
ferent parameters of the inefficiency distribution and also when different distributions
are used for the one-sided error term.
This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 2.1 presents a brief literature review
on the treatment of observed heterogeneity in stochastic frontier models from both the
frequentist and the Bayesian approach. Section 2.2 presents a general SFA model which
∗Much of the work in this chapter has been published in the Journal of Productivity Analysis (see
Gala´n et al., 2014b).
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allows to include observed covariates in different parameters of the inefficiency distribu-
tion. Bayesian inference for this model and three different model selection criteria are
presented. Section 2.3 presents a detailed analysis of the effects of including observed
covariates in different parameters of the inefficiency distribution on efficiency estima-
tions and rankings. This is illustrated using two real samples previously studied under
the frequentist approach. In Section 2.4, the effects on the estimations when different
distributions are used for modeling observed inefficiency heterogeneity are presented.
Finally, Section 2.5 concludes the chapter.
2.1 Analysis of observed inefficiency heterogeneity
In this section, a general stochastic frontier model for panel data that allows the inclusion
of observed inefficiency heterogeneity is presented. The aim is to study the effects on the
estimations of including observed covariates in the different parameters of the inefficiency
distribution.
For the evaluation of the effects on different parameters of the inefficiency distri-
bution, we focus on a truncated normal distribution, which is one of the most used
distributions in studies involving observed heterogeneity in the inefficiency. In particu-
lar, covariates are often included in the location parameter of this distribution following
the Battese and Coelli (1995) model. However, it is not clear in which parameter of the
inefficiency distribution heterogeneity should be included. Wang (2002) proposed mod-
eling the covariates simultaneously in the location and scale parameters of the truncated
distribution. Alvarez et al. (2006) analyze a particular specification of truncated normal
distributed inefficiencies that has the property of preserving the shape while changing
the scale of the inefficiency, and also estimate a model where heterogeneity is captured
only by the scale parameter of this distribution. We think that at an individual level,
the moments of the distributions affected have different effects on the posterior efficiency
distributions of each firm. Since this is possible to be studied from a Bayesian context,
our aim here is to analyze the effects on the posterior efficiency distributions of including
observed heterogeneity in the location, scale or both parameters of the truncated normal
distribution. For the latter case, we extend to the Bayesian framework the scaling prop-
erty model proposed by Alvarez et al. (2006). This allows us to think of the inefficiency
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as being composed of two parts, one component capturing natural managerial skills and
other component which depends on observed firm characteristics.
For the one-sided error we use an exponential specification of a truncated normal
distribution where the location, scale, or both parameters can model firm heterogeneity.
The general model in the case of a production function is:
yit = xitβ + z
∗
itδ + vit − uit; vit ∼ N(0, σ2v)
uit ∼ N+(µ · exp(zitγI1), σ2u · (exp(zitγI2))2), (2.1)
where yit is the output of firm i at time t, xit is the row vector of input quantities, z
∗
it
is a row vector of the observed heterogeneity variables that affect the technology; zit is
a row vector of observed covariates with effects in the inefficiency; and, β, δ, and γ are
the corresponding parameter column vectors. I1 and I2 are indicator variables taking
the value of 1 when either observed covariates are accounted for in the location or scale
parameters, respectively, and 0 otherwise.
This model nests other specifications in the literature that capture only observed
heterogeneity. When I2 is equal to 0, the model reduces to an exponential specification of
the Battese and Coelli (1995) model in (1.16). If I1 is equal to 0, the model allows only the
scale parameter to include heterogeneity. This specification has only been studied before
by Alvarez et al. (2006) in the framework of testing the scaling property. If additionally
the location parameter µ is set to zero, our model becomes an extension of the half-
normal model proposed by Caudill et al. (1995) in (1.17). Finally, if both parameters are
allowed to include simultaneously the same type of heterogeneity (I1, I2 = 1) our proposal
becomes an extension of the scaled Stevenson model in (1.18). In case heterogeneity is
considered time invariant, the vector of observed covariates zit can be set to vary only
across firms.
It is easy to extend this specification to a hierarchical model which also allows for
additional, unobserved, firm effects in the technology. However, in practical applications,
mean posterior efficiencies are found to be very close to 1 for almost all firms (see Huang,
2004; Tsionas, 2002, for similar results). From our point of view, these results are
inconclusive as they do not allow us to get reliable efficiency rankings.
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2.1.1 Bayesian inference
All the models derived from the general specification in (3.1) are fitted by Bayesian
methods. In order to do this, we first need to introduce prior distributions for the model
parameters. We assume proper but relatively disperse prior distributions throughout.
In particular, the distributions assumed for the parameters in the frontier function are
as follows: β ∼ N(0,Σβ), δ ∼ N(0,Σδ) with diffuse, inverse gamma priors for the
variances. Finally, the variance of the idiosyncratic error term is inverse gamma, that is
equivalent to σ−2v ∼ G(aσ−2v , bσ−2v ) with low values for the shape and scale parameters.
Regarding observed inefficiency heterogeneity, the distribution of the one-sided er-
ror component for the truncated normal model is: uit|γ, zit ∼ N+(µ · exp(zitγ), σ2u ·
(exp(zitγ))
2), where µ = ψ/
√
σ−2u with ψ ∼ N(0, 1) and σ−2u ∼ G(5, 5 · ln2 r∗) which
centres efficiency at r∗ (see Griffin and Steel, 2007, for this implementation). When
models include heterogeneity in the inefficiency γ is N(0,Σγ) distributed with a diffuse
prior for the covariance matrix.1
The complexity of these models makes it necessary to use numerical integration
methods such as Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC), and in particular the Gibbs
sampling algorithm with data augmentation as introduced by Koop et al. (1995). For
our models, implementation was carried out using the WinBUGS package following the
general procedure outlined in Griffin and Steel (2007). The MCMC algorithm involved
50,000 iterations where the first 10,000 were discarded in a burn-in phase. We present
in the Appendix of this chapter an example of the code used for the implementation of
this model. Sensitivity analysis of our results to changes in prior parameters and values
for r∗ was also carried out. Results showed that the posterior inference was relatively
insensitive to small changes in these parameters.
2.1.2 Model selection
The different models are evaluated in terms of three criteria, the DIC3, which is a variant
of the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC), the Log Predictive Score (LPS) and the
Mean Square Error (MSE) of predictions.
The standard choice for comparing competing models in Bayesian statistics is to use
the Bayes factor, that is the ratio of the posterior odds to the prior odds in favour of
1Griffin and Steel (2007) use priors for γ similar to that used for µ here. In our exercises we found
that using either alternative lead to roughly the same posterior results.
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the first model. However, the accurate calculation of the Bayes factor is very difficult in
complex models which need MCMC techniques for parameter estimation such as those we
examine here. Therefore, we prefer to use an alternative Bayesian model choice criterion
based on the DIC3. This is a variant of the DIC which is a within sample measure of
fit introduced by Spiegelhalter et al. (2002) commonly used in Bayesian analysis.
Defining the deviance of a model with parameters θ as D(θ) = −2 log f(y|θ), where
y are the data, then DIC = 2D(θ) − D(θ¯) where θ¯ represent some mean posterior
parameter estimates. However, the DIC is well known to possess a number of stability
problems in certain cases such as random effects models and mixture models (see Celeux
et al., 2006). In particular, we can note here that the representation we use for the
parameters of the inefficiency term is a type of random effects model in the cases where
we include an unobserved heterogeneity term. Furthermore and more recently, Li et al.
(2012) also remark on the lack of robustness of the original DIC in models with data
augmentation such as those we examine here. For such cases, Celeux et al. (2006)
recommend the use of the DIC3 criterion as one of the best choices among various
alternatives to the DIC. The formulation for this criterion is:
DIC3 = −4Eθ[log f(y|θ)|y] + 2 log f̂ (y).
This criterion is based on the expected deviance and an estimate of the predictive density
fˆ(·) which are both easy and stable to calculate from the MCMC output provided by
WinBugs.
We also compare the models in terms of their predictive performance. In order to
do this, we calculate the LPS and the MSE of predictions. The LPS is a proper scoring
rule developed in Good (1952) that assesses the post-sample behaviour of the models
associated with the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the actual sampling density
and the predictive density (see Ferreira and Steel, 2007; Griffin and Steel, 2004, for
previous applications of LPS in stochastic frontier models).2 In general, LPS examines
how well a model performs when its implied predictive distribution is compared with
observations not used in the inference sample. The procedure consists of partitioning
the sample into two sets. The first, is a training data set used to fit the model and
the second is a prediction set used to evaluate the predictive performance of the first
2More details on this criterion and an approximate lower bound for the LPS are described in Fer-
nandez et al. (2001).
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set. In our implementation for the panel data models, the training data set contains
the observations up to the penultimate time period at which data are observed for each
firm. Then, if ti represents the index of the last time point when data are observed for
firm i, the predictive set contains the set of observations y1,t1 to yk,tk for the k firms in
the sample. The average of the log predictive density functions evaluated at observed
out-of-sample values are calculated and the formulation is the following:
LPS =
−1
k
k∑
i=1
log f(yi,ti |previous data).
Finally, the calculation of the predictive MSE involves again the partition of the
sample into two parts as earlier. The models are fitted using the training sample and
their estimated parameters are used to predict the data for the last observation of every
firm. The MSE is calculated as follows:
MSE =
1
k
k∑
i=1
(
yi,ti − E
[
(β′xi,ti − ui,ti)|previous data
])2
,
where k is the number of firms as earlier and ui,ti is the mean of the inefficiency com-
ponent, which is different depending on the distribution and varies with the firm for
models with heterogeneity in the inefficiency.
2.2 Empirical applications
In this section, we analyze two data sets, estimate the model presented in (3.1) and
interpret the results.
2.2.1 Application to WHO data set
Evans et al. (2000) estimated the technical efficiency of 191 countries in the provision of
health by using a classical fixed effects stochastic frontier model for an unbalanced panel.
The original data set covers 5 years from 1993 to 1997 and the production function model
proposed was the following:
ln(DALEit) = αi + β1 ln(HExpit) + β2 ln(Educit) + β3
1
2
ln2(Educit) + vit,
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where DALE is the disability adjusted life expectancy, a measure that considers mortal-
ity and illness and represents health output. Input amounts are measured by HExp and
Educ, which are health expenditure and the average years of education, respectively.
Their results were reported by the WHO and suffered from several criticisms since
the authors did not consider the effects of heterogeneity in their study, even though the
sample included countries with very different characteristics such as Switzerland, China,
or Zimbabwe. This led to unexpected country health system performance rankings.
Greene (2004) proposed to capture differences among countries in this sample by in-
cluding eight exogenous variables: Tropics, PopDen,GEff, V oice,Gini,GDP,PubF in,
and OECD. Tropics is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the country is located
in the tropic and 0 otherwise. This is out of the control of the countries and distinguishes
them by the type of diseases found in this region. PopDen is the country population
density, which may capture effects of dispersion but also congestion in the provision of
health. These two variables are characteristics of the health provision in each country
and then they are included as covariates in the production function following Greene
(2004). Regarding the other variables, GEff is an indicator of government efficiency;
V oice is a measure of political democratization and freedom; Gini is the income inequal-
ity coefficient; GDP is the per capita country gross domestic product; PubF in is the
proportion of health care financed with public resources, and OECD is a binary vari-
able that takes the value 1 if the country belongs to the organization and 0 otherwise.
These variables are policy related and more likely to be drivers of the efficiency in the
sense that income, inequality and government characteristics may affect the way health
services are managed. However, in this field there is no theory on where these variables
should be placed at (see Greene, 2004).3
For this application the general model is:
ln(DALEit) = α+ β1 ln(HExpit) + β2 ln(Educit) + β3
1
2 ln
2(Educit) + β4Tropicsi
+β5 ln(PopDeni) + ziδ + vit − uit; vit ∼ N(0, σ2v)
uit ∼ N+(µ · exp(ziγI1), σ2u · (exp(ziγI2))2).
(2.2)
We estimate five different models. Model I is the heterogeneity free base model
where I1, I2, and δ are also equal to zero. Model II includes the covariates in the frontier
3After performing some tests Greene (2004) chose a model that includes Gini and GDP in the
inefficiency and the rest of covariates in the production function.
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as technology heterogeneity variables but not in the inefficiency (I1, I2 = 0). Models
III to V consider observed heterogeneity in the inefficiency distribution and not in the
production function (δ = 0). In particular, Model III does it only through the location
parameter, that is I1 = 1 and I2 = 0. Model IV includes the observed covariates through
the scale parameter (I1 = 0,I2 = 1). Finally, Model V preserves the scaling property
since both parameters of the inefficiency distribution includes the same covariates and
coefficients (I1, I2 = 1).
Table 2.1 reports the estimation results. They show that models considering observed
heterogeneity improve from the base model in terms of fit and predictive performance.
In particular, models including heterogeneity in the inefficiency distribution exhibit the
lowest values for the three model comparison criteria. This suggests that covariates in zi
are inefficiency related. Regarding the estimated frontier coefficients, we observe decreas-
ing returns to scale in health provision for all models and countries. This implies that
efforts of countries in terms of increasing health expenditure or education are reflected
in less than proportional life expectancy improvements. Results for the inefficiency co-
variates suggest that higher equality, income, government efficiency or pertaining to the
OECD increase the efficiency of health provision. However, higher levels of democracy
and public finance of health services lead to lower efficiency.
Focusing on models III to V which are those including inefficiency heterogeneity, we
observe that the best fit and predictive performance is obtained by the scaling property
model (Model V). Results for the predictive efficiency distribution suggest that includ-
ing covariates in the location parameter of the inefficiency increases its mean, while
including them in the scale parameter decreases its dispersion. In particular, the scaling
property model which includes covariates in both parameters of the one-sided error dis-
tribution presents the highest mean and the lowest dispersion of the predictive efficiency
distribution among all models.
The most clarifying insights come from the efficiency rankings since they allow coun-
try comparisons. Figure 2.1 shows efficiency rankings’ scatter plots comparing the base
model against the other four models. For Model II, which includes the covariates in
the frontier, most countries preserve a similar position except for small changes in the
middle rankings. Spearman’s rank correlation with the base model is 0.92. In contrast,
models III to V differ widely from the base model in the top and middle positions and
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Table 2.1: Posterior mean and S.D. of the parameter distributions
Parameter Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Frontier
α 3.574 0.585 3.479 0.512 3.844 0.627 3.711 0.608 3.769 0.596
β1 0.061 0.021 0.026 0.013 0.024 0.011 0.064 0.029 0.041 0.018
β2 0.226 0.085 0.236 0.090 0.249 0.795 0.248 0.081 0.160 0.077
β3 -0.039 0.012 -0.049 0.017 -0.061 0.019 -0.046 0.014 -0.033 0.011
β4 -0.017 0.008 -0.014 0.007 -0.005 0.002 -0.043 0.002 -0.009 0.004
β5 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
δ1(Gini) -0.147 0.007
δ2(lnGDP ) 0.062 0.029
δ3(GEff) -0.014 0.010
δ4(V oice) 0.018 0.011
δ5(OECD) -0.026 0.018
δ6(lnPubF in) -0.036 0.021
Inefficiency
γ1(Gini) 3.779 0.527 8.212 1.025 5.054 0.960
γ2(lnGDP ) -0.266 0.074 -0.279 0.061 -0.662 0.119
γ3(GEff) -0.043 0.014 -0.132 0.046 -0.054 0.017
γ4(V oice) 0.077 0.032 0.159 0.070 0.030 0.017
γ5(OECD) -0.092 0.046 -3.389 1.603 -1.049 0.518
γ6(lnPubF in) 0.062 0.030 0.376 0.192 0.076 0.037
µ -1.584 0.348 -1.411 0.253 -0.620 0.214 -1.423 0.288 -0.372 0.146
σ2u 0.238 0.054 0.214 0.059 0.406 0.098 0.054 0.017 0.058 0.019
Pred. eff. 0.878 0.104 0.877 0.103 0.908 0.138 0.785 0.081 0.914 0.072
DIC3 -2517.282 -2809.581 -3015.727 -2989.307 -3094.403
LPS -122.890 -130.452 -180.507 -169.215 -185.983
MSE 0.139 0.105 0.103 0.093 0.087
the Spearman’s rank correlations with the base model are 0.76, 0.77 and 0.75, respec-
tively.4 However, badly performing countries are always roughly the same regardless of
the model used. This latter group is composed mainly of central African countries (e.g.
Zambia, Botswana, Zimbabwe), which share some characteristics related to low income,
tropical diseases, etc.
In order to observe in detail the changes that occur in the top ranked countries under
the different models, Table 2.2 shows the top 20 most efficient countries under all five
models. Although there are differences, the ranking is quite stable when we consider the
first two models. They include countries such as Oman, Yemen and Cape Verde and other
developing countries from Middle East, Asia, North of Africa and Latin America in the
top positions. However, this changes completely when observed heterogeneity affects the
inefficiency. In models III to V, developed countries rank in the first positions, as might
4Among models with inefficiency heterogeneity, rank correlation is very high (0.99).
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Figure 2.1: Efficiency rankings - Base model vs. heterogeneity models
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be intuitively expected, and for the scaling property model all top 20 countries are from
this group. Differences are important compared to the base model. For example, Japan,
Norway and Sweden which are the top 3 countries under Model V, rank in positions 45,
70 and 72, respectively, under the base model.
Using a scaling property model with heterogeneity in both parameters of the in-
efficiency distribution has an important effect over the ranking. Figure 2.2 shows that
while most of the African countries continue to exhibit low efficiency; there is a significant
change in the positions of the top and middle ranked observations. The best performing
countries (developed countries) are very sensitive to the inclusion of relevant covariates
such as income and inequality that distinguish them from developing countries.
The main evidence is that models including inefficiency heterogeneity lead to impor-
tant moves and shrinkages of the individual posterior efficiency distributions changing
the estimated mean efficiency scores and rankings. Figure 2.3 shows 90% probability
intervals of efficiencies for some selected countries. It can be seen that when covari-
ates affect the location parameter (Model III), the gap between the worst and the best
performing countries increases, which leads to a separating effect on the posterior distri-
butions. On the other hand, the intervals are narrower when the observed heterogeneity
affects the scale parameter of the inefficiency (Model IV), which implies that estimation
uncertainty diminishes. For the scaling property model (Model V) both effects are ob-
served. This leads to less dispersion and overlapping of posterior efficiency distributions,
which allow for more reliable conclusions about efficiency scores and rankings.5
5Similar results were obtained from other scaling-type models following half-normal and exponential
distributions but they performed a bit worse in terms of fit and predictive performance.
26
2.2 Empirical applications
Table 2.2: Top 20 most efficient countries
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
1. Oman 1. Yemen 1. Japan 1. Luxembourg 1. Japan
2. Solomon Islands 2. Jamaica 2. Sweden 2. Spain 2. Norway
3. Yemen 3. Morocco 3. Italy 3. Greece 3. Sweden
4. Jamaica 4. Armenia 4. France 4. Malta 4. Austria
5. Morocco 5. Turkey 5. Spain 5. Armenia 5. Luxembourg
6. Cape Verde 6. Oman 6. Iceland 6. Cyprus 6. Italy
7. Georgia 7. Cape Verde 7. Greece 7. Jamaica 7. Belgium
8. Indonesia 8. Honduras 8. Germany 8. Georgia 8. Finland
9. Armenia 9. Cuba 9. Norway 9. Japan 9. Spain
10.Sri Lanka 10.China 10.United Kingdom 10.Slovakia 10.France
11.Venezuela 11.Nicaragua 11.Ireland 11.Italy 11.Denmark
12.China 12.El Salvador 12.Singapore 12.France 12.Switzerland
13.Saudi Arabia 13.Sri Lanka 13.Jamaica 13.New Zealand 13.Iceland
14.El Salvador 14.Moldova 14.Malta 14.Ireland 14.Greece
15.Honduras 15.Mexico 15.Portugal 15.Norway 15.Canada
16.Azerbaijan 16.Costa Rica 16.Czech Republic 16.Sweden 16.Netherlands
17.Turkey 17.Azerbaijan 17.Georgia 17.Oman 17.United Kingdom
18.Costa Rica 18.Colombia 18.Slovakia 18.Singapore 18.Australia
19.Dominican Rep. 19.Spain 19.Oman 19.Portugal 19.Germany
20.Egypt 20.Greece 20.Armenia 20.Czech Republic 20.New Zealand
As mentioned previously, one of the advantages of preserving the scaling property is
the decomposition of the one-sided error term into a base and a heterogeneity component.
In particular, for Model V, uit = u
∗
it · exp(ziγ) where u∗it ∼ N+(µ, σ2u). Table 2.3
presents this decomposition in terms of efficiency for countries in Figure 2.3. We observe
that countries such as Yemen and Brazil present higher base efficiency but lower total
efficiency than developed countries. This may indicate that these countries present good
managerial skills in health provision but under their specific characteristics, they exploit
their management abilities to a lesser extent than the developed countries. One of the
countries taking great advantage of environmental characteristics is the USA, where
efficiency in health provision is highly dependent in their particular attributes. These
results are in line with those obtained by contrasting the base model and Model V.
Other group of countries, mainly from Africa exhibit low base and low total efficiency.
This may indicate both, poor natural managerial abilities, and inability to perform well
under their relative bad conditions. Consequently, these countries present very bad
performance under all models whether heterogeneity is considered or not.
Overall, we observe that observed heterogeneity variables are inefficiency related and
their inclusion in the parameters of the one sided error component distribution has a large
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Figure 2.2: Heat map of efficiency rankings - Base model vs. Model V
Table 2.3: Posterior mean of base and total efficiency for selected countries
Country Base efficiency Total efficiency
Brazil 0.6716 0.9149
Cameroon 0.2543 0.6313
Japan 0.6371 0.9970
Sierra Leone 0.2808 0.4260
Spain 0.6579 0.9953
United States 0.3702 0.9867
Yemen 0.7312 0.8950
Zimbabwe 0.2491 0.4750
impact on the countries’ efficiency ranking. Moreover, allowing observed heterogeneity
to affect simultaneously both the location and scale parameters of the one-sided error
distribution in a way such that the scaling property is preserved has relevant effects on
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Figure 2.3: 90% probability intervals of the posterior efficiency distributions for selected
countries
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shrinking and separating the distributions of posterior individual efficiencies.
2.2.2 Application to Airlines
The airline industry is an interesting sector where performance and efficiency have been
studied in the literature using parametric and non-parametric methods. Usually, produc-
tion functions are employed to evaluate technical efficiency and environmental covariates
are often included in the frontier as exogenous variables (see Coelli et al., 1999).
In this application we use a Cobb-Douglas cost function with an output quadratic
term to evaluate economic efficiency of the airline industry. The model in (3.1) can
be easily extended to a cost function and as in the previous application we consider
individual characteristics to capture firms heterogeneity. We use a data set of 24 US
domestic airlines over 15 years, from 1970 to 1984, with a total of 246 observations. This
is a revised sample obtained from a data set used by Greene (2008).6
6The original data set includes 256 observations, ten years of observations for an extra airline com-
pany. We excluded this firm since we do not have data for the exogenous variables of this airline.
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The general model for this application is the following:
lnCit = α+ β1 lnPmit + β2 lnPfit + β3 lnPlit + β4 lnPeit +
β5 ln(yit) + β6
1
2 ln
2(yit) + β7t+ β8t
2 + zitδ + vit + uit
vit ∼ N(0, σ2v)
uit ∼ N+(µ · exp(zitγI1), σ2u · (exp(zitγI2))2),
(2.3)
where Cit is the total cost supported by airline i at time t in the output production,
and Pmit, Pfit, Plit, Peit are the input prices of material, fuel, labor and equipment,
respectively. Cost and prices are normalized by the property price. yit is the output of
airline i at time t and it is an index that aggregates regular passenger, mail, charter,
and other freight services. In order to capture possible technological changes over the
15 years covered by the sample we include a trend and its square into the model.
Regarding heterogeneity, zit is a vector containing information of three observed
covariates (load factor, average stage length and points served). Load factor is the
effective performed tonne-passenger per kilometer by the airline as a proportion of the
total available tonne-passenger per kilometer. Stage length is the ratio of total performed
kilometers to the total number of departures. And, points served is the number of
destinations.
Variables in zit, as well as other variables of size, are commonly used in productivity
and efficiency analysis of the airlines sector but their behavior as drivers of either the
frontier or the inefficiency is an open issue. Coelli et al. (1999) present a review on studies
using environmental variables in both cases and note that variables in zit may be argued
to have effects on costs and inefficiency.7 In particular, airlines face high fix but low
variable costs, thus we would expect airlines with high load factor to incur in lower costs
to transport the same outputs than airlines with a low value for this variable. Its effect
on inefficiency would also be negative since a higher load factor implies a higher capital
utilization ratio. Airlines operating with high stage length would incur in lower takeoff,
landing, parking and other airport costs. Also, they are expected to be more efficient
since their aircrafts are being productive for longer time periods. Finally, points served
are expected to have a positive effect on total costs since a larger network requires more
resources but also more managerial skills which may result on higher or lower inefficiency
depending on the routes optimization carried out.
7Coelli et al. (1999) evaluate both alternatives for a technical efficiency analysis and conclude sta-
tistically in favor of a model including them in the inefficiency term.
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Similarly to the WHO application, we estimate five different models. The base model
(Model I) does not consider any type of heterogeneity; therefore, δ = 0 and I1, I3 = 0.
Model II considers only frontier heterogeneity by including the observed covariates in
the cost function. Models III to V consider covariates in zit as determinants of the
inefficiency and include them in the location, scale or both parameters of the one-sided
error distribution, respectively.8
Table 2.4: Posterior mean and S.D. of the parameter distributions
Parameter Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Frontier
α 1.777 0.328 2.463 0.495 1.341 0.289 0.757 0.214 1.623 0.202
β1(lnPm) 0.359 0.176 0.148 0.070 0.270 0.135 0.112 0.048 0.289 0.162
β2(lnPf) 0.176 0.055 0.195 0.048 0.197 0.062 0.195 0.064 0.224 0.070
β3(lnPl) 0.236 0.043 0.484 0.051 0.299 0.048 0.449 0.085 0.217 0.053
β4(lnPe) 0.052 0.027 0.189 0.064 0.116 0.049 0.136 0.052 0.137 0.058
β5(ln y) 0.942 0.240 0.959 0.218 0.894 0.293 0.861 0.299 0.965 0.305
β6(
1
2
ln2 y) 0.088 0.036 0.039 0.012 0.042 0.018 0.038 0.012 0.044 0.017
β7(t) -0.029 0.012 -0.038 0.011 -0.020 0.010 -0.023 0.010 -0.037 0.016
β8(t
2) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
δ1(Load) -0.914 0.253
δ2(lnStage) -0.217 0.056
δ3(lnPoints) 0.149 0.050
Inefficiency
γ1(Load) -0.625 0.296 -0.872 0.408 -0.805 0.395
γ2(lnStage) -0.206 0.152 -0.366 0.210 -0.492 0.283
γ3(lnPoints) 0.252 0.199 0.250 0.184 0.306 0.204
µ 0.021 0.005 0.209 0.004 0.351 0.008 0.284 0.007 0.351 0.009
σ2u 0.184 0.004 0.125 0.003 0.152 0.004 0.123 0.003 0.127 0.004
Pred.eff. 0.869 0.101 0.786 0.128 0.681 0.177 0.754 0.099 0.710 0.087
DIC3 -605.287 -815.394 -697.857 -674.067 -704.846
LPS -13.734 -33.652 -19.792 -18.647 -21.669
MSE 0.026 0.009 0.013 0.019 0.018
Table 2.4 reports the estimation results. We observe that Model II which includes
the observed heterogeneity variables in the cost function present the best fit and predic-
tive performance, suggesting variables in zit to be drivers of the frontier.
9 Nevertheless,
models with inefficiency covariates also improve results from the base model. Among
8For all models, monotonicity conditions were found to be not satisfied because of negative signs
obtained for prices coefficients. This result was also obtained by Greene (2008). Therefore, we impose
regularity conditions by requiring the cost function to have positive elasticities on prices (∂cit/∂pit > 0).
We follow the procedure described in Griffin and Steel (2007) by restricting coefficients β1 to β4 to be
positive through truncated normal prior distributions for these parameters.
9In fact, most of the efficiency studies applied to airlines have treated size and network environment
variables as frontier drivers (see Coelli et al., 1999).
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these models, the one that includes covariates in both parameters of the inefficiency dis-
tribution and preserves the scaling property (Model V) presents the best values in terms
of DIC3 and LPS. However, differences are narrower than in the previous application,
in particular compared to Model III, which exhibits the lowest value of MSE. As in the
WHO application, models including observed heterogeneity in the scale parameter of the
inefficiency exhibit lower dispersion of the predictive efficiency distribution. Regarding
the estimated coefficients, we identify increasing returns to scale and expected effects
of covariates on costs and inefficiency as discussed above. From the estimation results
obtained for Model II we conclude that load factor and stage length affect negatively
costs, while the network size has the opposite effect. Overall, considering heterogeneity
has effects on the estimations of posterior mean efficiencies with respect to the base
model, as we observe in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4: Posterior mean efficiencies - Base model vs. heterogeneity models
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2.3 Effects of different inefficiency distributions
Besides including these covariates in the different parameters of the same distribution,
we also evaluate the effects of assuming different distributions for the one-sided error
component. Inefficiencies are assumed to follow: a) a half normal distribution, following
the specification for the scale parameter in (1.17), b) a truncated normal distribution,
using the scaled Stevenson model in (1.18), and c) an exponential distribution following
the model in (1.19).
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The general model for panel data in this case is the following:
yit = xitβ + z
∗
itδ + vit − uit
vit ∼ N(0, σ2)
a) uit ∼ N+(0, σ2u · (exp(zitγ))2)
b) uit ∼ N+(µ · exp(zitγ), σ2u · (exp(zitγ))2)
c) uit ∼ Exp(λ · exp(zitγ)),
(2.4)
z∗it is a row vector of the observed heterogeneity variables that affect the technology;
zit is a row vector of observed covariates with effects in the inefficiency; and, β, δ, and
γ are vectors of the estimated parameters.
In this case, the distributions of the one-sided error component are: uit|γ, zit ∼
N+(0, σ2u · (exp(zitγ))2) for the half-normal model; uit|γ, zit ∼ N+(µ · exp(zitγ), σ2u ·
(exp(zitγ))
2) for the truncated normal model; and, uit|γ, zit ∼ Exp(λ · exp(zitγ)) for
the exponential case. µ, σ2u and λ are defined as in Griffin and Steel (2007). The MCMC
is performed as in the previous case, running 50,000 iterations and discarding the first
10,000 in a burn-in phase.
2.3.1 Application to WHO data set
The model in (3.2) is adjusted in order to allow the inefficiency component to follow: a)
half-normal, b) truncated normal, or c) exponential distributions:
ln(DALEit) = α+ β1 ln(HExpit) + β2 ln(Educit) + β3
1
2 ln
2(Educit) + β4Tropicsi
+β5 ln(PopDeni) + ziδ + vit − uit
vit ∼ N(0, σ2v)
a) uit ∼ N+(0, σ2u · (exp(ziγ))2)
b) uit ∼ N+(µ · exp(ziγ), σ2u · (exp(ziγ))2)
c) uit ∼ exp(λ · exp(ziγ)).
(2.5)
Model comparison criteria for the four models and the three distributions are pre-
sented in Table 2.5. In general, similar conclusions are obtained from the three cri-
teria. Results show that models including either observed or unobserved heterogeneity
improve from the base model. In particular, the model that exhibits the best fit and pre-
dictive performance includes observed heterogeneity in the inefficiency, which suggests
that covariates in zi are inefficiency related. Regarding the inefficiency distributions,
the half-normal and truncated normal models present better indicators and seem to be
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Table 2.5: Model comparison criteria assuming different inefficiency distributions
Distribution Model I Model II Model III Model IV
Half normal DIC -2251.7150 -2598.3080 -2423.3160 -2914.7370
LPS -97.1690 -132.7610 -154.8950 -196.4420
MSE 0.1382 0.0864 0.0906 0.0736
Truncated normal DIC -2292.7710 -2593.1280 -2495.1400 -2884.9030
LPS -122.8900 -130.4520 -146.7710 -185.9830
MSE 0.1387 0.1051 0.1084 0.0869
Exponential DIC -2223.7420 -2568.4380 -2231.4950 -2580.1720
LPS -95.9810 -121.5150 -123.3560 -132.2700
MSE 0.1392 0.1153 0.1281 0.1085
better alternatives, specially for those models considering observed heterogeneity in uit.
However, efficiency rankings are almost perfectly correlated across distributions as we
can observe for Model IV in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5: Efficiency rankings in Model IV across distributions
2.4 Conclusions
In stochastic frontier analysis the inefficiency component may be erroneously estimated
when firm characteristics are not taken into account. These firm characteristics induce
heterogeneity that might result in different firm frontiers, or may have an impact directly
on the inefficiencies.
In this chapter, the effects of including observed heterogeneity in different parameters
of a truncated normal distributed inefficiency were studied. The models were fitted to
two data sets previously studied only in the frequentist context and the results were
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compared to those obtained with models that ignore heterogeneity or include it in the
frontier.
Differences in efficiency rankings and mean scores were observed when inefficiency
heterogeneity was included in different parameters of the one-sided error distribution.
This was found to be related to effects in the posterior efficiency distributions. In partic-
ular, considering firms’ heterogeneity in the location parameter of the inefficiency has an
effect on separating the firm specific posterior efficiency distributions from each other,
which leads to more reliable rankings. On the other hand, when heterogeneity affects
only the scale parameter of the inefficiency, an important shrinking effect is observed on
the individual posterior efficiency distributions. This results in less uncertainty around
mean individual efficiency scores. Finally, including the heterogeneity in both param-
eters of the inefficiency distribution in models that preserve the scaling property leads
to both separating and shrinking effects. This allows less overlapping of the posterior
efficiency distributions and provide both more reliable efficiency scores and rankings.
Models with this property were extended to the Bayesian context and preserving the
scaling property was found to lead to better fit and predictive performance indicators.
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2.5 Appendix
A. WinBUGS code for a truncated normal model with observed het-
erogeneity - Airlines application
model{
for (i in 1:N) {
m[i] <- mu*exp(gamma[1]*z1[i]+gamma[2]*z2[i]+gamma[3]*z3[i])
sigmau[i]<- (1/sqrt(lambda))*exp(gamma[1]*z1[i]+gamma[2]*z2[i]+gamma[3]*z3[i])
nu[i]<-1/(sigmau[i]*sigmau[i])
u[i] ~ djl.dnorm.trunc(m[i],nu[i],0,1000)
eff[i] <- exp(- u[i]) }
for ( i in 1:N ) {
mc[i] <- alpha + u[i]+ beta[1]*x1[i]+beta[2]*x2[i]+beta[3]*x3[i]+beta[4]*x4[i]
+beta[5]*y[i]+0.5*beta[6]*y[i]*y[i]+beta[7]*(t[i])+beta[8]*(t[i]*t[i])
+beta[9]*z1[i]+beta[10]*z2[i]+beta[11]*z3[i]
lnc[i] ~ dnorm(mc[i], prec) }
mu <- psi/sqrt(lambda)
psi ~ dnorm(0.0,1)
lambda~dgamma(5,lambda0)
lambda0 <- 5*log(rstar)*log(rstar)
for (i in 1:3) {
gamma[i] ~ dnorm(0.0, 0.1)}
#Alternative prior for gamma:
#for (i in 1:3) {
#gammastar[i] ~ dnorm(0.0, 0.1)
#gamma[i] <- gammastar[i] / sqrt(lambda) }
alpha ~ dnorm(0.0, 1.0E-06)
for (i in 1:5) {
beta[i] ~ djl.dnorm.trunc(0.0, 1.0E-06,0,1000) }
for (i in 6:11) {
beta[i] ~ dnorm(0.0, 1.0E-06) }
prec ~ dgamma(0.001, 0.001)
sigmasq <- 1 / prec }
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Chapter 3
Modeling Unobserved Inefficiency
Heterogeneity
Unobserved heterogeneity in the non-negative error component has been very little ex-
plored in the literature from a frequentist or a Bayesian approach. However, ignoring
its existence means that heterogeneity which is not captured by observed covariates is
wrongly attributed to inefficiency and consequently leads to bad efficiency estimates.
The literature on modeling unobserved firm characteristics in the inefficiency is still
scarce. In the frequentist context, Greene (2005) proposed a model where the coefficients
of the observed covariates are allowed to be firm specific and vary randomly. In the
Bayesian framework, Koop et al. (1997) propose a model that may capture unobserved
inefficiency heterogeneity. In this case, the inefficiency is assumed to be exponentially
distributed with firm specific mean and independent priors.
In this chapter, we introduce two different ways to account for unobserved inefficiency
heterogeneity. The first is the inclusion of a random parameter in the distribution of the
inefficiency, which can be included alone or along with observed covariates. The second
proposal is modeling random coefficients of the observed inefficiency covariates. This is
performed through hierarchical structures in the parameters associated to the observed
covariates. Both models are then analyzed using Bayesian inference techniques.
This chapter is divided into three sections. In Section 3.1, we present the model in-
cluding a random parameter in the inefficiency intended to capture latent heterogeneity.
This specification is studied in the two samples presented in Chapter 2 and the effects
of its inclusion in the location or scale parameter of a truncated-normal distributed
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inefficiency are also analyzed. Section 3.2 presents the random coefficients model and
its application to the relationship between risk-taking and efficiency in the Colombian
banking sector. Finally, Section 3.3 presents some conclusions.
3.1 A stochastic frontier model with a random parameter
in the inefficiency∗
In this section, a proposal to model unobserved heterogeneity in the inefficiency through
the inclusion of a random parameter is presented. This parameter has three main char-
acteristics. It can be allowed to be time-varying, it can be included simultaneously with
observed covariates in the inefficiency distribution in order to distinguish observed from
unobserved heterogeneity and it can indicate whether or not observed covariates do a
good job in capturing the existing heterogeneity.
Following the formulation in Chapter 2, we present a general stochastic frontier model
for panel data that allows the modeling of both observed and unobserved inefficiency
heterogeneity. For the one-sided error we use an exponential specification of a trun-
cated normal distribution where the location, scale, or both parameters can model firm
heterogeneity. The general model in the case of a production function is:
yit = xitβ + z
∗
itδ + vit − uit; vit ∼ N(0, σ2v)
uit ∼ N+(µ · exp(zitγI1 + τitI2), σ2u · (exp(zitγI3 + τitI4))2), (3.1)
where yit is the output of firm i at time t, xit is the row vector of input quantities, z
∗
it
is a row vector of the observed heterogeneity variables that affect the technology; zit
is a row vector of observed covariates with effects in the inefficiency; τit is a random
parameter that captures time-varying unobserved firm effects in the inefficiency; and, β,
δ, and γ are the corresponding parameter column vectors. I1 to I4 are indicator variables
taking the value of 1 when either observed covariates or unobserved heterogeneity are
accounted for in the location or scale parameters, respectively, and 0 otherwise.
∗Much of the work in this section has been published in the Journal of Productivity Analysis (see
Gala´n et al., 2014b).
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3.1.1 Bayesian inference
All the models derived from the general specification in (3.1) are fitted by Bayesian
methods. Proper but relatively disperse prior distributions throughout. The distribu-
tions assumed for the parameters in the frontier (β, δ), the variance of the idiosyncratic
error term (σ−2v ), and the inefficiency covariates (γ) are the same described in Chapter
2.
In the case of unobserved heterogeneity in the inefficiency, the unknown parameter
is specified to have a hierarchical structure: τit ∼ N(τ , σ2τ ), where τ ∼ N(0, 10) and
σ−2τ ∼ G(0.5, 0.5). The random parameter τit can be defined to be either time-varying
or not.
As in Chapter 2, the MCMC for these models is carried out using the WinBUGS
package following the general procedure outlined in Griffin and Steel (2007). However,
the hyperparameters τ and σ−2τ present slow convergence and high autocorrelation. In
particular, if initial values are set far from the posterior mean, convergence is observed
only after 50,000 iterations and autocorrelations of order around 20 are identified. There-
fore, for these models 550,000 iterations were used for the MCMC, thinning every 25
iterations and discarding the first 50,000. We computed the MCMC convergence diag-
nostic in Geweke (1992) for the hyperparameteres and the obtained numerical standard
errors show very low values that suggest reasonably precise estimates.1 In Appendix A
we show the MCMC iterations for different initial values of τ in both empirical applica-
tions. Finally, sensitivity analysis of our results to changes in other prior parameters was
also carried out. Results showed that the posterior inference was relatively insensitive
to small changes in these parameters.
Finally, the model selection criteria used for these models are DIC3, LPS and MSE
as described in Chapter 2.
3.1.2 Empirical applications
For illustration, we use the same, WHO and airlines, data sets described in Chapter
2. In particular, in the WHO application, since the observed covariates are inefficiency
related and time invariant, we include them in different parameters of the inefficiency
distribution together with a time invariant random parameter. On the other hand, in
1We computed the numerical standard errors employing a 4% autocovariance tapered estimate.
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the second application observed heterogeneity variables are time-varying and frontier
drivers, so the unobserved heterogeneity component is allowed to change over time and
its effects in the posterior efficiency distributions are evaluated when it is included in
the location, scale or both parameters of the one-sided error distribution.
3.1.2.1 The WHO data set
The results obtained in Chapter 2 allow us to test our proposal to capture latent hetero-
geneity through a random parameter. Since previous results favor the scaling property
model, we analyze unobserved heterogeneity in models that satisfy this property.
For this application the general model is:
ln(DALEit) = α+ β1 ln(HExpit) + β2 ln(Educit) + β3
1
2 ln
2(Educit) + β4Tropicsi
+β5 ln(PopDeni) + ziδ + vit − uit; vit ∼ N(0, σ2v)
uit ∼ N+(µ · exp(ziγI1 + τiI2), σ2u · (exp(ziγI3 + τiI4))2).
(3.2)
First, we estimate Model A where we assume no information about observed het-
erogeneity variables in zi. That is, we impose I2, I4 = 1 and I1, I3 = 0 in Equation
(3.2). Notice that these covariates are time invariant, so for this application the random
parameter capturing unobserved effects is defined to be firm specific and constant over
time, as well.
We propose to estimate two additional models, where observed covariates are also
considered to affect inefficiency. In these cases all indicator variables in Equation (3.2)
are equal to 1. This allows us to analyze the efficacy of the parameter τi to capture
information from omitted covariates and to identify those which are relevant. Model
B considers the variables Gini and GDP in addition to the random parameter. These
two variables capture the most relevant aspects of inequality and income distinguishing
countries and were also found to be the most inefficiency related by Greene (2004) after
performing a frequentist based test. Finally, we estimate Model C where τi is estimated
along with all the covariates in zi.
Results are presented in Table 3.1. In general, we observe that all model comparison
criteria improve compared to models I and II when the unobserved component is included
in the inefficiency distribution. This implies that the random component captures part
of the heterogeneity identified by covariates in zi and therefore, it is a good alternative
when no observed heterogeneity variables are available.
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Table 3.1: Posterior mean and S.D. of the parameter distributions for unobserved hetero-
geneity models
Parameter Model A Model B Model C
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Frontier
α 3.846 0.517 3.753 0.504 3.732 0.498
β1 0.026 0.012 0.024 0.010 0.025 0.010
β2 0.212 0.085 0.372 0.137 0.413 0.132
β3 -0.036 0.013 -0.085 0.020 -0.099 0.026
β4 -0.005 0.003 -0.003 0.002 -0.008 0.003
β5 -0.002 0.001 -0.005 0.002 -0.006 0.003
Inefficiency
γ1(Gini) 1.950 0.542 1.261 0.469
γ2(lnGDP ) -0.542 0.106 -0.363 0.093
γ3(GEff) -0.070 0.021
γ4(V oice) 0.024 0.011
γ5(OECD) -0.746 0.321
γ6(lnPubfin) 0.083 0.022
τ -4.617 0.953 -0.803 0.197 -0.745 0.175
σ−2τ 1.039 0.428 2.192 0.806 1.976 0.760
µ -1.655 0.294 -1.486 0.351 -0.392 0.147
σ2u 0.079 0.020 0.099 0.021 0.057 0.013
Pred.eff. 0.833 0.090 0.877 0.099 0.915 0.071
DIC3 -2957.820 -3017.610 -3085.190
LPS -146.717 -152.950 -180.427
MSE 0.104 0.101 0.088
A second finding is that when τi is included simultaneously with observed variables in
the inefficiency distribution, this parameter can be used as an indicator of the suitability
of the observed covariates to capture inefficiency heterogeneity. In fact, it is observed
that Model B, which includes only two covariates in zi besides the random parameter,
improves in terms of fit and predictive performance in comparison to Model A but it is
not as good as Model V that include six covariates. This would mean thatGini andGDP
are relevant heterogeneity variables but they are not able to capture all the inefficiency
heterogeneity. On the other hand, Model C that includes all observed covariates plus
the parameter τi performs a little worse than Model V (see model comparison criteria in
tables I and IV). This would imply that the six covariates in zi capture all the relevant
inefficiency heterogeneity.
These conclusions are the same when we compare the posterior predictive efficiencies
of models including the unobserved component to those of models I and V (see Figure
3.1). It can be seen that the predictive efficiency distribution becomes less disperse
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Figure 3.1: Kernel densities of posterior efficiency distributions
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
 
 
Model I
Model A
Model B
Model C
Model V
to the extent inefficiency heterogeneity is better identified by the random parameter,
observed covariates or a combination of both. Also, it is observed that the predictive
efficiency distribution of Model C is very close to that of Model V, which suggests that
the parameter τi is irrelevant when the observed covariates are able to capture most of
the inefficiency heterogeneity.
3.1.2.2 The airlines data set
Since in Chapter 2, the observed covariates were found to be related to frontier het-
erogeneity, our benchmark here is Model II. However, we assume that it may still exist
inefficiency heterogeneity in the sector related to other factors not considered by vari-
ables in zit. Therefore, we evaluate the inclusion of a time-varying random parameter
in the distribution of the inefficiency when it is specified in the location, scale, or both
parameters of the one-sided error distribution. The general model for this application
considering unobserved inefficiency heterogeneity is:
lnCit = α+ β1 lnPmit + β2 lnPfit + β3 lnPlit + β4 lnPeit +
β5 ln(yit) + β6
1
2 ln
2(yit) + β7t+ β8t
2 + zitδ + vit + uit
vit ∼ N(0, σ2v)
uit ∼ N+(µ · exp(τitI1), σ2u · (exp(τitI2))2).
(3.3)
In contrast to the WHO application, here the random parameter τit is allowed to
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vary over time and is modeled without any observed covariates in the inefficiency. We
estimate there different models derived from (3.3). Model A includes τit only in the
location parameter of the inefficiency distribution and then the indicator I2 = 0; Model
B includes it only in the scale parameter (I1 = 0); and Model C includes it in both the
location and the scale parameters of the inefficiency distribution (I1 = I2 = 1).
Results for the three estimated models are presented in Table 3.2. It can be ob-
served that all three models improve their fit and predictive performance in comparison
to Model II. In particular, models A and C exhibit the best values for the three cri-
teria. However, when the random parameter is included in the scale parameter of the
inefficiency distribution (models B and C), a decrease in the dispersion of the predictive
efficiency distribution is observed.
Table 3.2: Posterior mean and S.D. of the parameter distributions for unobserved hetero-
geneity models
Parameter Model A Model B Model C
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Frontier
α 1.666 0.201 0.470 0.125 2.914 0.345
β1(lnPm) 0.436 0.227 0.303 0.162 0.153 0.080
β2(lnPf) 0.194 0.063 0.197 0.061 0.237 0.069
β3(lnPl) 0.155 0.048 0.236 0.076 0.330 0.081
β4(lnPe) 0.147 0.054 0.154 0.059 0.204 0.062
β5(ln y) 0.871 0.301 0.878 0.283 0.976 0.265
β6(
1
2 ln
2 y) 0.045 0.019 0.026 0.013 0.043 0.019
β7(t) -0.032 0.010 -0.013 0.004 -0.027 0.012
β8(t
2) 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.000
δ1(Load) -1.096 0.262 -1.142 0.254 -0.856 0.197
δ2(lnStage) -0.247 0.054 -0.235 0.049 -0.205 0.049
δ3(lnPoints) 0.106 0.048 0.071 0.030 0.135 0.057
Inefficiency
τ -3.491 0.924 -4.221 0.931 -3.514 0.806
σ−2τ 1.729 0.562 0.895 0.391 1.255 0.389
µ 0.611 0.167 0.343 0.095 0.321 0.082
σ2u 0.105 0.031 0.052 0.016 0.076 0.017
Pred.eff. 0.774 0.089 0.835 0.019 0.797 0.047
DIC3 -971.711 -938.855 -984.369
LPS -40.528 -36.780 -39.647
MSE 0.009 0.009 0.009
The effects on the individual posterior efficiencies using the random parameter are
similar to those found in the previous application using observed covariates. That is,
when τit is considered in the location parameter of the one-sided error distribution, the
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posterior efficiencies of different airlines are more separated from each other, and when
it is included in the scale parameter, we observe a shrinking effect and consequently
a decrease in the dispersion of the posterior efficiency distributions. Figure 3.2 shows
these effects for some selected airlines. We can observe that Model C, which includes the
random parameter in both parameters of the inefficiency distribution and satisfies the
scaling property, separates and shrinks the individual posterior efficiency distributions
providing both more reliable efficiency scores and rankings.
Figure 3.2: 90% credible intervals of the posterior efficiency distributions for selected
airlines
0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Model AModel II Model B Model C
Preserving the scaling property makes it possible to decompose inefficiency for Model
C. In this case, uit = u
∗
it · exp(τit) where u∗it ∼ N+(µ, σ2u). Table 3.3 exhibits the
decomposition in terms of efficiency for the airlines plotted above. The difference between
the base and total efficiency allows us to distinguish the way unobserved firm effects are
handled by airlines managers. For instance, airline 12 presents lower base efficiency but
higher total efficiency than airline 17, suggesting that the former handles their specific
characteristics better.
Finally, using the results of Model C, in Figure 3.3 we plot the probabilities of being
the most efficient airline in the sample period for some selected firms. This can be
easy calculated in the Bayesian context from the posterior individual distributions of
efficiencies and might be very useful in empirical studies. We observe that for the last
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Table 3.3: Posterior mean of base and total efficiency for selected airlines
Airline ID Base efficiency Total efficiency
1 0.4837 0.8245
2 0.3052 0.7669
5 0.4017 0.7614
8 0.6238 0.8092
12 0.3571 0.8970
17 0.5466 0.7194
18 0.5824 0.8352
19 0.3920 0.7317
10 years of the sample period, airline 8 is the most likely to be the benchmark firm.
Also, it is possible to see improvements and declines in the airlines’ performance along
time. For instance, airline 11 presents a high relative improvement of its performance
especially in the last 3 years, while airline 16 starts being the most likely benchmark
firm and decreases very fast its probability up to being zero in year 9.
Figure 3.3: Probability of being the most efficient firm in the sample period
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Summing up, the performance indicators suggest that firm characteristics such as
the distance between destinations, the capacity offered, and the size of the network
differentiate the airlines in terms of the cost frontier they face. However, there is still
latent inefficiency heterogeneity related to unobserved factors. This is captured through
a time varying random parameter that improves fit and predictive performance. The way
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this parameter is included in the inefficiency has different effects in terms of separating
and shrinking the individual posterior efficiency distributions. The most desirable effects
are obtained when the unobserved heterogeneity component is included both in the
location and scale parameters of the inefficiency distribution in models that satisfy the
scaling property.
3.2 A stochastic frontier model with random inefficiency
coefficients∗
Unobserved heterogeneity sources in the inefficiency may also be associated to differences
in the way observed covariates affect the inefficiency. That is, covariates modeled in the
inefficiency distribution may produce different effects on the inefficiency depending on
some unobserved firm-specific characteristics.
This has been previously studied for unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity in the
technology. Tsionas (2002) proposed, in the Bayesian context, a model with random co-
efficients in the frontier, which captures different effects of technology factors for every
firm. That model is the one in (1.23) described in Chapter 1. In this Section, this speci-
fication is extended by including random coefficients in the covariates of the inefficiency
distribution rather than in the frontier.
The proposed stochastic frontier model assuming an exponential distribution for the
one-sided error term is the following:
yit = xitβ − uit + vit
vit ∼ N(0, σ2v)
uit ∼ Exp(λit)
λit = exp
((
γ
γ∗i
)′(
zit 0
0 z∗it
))
,
(3.4)
where yit represents the output for firm i at time t, xit is a row vector that contains
the input quantities, β is a vector of parameters, vit is an idiosyncratic error assumed
to follow a normal distribution, and uit is the inefficiency component. The inefficiency
is assumed to follow an exponential distribution with a firm specific and time-varying
parameter λit, which depends on a vector including two sets of parameters and a matrix
∗Much of the work in this section is joint with Miguel Sarmiento from the Colombian central bank
(see Sarmiento and Gala´n, 2014)
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that includes two types of heterogeneity variables. γ is a vector of parameters which
are common to all firms, including the constant; and, γ∗i is a vector of firm-specific
parameters intended to capture differences in the effects of covariates across firms on
the inefficiency. Therefore, zit is a vector of heterogeneity variables whose effects are
assumed to be constant across firms, and z∗it contains a set of heterogeneity variables
with firm-specific effects. In the case of assessing cost efficiency, yit would represent costs
and the sign of the inefficiency component is reversed.
The novel specification with random coefficients in the parameter of the inefficiency
distribution is flexible in the sense that some covariates can be associated to firm specific
coefficients while other heterogeneity variables may be modeled with fixed coefficients.
In particular, the random specification for the inefficiency coefficients is intended to
capture differences in the way some specific characteristics affect efficiency of different
types of firms. Therefore, the model is able to identify, not only the effects of observed
covariates in the inefficiency, but also the type of firms that are more affected by each
of these characteristics.
3.2.1 Bayesian inference
We assume proper but relatively disperse prior distributions throughout. In particular,
the distributions assumed for the parameters in the frontier are: β ∼ N(0,Σβ) where
Σ−1β is a precision diagonal matrix with priors set to 0.001 for all coefficients. Finally,
the variance of the idiosyncratic error term is inverse gamma, that is equivalent to σ−2v ∼
G(aσ−2v , bσ−2v ) with priors set to 0.01 for the shape and rate parameters, respectively.
Regarding the inefficiency component, its distribution is assumed to be exponential:
uit|γ,γ∗, zit, z∗it ∼ Exp(exp(zitγ + z∗itγ∗i )). The prior distribution of the vector of
common parameters γ is chosen to be centered in a given prior mean efficiency value
r∗ following the procedure in Griffin and Steel (2007) i.e. exp(γ) ∼ Exp(− ln r∗). For
the firm-specific inefficiency heterogeneity coefficients, a hierarchical structure is defined,
where: exp(γ∗i ) ∼ Exp(γ∗), and γ∗ ∼ Exp(− ln r∗). Therefore, the firm-specific param-
eters are centered a priori in a common parameter, which at its turn, is centered in a
given prior mean efficiency value. In this particular application, r∗ is set at 0.65, follow-
ing other Bayesian SFA studies in banking (see Marzec and Osiewalski, 2001; Tabak and
Tecles, 2010). Sensitivity analysis is performed to the use of a normal prior distribution
for the inefficiency parameters such that: γ is N(0,Σγ) with priors for the diagonal
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precision matrix Σ−1γ equal to 0.1 for all the coefficients. In this case, the hierarchical
structure used for the firm-specific parameters is γ∗i ∼ N(γ∗,Σγ∗) where γ∗ is defined
in the same way that γ.
The implementation is carried out using the WinBUGS package. The MCMC al-
gorithm involves 50,000 iterations where the first 10,000 are discarded and a thinning
equal to 4 is used to remove autocorrelations. Therefore, 10,000 iterations are used for
the posterior inference. We assess the fit and predictive performance of the different
models using a version of the DIC3 and the LPS as earlier.
3.2.2 Application to bank risk-taking in the Colombian banking sector
After the global financial crisis, understanding bank risk taking has gained more atten-
tion among researchers and practitioners because of the regulatory framework proposed
in Basel III, which limit and monitor bank risk taking by imposing higher capital re-
quirements and more liquid assets holdings in their portfolios (BIS, 2010).2 These higher
requirements would reduce bank risk exposure but also their profitability in the short
run. In the case of emerging economies, there is a growing interest on the effects of
the increasing risk appetite exhibited recently by financial institutions, which is mainly
associated to higher capital inflows from advanced economies, where financial fragility
coexists with prolonged lower interest rates, especially in the Euro area (Ahmed and
Zlate, 2013; Bruno and Song, 2013). As a result, the analysis of bank efficiency incorpo-
rating bank risk exposure constitute a key element to identify bank performance under
risk taking environment which may contribute to the proper design of macroprudential
policies to enhance financial stability.
Modern banking theory highlights that risk taking is an inherent element of banking
production which should be properly modeled into the efficiency measurement (Hughes
et al., 2001). Recent studies have shown that failing to account for risk taking leads to
biased estimations of bank efficiency as well as mislead estimates of scale economies and
2The Basel III framework promotes higher and better-quality capital, risk coverage and leverage
ratios to increase resilience in periods of stress. Likewise, states the introduction of a Liquidity Coverage
Ratio for short term (30 days) and a Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) for long-term (one year), which
will be implemented gradually during the 2015-2018 period according with the evolution of the economic
activity in each member country. The recent initiatives by the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB),
the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the Financial Stability Board
(FSB) are also aligned to limit the risk-taking behavior and contagion in financial market through micro
and macro-prudential policies.
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cost elasticities (Hughes and Mester, 2013; Koetter, 2008; Malikov et al., 2013). However,
studies that incorporate bank risk taking in efficiency measurements have traditionally
included only proxies of credit risk exposure (i.e. non-performing loans or loan losses
provisions), omitting other important risks faced by banks (e.g. liquidity, market and
capital exposures).
Credit risk proxies are usually included into costs and profit functions as a measure
of output quality that directly affects the technology (Hughes and Mester, 1998; Mester,
1996) or as an undesirable output where reductions are desirable (see applications in
Assaf et al., 2013; Park and Weber, 2006; Zago and Dongili, 2011). Under that approach,
risk taking is assumed as an exogenous component of the banking production process.
This contrasts with recent empirical literature that illustrates how most of the bank
inefficiency corresponds to poor management (or riskier strategies), which is reflected in
a higher ex-post credit risk, i.e. elevated share of NPLs (Lepetit et al., 2008).
When risk taking is modeled as endogenous, we can find two approaches in the
literature: Firstly, structural models of banking production that account for managerial-
risk preferences and endogenous risk taking. In these models, bank performance is
measured in the risk-return space that incorporates the trade-off between expected profit
and risk.3 Secondly, SFA models in which firm-specific characteristics are modeled as
elements that affect the inefficiency distribution instead of the production technology.
This framework avoids additional assumptions on firms behavior and their impact on
the production technology. Recently, Radic´ et al. (2012) applied this approach to assess
cost and profit efficiency of a sample of G-7 investment banks. This paper included
a set of measures of risk exposure and other firm-specific and macro-related factors as
environmental variables and found that those variables affect the inefficiency distribution
rather than the production technology. Moreover, it was observed that omitting risk
taking from the efficiency estimation leads to underestimate profit efficiency, and that
liquidity and capital are the most relevant risk exposures explaining efficiency. Overall,
these findings suggest that bank risk taking can be modeled as an endogenous bank
characteristic without imposing additional assumptions on their behavior or technology.
Recent literature recognizes that risk exposure may also affect banks with different
characteristics in different ways. Foreign banks may deal better with risk exposure given
3These models were developed by Hughes et al. (1996, 2001) and have been recently applied by
Koetter (2008).
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cheaper access to funding sources or more diversification (see Chen and Liao, 2011).
Similar effects could be faced by large institutions or those operating in different markets,
mainly associated to scale economies (Bos and Kool, 2006; Wheelock and Wilson, 2012).
In addition, there is evidence supporting the fact that high-leveraged institutions (or
lower capitalized) tend to take on more risk when they can adjust their capital structures
and also in presence of market power (Borio and Zhu, 2012; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2011).
Banks with a higher risk propensity may choose to produce less fixed interest bearing
loans and engage more in securities or derivatives trading, increasing their market risk
exposure. Likewise, lower capitalized banks may increase their risk of insolvency due to
credit losses or sudden security price deterioration (Mester, 2008). Risky banks tend to
attract more deposits because bank creditors demand higher interest rate as a way to
exert market discipline (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004). Therefore, it is relevant
not only to account for risk exposure measures as possible inefficiency drivers, but also
to recognize differences in the way risk exposure may affect different banks.
In this context, the proposed SFA model with random inefficiency coefficients allows
us to identify the role of bank risk-taking on driving inefficiency and different effects of
risk taking on banks involved in merges and acquisitions (M&A) and banks with different
size and affiliation. We account for an integral group of risk exposure covariates (i.e.
risks of credit, liquidity, capital, and market), and bank characteristics related to size
and affiliation (i.e. domestic or foreign-owned bank). By comparing models with fixed
and random coefficients we identify the impact that risk taking has on cost and profit
efficiency of each bank depending on their specific characteristics. To the best of our
knowledge, this proposal constitutes the first SFA model that incorporates endogenous
risk taking within a Bayesian framework and that accounts for individual effects of
covariates in the inefficiency.
3.2.2.1 Evidence from the Colombian banking sector
The efficiency of the Colombian banking sector has been extensively studied because
of: i) the increase on M&A in the banking industry as a result of the growing affluence
of capital flows from advanced and other emerging economies; and ii) for regulatory
objectives trying to identify micro and macro prudential measures to reduce bank default
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episodes and to mitigate contagion among financial institutions.4
Recent studies have applied the standard stochastic frontier approach using alter-
natively Cobb-Douglas or translog functions to characterize the technology and find
evidence of low cost efficiency during the 90s (Clavijo et al., 2006; Estrada and Oso-
rio, 2004). The most recent studies for the Colombian banking sector find a general
improvement of both technical and cost efficiency along with a greater heterogeneity
among banks. Cepeda et al. (2013) use a non-parametric frontier model to evaluate the
efficiency of Colombian banks for the period 2000-2009. They found that technical effi-
ciency gradually improved during the decade up to the global financial crisis of 2008-09,
when all estimated measures of efficiency decreased and a negative productivity change
was found. Also, a high heterogeneity in efficiency scores was observed among banks
irrespective of their size and affiliation, and M&A were found to have a significant and
positive impact on bank efficiency for merged or acquired banks.
For the same period, Gala´n et al. (2014c) estimated input-oriented technical efficiency
using a dynamic Bayesian SFA model. It was found that foreign ownership has positive
and persistent effects on efficiency, while the effects of size are positive but rapidly
adjusted. High inefficiency persistence in Colombian banks with important differences
between institutions were also identified. In particular, merged banks were found to
exhibit low costs of adjustment that allow them to recover rapidly the efficiency losses
derived from merging processes.
Moreno and Estrada (2013) studied the role of market power in explaining efficiency
gains in Colombian banks during the 2004-2012 period. By using alternative SFA and
nonparametric models, it was found that there is a positive relationship between market
power and efficiency, which is explained by the product differentiation that allows banks
to gain in efficiency while they do not charge excessive credit prices.
However, none of these studies have yet incorporated the role of bank-risk-taking
on the banking production to estimate efficiency. As mentioned in the previous section
risk taking plays a major role in explaining the inefficiency of banks and it should be
properly accounted for in efficiency estimations.
4In particular, several bank regulatory measures were adopted by the end of nineties as a result of
the Mexican and Asian crisis that also affected the Colombian banking sector (see Clavijo et al., 2006,
for a detailed review on the evolution of M&A, regulation and performance of the Colombian banking
industry during the regional and local financial crises).
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3.2.3 Data and empirical model
We employ annual data from 31 commercial banks for the period 2002-2012. This is an
unbalanced panel data set from the local central bank (Banco de la Repu´blica) and the
financial supervisory agency (Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia). We follow the
financial intermediation approach in which banks employ deposits, labor and physical
capital to produce loans, securities investments and other financial services (Berger,
2007).5 We consider as input prices: the price of deposits (p1), which is the ratio of
interest expenses divided by total deposits; the price of labor (p2), which is personnel
expenses divided by the total number of employees, and the price of physical capital
(p3), which is calculated as the ratio of operating expenses (i.e. non-interest reduced by
personnel) to total fixed assets. As outputs we consider: loans (y1) including consumer,
commercial, mortgage, and microcredit; securities (y2), which includes public and private
bonds holdings, and other securities investments; and off-balance-sheet (OBS) activities
(y3) measured as the ratio of non-interest income over total income. Non-interest income
includes securitization, brokerage services, and management of financial assets for clients
which represent an important source of income for Colombian banks.6 Total costs are
considered as the sum of interest and non-interest costs and total profit as the earned
net profit.
We define a set of bank-specific characteristics including: size (z1), measured as
the level of total assets; and foreign ownership (z2), which is a binary variable taking
the value of 1 if more than 50% of bank shares are foreign owned, and 0 otherwise.
As aforementioned, these effects have been found to be relevant inefficiency drivers in
previous studies.
Additionally, we include several specific measures of credit, liquidity, capital and
market risk according to recent literature, the Colombian financial regulation and the
Basel III standards. Credit risk (z∗1) is measured as risky loans over total loans. We use
risky loans instead of NPLs because it is a measure of ex-ante credit risk assumed by
banks when they assign loans, which is based on internal loan ratings associated to their
5Hughes and Mester (1993) provide evidence that confirm that deposits should be treated as inputs
(see Sealey and Lindley, 1977, for a discussion on the intermediation approach).
6In a recent study, Tabak and Tecles (2010) find that omitting OBS as an output over (under)
estimate cost (profit) efficiency results.
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probability of default.7 In addition, the regulation establishes that loan losses provisions
are required for each loan according with its rating. Thus, higher credit risk exposure
is associated to more provisions for potential loan losses. As we mentioned before, the
use of NPLs in the estimation of bank efficiency may lead to biased estimates of bank
technology (Malikov et al, 2013). Liquidity (z∗2) is measured as liquid assets over total
assets.8 Higher liquid assets prevent banks from losses due to rapid price deterioration
and also for the maturity mismatch. Capital risk exposure (z∗3) is measured as capital
equity over total assets. Capital risk is considered as a proxy for regulatory conditions
that may affect bank inefficiency. Lower capitalization is usually associated to higher
inefficiency.9 Finally, market risk exposure (z∗4) is measured as securities investments
over total assets. Operating costs associated to securities investments are generally lower
that those involved in monitoring and assessing of loans which may induce less efficient
banks to engage on more securities investments. However, higher holdings of securities
by banks also entail higher market risk exposure.
Table 3.4 exhibits the summary statistics of the main variables described above,
where all monetary values are expressed in thousands of U.S. dollars at constant prices
of year 2012.
Table 3.4: Summary statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Total loans 3,342,012 4,206,436 11,553 28,267,020
Securities 1,265,349 1,339,794 563 6,461,458
OBS 0.0354 0.0299 0.0266 0.0587
Price of deposits 0.0248 0.0121 0.0009 0.0923
Price of labour 36.44 22.30 3.13 142.03
Price of capital 1.92 2.66 0.29 17.30
Total assets 5,503,680 6,425,746 39,699 41,786,469
Credit risk exposure 0.0988 0.0667 0.0019 0.3839
Liquidity risk exposure 0.2296 0.0667 0.0019 0.3839
Capital risk exposure 0.1211 0.0757 0.0448 0.7854
Market risk exposure 0.2381 0.1368 0.0013 0.7478
Total cost 1,132,776 1,402,621 15,673 7,722,227
Total profit 76,927 377,974 - 784,642 2,809,771
Source: Colombian central bank and financial supervisory agency.
7This measure of ex-ante credit risk has been used in the literature to identify bank risk-taking in
the credit market (Ioannidou and Penas, 2010).
8Liquid assets include cash holdings, negotiable and available to sell public and private debt instru-
ments and pledged collateral in repurchase agreement operations.
9We use both Tier I and Tier II capital requirements as measure of capital equity.
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We evaluate cost and profit efficiency for the Colombian banking sector. Thus, we
use cost and profit functions for the frontier specification in (3.4), and we choose to
represent them with translog multi-product functions. The estimated model is:
ln cit = β0 +
∑3
m=1 βm ln ymit +
∑2
r=1 δr ln prit +
1
2
∑3
m=1
∑3
n=1 βmn ln ymit ln ynit
+12
∑2
r=1
∑2
s=1 δrs ln prit ln psit +
∑3
m=1
∑2
r=1 ηmr ln ymit ln prit + κ1 t
+12 κ2 t
2 +
∑3
m=1 φmt ln ymit +
∑2
r=1 ϕrt ln prit +
∑4
j=1 ωjz
∗
jit
+ vit + uit
vit ∼ N(0, σ2v)
uit ∼ exp(λit)
λit = exp(γ0 +
∑2
h=1 γhzhit +
∑4
j=1 γ
∗
ji
z∗jit),
(3.5)
where cit is the total cost or the total profit, y are outputs, p are input prices and t
is a time trend in order to account for technological change. Linear homogeneity of
the cost function is achieved by normalizing total costs and input prices by the price of
capital (p3). We include two types of heterogeneity variables: i) those related to size (z1)
and foreign ownership (z2), which are modeled in the inefficiency distribution and have
common effects to all banks; and, ii) those capturing banks risk-exposure (z∗1 , z∗2 , z∗3 , z∗4),
which may be included either in the frontier or in the inefficiency. In the latter case, they
are able to be modeled either with common or firm-specific effects on banks inefficiency.
In order to overcome the problem of calculations of logarithms of negative profits, we
correct profit values by a factor corresponding to the absolute value of the lowest profit
plus one (see Tecles and Tabak, 2010). Symmetry of the cross-effects is accomplished by
imposing βmn = βnm, δrs = δsr.
3.2.4 Results
From the general model in (3.5) we estimate four models intended to evaluate cost
efficiency (C1 to C4) and four models assessing profit efficiency (P1 to P4). Mod-
els C1 and P1 do not include any risk-exposure variable, so ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4 = 0 and
γ∗1i, γ
∗
2i, γ
∗
3i, γ
∗
4i = 0. Models C2 and P2 include the risk-exposure variables only in the
frontier and then γ∗1i, γ
∗
2i, γ
∗
3i, γ
∗
4i = 0. Models C3 and P3 include the risk covariates only
in the inefficiency but restrict them to have a common effect on the inefficiency of all
banks; thus, ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4 = 0 and γ
∗
1i, γ
∗
2i, γ
∗
3i, γ
∗
4i = γ
∗
1 , γ
∗
2 , γ
∗
3 , γ
∗
4 . Finally, our proposed
specification to model random inefficiency coefficients is estimated in models C4 and P4
(ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4 = 0). This allows the effects of risk exposure to be different among banks.
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Table 3.5: Posterior mean and standard deviation of parameter distributions in cost models
Parameter Model C1 Model C2 Model C3 Model C4
No risk Risk in frontier Risk in inefficiency Random coefficients
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
β0 5.6560 0.6469 6.1830 0.5926 5.8790 0.5956 5.3440 0.7086
β1 0.0533 0.0398 0.1317 0.0391 0.0296 0.0185 0.0873 0.0593
β2 0.0927 0.0652 0.0995 0.0719 0.0792 0.0677 0.0401 0.0316
β3 0.0475 0.0349 0.0315 0.0214 0.0516 0.0329 0.0571 0.0425
β11 0.0712 0.0275 0.1238 0.0257 0.0780 0.0304 0.0873 0.0415
β12 0.0186 0.0275 -0.0752 0.0296 0.0119 0.0300 0.0022 0.0383
β13 -0.0048 0.0030 -0.0014 0.0027 -0.0044 0.0031 -0.0029 0.0033
β22 0.0116 0.0241 0.1217 0.0322 0.0157 0.0255 0.0033 0.0369
β23 0.0018 0.0020 -0.0014 0.0019 0.0015 0.0020 0.0012 0.0021
β33 0.0011 0.0010 0.0005 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0014 0.0009
δ1 0.1544 0.1243 0.2440 0.1524 0.1484 0.1025 0.0959 0.0812
δ2 0.1802 0.1620 0.1125 0.0704 0.1726 0.1272 0.1515 0.1315
δ11 0.2195 0.0596 0.1356 0.0689 0.1866 0.0707 0.0397 0.0977
δ12 -0.2212 0.0430 -0.1651 0.0434 -0.2062 0.0453 -0.1467 0.0580
δ22 0.2010 0.0518 0.1204 0.0519 0.1857 0.0528 0.1831 0.0523
η11 0.1508 0.0257 0.1401 0.0253 0.1492 0.0270 0.1623 0.0379
η12 -0.0298 0.0234 -0.0216 0.0205 -0.0289 0.0239 -0.0354 0.0310
η21 -0.0175 0.0252 -0.0473 0.0251 -0.0283 0.0311 -0.0979 0.0365
η22 -0.0836 0.0235 -0.0521 0.0220 -0.0752 0.0256 -0.0439 0.0292
η31 0.0012 0.0039 0.0007 0.0032 0.0017 0.0037 0.0033 0.0038
η32 0.0035 0.0036 0.0048 0.0031 0.0023 0.0038 -0.0016 0.0041
κ1 -0.3458 0.1273 -0.3620 0.1074 -0.3589 0.1279 -0.3092 0.1086
κ2 0.0022 0.0046 -0.0007 0.0045 0.0022 0.0046 0.0051 0.0038
φ1 0.0364 0.0114 0.0355 0.0099 0.0373 0.0115 0.0364 0.0105
φ2 -0.0344 0.0085 -0.0300 0.0077 -0.0349 0.0085 -0.0359 0.0075
φ3 0.0002 0.0008 0.0000 0.0007 0.0001 0.0008 -0.0006 0.0007
ϕ1 -0.0401 0.0141 -0.0424 0.0131 -0.0417 0.0142 -0.0388 0.0133
ϕ2 0.0167 0.0122 0.0108 0.0106 0.0166 0.0120 0.0099 0.0106
ω1 (credit) 0.1344 0.3519
ω2 (liquidity) -0.1887 0.2062
ω3 (capital) 1.7340 1.0197
ω4 (market) -2.0900 1.1383
γ0 1.0350 0.4927 0.5318 0.2616 0.8946 0.7756 1.0090 0.6995
γ1(ln assets) -0.1981 0.0531 -0.1731 0.0574 -0.2318 0.0693 -0.1595 0.0873
γ2 (foreign) -0.8144 0.3824 -1.1700 0.5051 -0.6873 0.2202 -0.1918 0.0856
γ∗1 (credit) 0.2002 1.0850 0.3162 0.7598
γ∗2 (liquidity) 0.3692 0.6539 -1.9667 1.5432
γ∗3 (capital) 1.5380 0.6128 2.9476 0.9247
γ∗4 (market) 0.0432 1.0600 -0.0168 1.1441
Posterior eff. 0.8934 0.0653 0.9092 0.0570 0.7923 0.1466 0.7102 0.2251
DIC3 2982.76 2916.44 2497.59 2007.75
LPS -9.62 -29.34 -65.19 -90.67
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Table 3.6: Posterior mean and s.d. of parameter distributions in profit models
Parameter Model P1 Model P2 Model P3 Model P4
No risk Risk in frontier Risk in inefficiency Random coefficients
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
β0 9.7890 7.1260 9.8730 7.3150 3.6980 9.0530 7.2050 6.0130
β1 3.0250 1.1470 3.4950 1.0970 4.0310 1.3970 2.9140 0.9397
β2 -3.3910 0.9323 -4.1220 0.8941 -4.5860 1.0290 -3.5380 0.6589
β3 -0.1987 0.1027 -0.2175 0.1001 -0.2612 0.1112 -0.2122 0.0797
β11 -0.4570 0.1279 -0.5658 0.1180 -0.5109 0.1588 -0.3992 0.1253
β12 0.2672 0.0993 0.3844 0.0952 0.3070 0.1290 0.2313 0.1010
β13 0.0173 0.0076 0.0176 0.0078 0.0152 0.0073 0.0128 0.0062
β22 0.0104 0.0686 -0.0778 0.0718 0.0288 0.0889 0.0477 0.0806
β23 -0.0034 0.0072 -0.0050 0.0049 -0.0011 0.0067 0.0011 0.0039
β33 0.0006 0.0020 0.0017 0.0020 0.0011 0.0017 -0.0014 0.0013
δ1 -1.6780 1.8830 -2.9660 1.6890 -4.3810 2.0620 -3.3070 1.2900
δ2 0.8204 1.2470 1.6330 1.1820 2.2720 1.2190 1.6450 0.7651
δ11 0.1789 0.1828 0.1024 0.1445 -0.0292 0.1694 -0.0434 0.1290
δ12 -0.0006 0.1784 0.0439 0.1391 0.0949 0.1584 0.0831 0.0942
δ22 -0.0767 0.1830 -0.1739 0.1760 -0.1500 0.1826 -0.2043 0.1071
η11 0.1704 0.1354 0.2448 0.1256 0.3185 0.1649 0.2352 0.0979
η12 0.1229 0.0991 0.0634 0.0926 0.0364 0.1116 0.1109 0.0725
η21 0.0051 0.0684 -0.0042 0.0538 -0.0443 0.0694 -0.0298 0.0461
η22 -0.1236 0.0698 -0.0946 0.0602 -0.0905 0.0717 -0.1137 0.0465
η31 -0.0087 0.0113 -0.0118 0.0113 -0.0157 0.0113 -0.0091 0.0071
η32 -0.0055 0.0090 0.0006 0.0099 0.0040 0.0106 -0.0033 0.0066
κ1 -0.3355 0.3613 -0.3630 0.2986 -0.5431 0.3371 -0.5106 0.2075
κ2 0.0066 0.0109 0.0031 0.0090 -0.0052 0.0091 -0.0010 0.0065
φ1 0.0658 0.0282 0.0587 0.0267 0.0825 0.0289 0.0776 0.0205
φ2 -0.0225 0.0185 -0.0163 0.0167 -0.0224 0.0177 -0.0304 0.0129
φ3 -0.0031 0.0018 -0.0027 0.0017 -0.0025 0.0018 -0.0018 0.0010
ϕ1 0.0486 0.0381 0.0335 0.0323 0.0436 0.0327 0.0241 0.0201
ϕ2 -0.0538 0.0422 -0.0466 0.0310 -0.0523 0.0339 -0.0436 0.0185
ω1 (credit) -0.7570 0.6517
ω2 (liquidity) -1.1490 0.6117
ω3 (capital) -0.4682 0.7637
ω4 (market) 0.1237 0.9031
γ0 -0.9668 0.4019 -1.4530 0.6724 -1.2240 1.1640 -1.4140 1.2740
γ1(ln assets) 0.0556 0.0429 0.0826 0.0527 0.0721 0.0593 0.1407 0.0848
γ2 (foreign) 1.0120 0.1713 1.1330 0.1966 1.0410 0.2180 1.0180 0.4408
γ∗1 (credit) -3.2610 1.2480 -1.9774 0.6750
γ∗2 (liquidity) 0.2454 0.5587 -1.0640 1.2801
γ∗3 (capital) 1.6180 0.5611 2.1365 0.7649
γ∗4 (market) -0.9284 0.3005 -1.9271 0.5147
Posterior eff. 0.5146 0.2638 0.5313 0.2719 0.6067 0.2818 0.6409 0.3281
DIC3 3168.01 3085.10 2466.83 2368.70
LPS -180.01 -282.42 -305.94 -401.56
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Results of the models using both the cost and profit functions derived from (3.5)
are presented in tables 3.5 and 3.6, where posterior means and probability intervals are
showed for all the parameters. We observe that loans, investments and OBS affect cost
positively in all models as well as input prices. In the case of profits, the relationship is
also positive for loans and investments but negative, although not significant, for OBS.
This result for OBS was also found by Tabak and Tecles (2010) in an application to the
Indian banking sector. However, in that work loans and investments are also found to
be not significant when OBS is included in the model in both cost and profit models.
Regarding input prices the coefficients are not relevant in any of the profit models.
We also found decreasing returns to scale in all the models, which may suggest low
margin for more M&A processes in the sector. When scale economies are analyzed by
groups of banks with similar characteristics of size, ownership, and involvement in M&A
we find that while big, domestic and merged institutions operate at decreasing returns to
scale; small, foreign and non-merged banks present increasing returns to scale.10 These
results coincide with those reported in Gala´n et al. (2014c) using an input distance
function, and suggest that M&A processes carried out mainly by domestic and large
institutions may led them to be oversized; while small and foreign banks may still present
some potential scale gains.
We observe that size and foreign ownership are important inefficiency drivers in all the
models. Their effects are negative on cost inefficiency and positive on profit inefficiency.
This suggests that large and foreign banks are more cost efficient but less profit efficient
than their counterparts. Previous studies have also found similar effects. Chen and Liao
(2011) find that foreign banks perform better than local banks because they may deal
better with risk exposure given cheaper access to funding sources or more diversification.
Fries and Taci (2005) find similar results for banks with majority of foreign ownership in
emerging economies. Regarding size, previous studies have found that large institutions
tend to exhibit greater efficiency associated to higher scale economies (see Bos and
Kool, 2006; Glass and McKillop, 2006; Hughes and Mester, 2013; Wheelock and Wilson,
2012).In previous applications to Colombian banks, both foreign and large banks have
been also found to be more cost efficient than local and small banks (see Gala´n et al.,
2014c; Moreno and Estrada, 2013). However, the fact that larger banks are found to
operate on decreasing returns to scale while they exhibit higher cost efficiency may
10Small and large banks are those below and above the median of the total assets, respectively.
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suggest that those banks benefit from lower funding costs. This relatively advantage
over smaller banks has been recently reported in the literature as evidence of the too-
important-to-fail dilemma where larger banks take advantage of their size for funding
at lower cots and for taking on more risk (IMF, 2014; Santos, 2014). Bertay et al.
(2013) analyzed a large sample of banks for 90 countries during the period 1992-2011
and found that banks interest costs tend to decline with systemic size. This result was
found for all banks except for those with very low capitalization level. Interestingly, as
it will be mentioned further, we also find that lower capitalization (i.e. higher capital
risk exposure) is associated with lower cost and profit efficiency.
Regarding the effects of risk exposure, posterior results for risk coefficients and model
comparison indicators lead to similar conclusions in both the cost and profit models.11
That is, models including risk exposure improve from a model omitting these variables;
and, from these models, the one including these covariates in the inefficiency distribution
exhibit better fit and predictive performance. Moreover, no important effects of any risk
measure are observed when they are modeled in the frontier, while some risk exposures
are found to be very relevant when they are included in the inefficiency distribution.
This suggests that risk-taking is an important driver of banks inefficiency. Also, cost
and profit efficiency are found to be over and under estimated, respectively, when risk
exposure measures are not modeled in the inefficiency distribution.
We identify that greater capital risk exposures lead to lower cost and profit efficiency.
There is evidence showing that highly capitalized banks tend to be more efficient than
thinly capitalized banks (Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997). This may be associated to the fact
that lower capitalized banks may increase their risk of insolvency due to credit losses or
sudden security price deterioration.12
Credit and market risks are also found to be key drivers of profit efficiency, providing
evidence in favor of risk-taking in both the credit and securities markets. This may
be related to the skimping hypothesis in Berger and DeYoung (1997), showing that
when banks relax credit standards (or expend lower resources in the analysis of loan
applications) they try to increase their quantity of loans and perform better (more
profitable). This ex-ante credit risk is reflected in a growing proportion of risky loans
11Lower values for DIC3 and LPS indicate better fit and predictive performance.
12See evidence for the U.S banks in Hughes and Mester (2001) and for German banking industry in
Koetter (2008).
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which also tend to increase during periods of lower interest rates. A similar strategy is
adopted by banks in the securities market. Banks with a higher risk appetite may choose
to produce less fixed interest bearing loans and engage more in securities, increasing their
market risk exposure (Mester, 2008).
3.2.5 Analysis of risk random coefficients
Results of DIC3 and LPS favour our proposed inefficiency specification with random
coefficients for risk covariates in both cost and profit models. These results suggest not
only that risk exposure measures are important inefficiency drivers but also that risk has
different effects on cost and profit inefficiency of banks with different characteristics.
Figure 3.4: Average posterior distributions of risk random coefficients by groups of banks
under cost model C4
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Figures 3.4 and 3.5 exhibit the posterior distributions of the four risk exposure bank-
specific coefficients averaged by groups of banks, in models C4 and P4, respectively. The
analysis is performed by groups of banks with different characteristics of size (small vs
large banks), ownership (domestic vs foreign banks), and involvement in M&A processes
(merged vs non-merged banks).13 We observe two main results when heterogeneity in
13Small and large banks are those below and above the median of the total assets, respectively.
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the effects of risk on efficiency is accounted for: firstly, some groups of banks are more
affected than others at the same risk exposure levels; and secondly, some types of risk
become relevant as inefficiency drivers for some groups of banks.
Figure 3.5: Average posterior distributions of risk random coefficients by groups of banks
under profit model P4
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In particular, credit risk is identified as a key cost inefficiency driver for foreign and
non-merged banks, in the sense that higher exposures to credit risk reduce cost efficiency
of these types of banks. Likewise, liquidity exposure is only identified as having relevant
negative effects on cost inefficiency of foreign banks. Moreover, the effect on domestic
banks is almost nonexistent. This result indicates that holding less liquid assets is more
costly for foreign banks which could be associated to their incentives to engage on more
risk taking. Regarding capital risk exposures, the positive effects on cost inefficiency
are similar between types of banks. However, increasing capital in the same proportion
is more likely to affect non-merged institutions. Finally, market risk is not relevant for
any of the analyzed types of banks following the conclusion obtained from the fixed
coefficients model.
Regarding bank-specific effects of risk on profit efficiency, it is observed in Figure
3.7 that credit risk affects more large, foreign and merged banks. Thus, these types of
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banks benefit more by assuming the same credit risk exposures than their counterparts.
On the other hand, small, domestic and non-merged banks find more benefits when they
increase market risk in the same proportions. As to liquidity and capital exposures,
no differences are identified between these groups of banks. As in the fixed coefficients
model, liquidity continues to be non-relevant explaining profit efficiency; while increasing
capital has similar positive effects on profit inefficiency for all banks.
3.2.6 Analysis of efficiency
The most important changes in the posterior efficiency estimations are observed when
the model is allowed to estimate bank-specific risk coefficients in the inefficiency distri-
bution. In these cases, the average posterior cost efficiency decreases and profit efficiency
increases with respect to the other models. This suggests that considering heterogene-
ity in the way risk affects inefficiency has important effects on estimations. It is also
observed that in both cost and profit models, the dispersion of the posterior efficiency
presents important increases in the random coefficient models. This suggests that these
models are recognizing differences between banks in terms of their risk exposure and
that these differences have effects on their efficiency estimations.
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 exhibit the average posterior distributions of cost and profit
efficiency, respectively. Posterior efficiency is analyzed by groups of banks and results
from models with fixed and random coefficients of risk covariates are presented.
In general, bank specific characteristics are found to be relevant factors that differ-
entiate banks performance. Large banks exhibit higher costs efficiency levels than small
banks in both fixed and random coefficients models. However, the random coefficient
models show a higher difference among large and small institutions. A possible explana-
tion for the differences between banks with different size may be associated to the fact
that large banks are considered by creditors as too-important-to-fail and then, they are
willing to offer funds at lower costs. In the case of small banks the result can be seen
as opposite in the sense that creditors and depositors may ask for higher return as a
way to exert market discipline (see evidence in Hughes and Mester, 2013; Wheelock and
Wilson, 2012). Regarding affiliation, domestic institutions present higher costs efficiency
than foreign banks but this difference is only important under the random coefficients
model, suggesting that domestic banks benefit from the differences in the way credit
and liquidity risk affect these banks. On the other hand, no important differences are
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Figure 3.6: Average posterior distributions of cost efficiency by groups of banks in Models
C3 and C4
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observed in cost efficiency between merged and non-merged banks. As presented further,
differences are more evident in the evolution of their efficiency.
Regarding profit efficiency, the random coefficients model identifies some differences
in the location and dispersion of the posterior efficiency distributions. The main dif-
ference in profit efficiency is observed between domestic and foreign banks. Domestic
banks almost double profit efficiency of foreign banks in both models.
Finally, focusing on the results of our preferred models with random coefficients, the
evolution of cost and profit efficiency over time is presented in Figure 3.8 by groups of
banks. Small banks have been more volatile in both cost and profit efficiency over time,
while large banks have been more stable and present higher cost efficiency during all the
period. This may suggest that large banks are less sensitive to environmental conditions.
Foreign banks present lower profit efficiency with the lowest value presented in 2008
coinciding with the global financial crisis. This suggest that foreign institutions could
be affected by their operations and investments in international markets. Nevertheless,
in the last years, foreign banks exhibit an increasing trend in profit efficiency and their
scores are very close to those of local banks.
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Figure 3.7: Average posterior distributions of profit efficiency by groups of banks in Models
P3 and P4
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Regarding merged banks, we observe that they present decreases in cost and profit
efficiency in the first years after these processes have been carried out (2005 - 2006).
However, in the last two years they seem to recover part of these losses. This pattern
was also found in Gala´n et al. (2014c) by using an input-oriented technical efficiency
approach under a dynamic SFA model. They find that merged banks are able to recover
very fast their efficiency levels and present higher efficiency than non-merged institutions
due to lower adjustment costs. Cuesta and Orea (2002) had also found a similar pattern
in merged Spanish banks after evaluating output-oriented technical efficiency. Here, we
find that these effects are even more evident when we assess integrally costs and revenues
in a profit efficiency analysis.
3.2.6.1 Empirical implications
Our findings remark the importance of considering different types of bank risk exposure
as cost and profit inefficiency drivers. In particular, large and foreign banks exhibit
higher costs efficiency, which can be associated to scale economies but also to “too-big-
too-fail” considerations that benefit large banks from lower deposit and funding costs.
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Figure 3.8: Evolution of mean posterior cost and profit efficiency by groups of banks in
random coefficient models
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
C
os
t e
ffi
ci
en
cy
Small vs Large Banks
 
 
Small Large
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
P
ro
fit
 e
ffi
ci
en
cy
 
 
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 
 
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 
 
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Domestic vs Foreign Banks
 
 
Domestic Foreign
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Merged vs Non−merged Banks
 
 
Merged Non−merged
Regarding risk effects on inefficiency, we find that greater exposures to credit and market
risks are found to be key drivers of profit efficiency. These findings suggest that banks
may have incentives for risk-taking in both the credit and securities markets. We also
find evidence to support that lower capital risk conduct to higher efficiency in both
costs and profits. Finally, our proposal to include random coefficients in the inefficiency
capture differences in the way risk affects cost and profit efficiency of banks involved in
M&A processes, and banks with different size and type of ownership. We identify large,
foreign and merged banks to benefit more by assuming the same credit risk exposures
than their counterparts; while small, domestic and non-merged banks institutions to
take advantage of assuming higher market risk.
Regulators should take into account not only the impact of requirements in capital
and liquid assets on cost and profit efficiency of banks, but also that these policies
have different, and sometimes opposite, effects on banks with different characteristics.
Moreover, the fact that large and merged banks are found to face lower costs and to have
incentives to take on more risk in credit and securities markets constitute a signal for
regulators to be alert on these institutions. Regulators should also consider alternative
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measures to limit risk taking incentives associated to the fact that large banks exploit
the benefits from being considered as too-important-to-fail. This is even more important
given the recent local expansion of financial conglomerates, which makes more difficult for
regulators to monitor their behavior and may enhance regulatory arbitrage and expose
other market participants (non-banking institutions) to higher risk exposure, boosting
systemic risk. Work is currently in progress on this area as well as on the relationship
between risk taking and the too-important-to-fail dilemma in the interbank market.
3.3 Conclusions
In stochastic frontier analysis, unobserved inefficiency heterogeneity has been little ex-
plored. In this chapter we have put forward the modeling of heterogeneity in a Bayesian
context by proposing two alternative methods to capture unobserved sources of hetero-
geneity in the inefficiency distribution: i) through a random parameter which can be
allowed to be time-varying depending on the application, and ii) through firm-specific
random coefficients of observed covariates.
In the first case, the effects of its inclusion in different parameters of a truncated
normal distributed inefficiency were studied. Our findings suggest that unobserved
inefficiency heterogeneity can be properly captured by a random parameter. Models
including this parameter whether alone or simultaneously with observed covariates im-
prove in terms of fit and predictive performance as long as latent heterogeneity remains
unidentified. In this sense, it can be used to distinguish unobserved heterogeneity from
inefficiency and to validate the suitability of observed covariates to capture it. As ob-
served in Chapter 2, differences in efficiency rankings and mean scores were found when
inefficiency heterogeneity was included in different parameters of a truncated normal
inefficiency distribution. Also for unobserved heterogeneity, we find that its inclusion in
the location parameter of the inefficiency has an effect on separating the firm specific
posterior efficiency distributions from each other; while a shrinking effect on the indi-
vidual posterior efficiency distributions is identified when it affects the scale parameter.
In the case, of the model preserving the scaling property by affecting both the location
and scale parameters, both effects are observed. Therefore, these results are consistent
whether we use observed covariates or our proposal to model unobserved heterogeneity.
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In general, models preserving the scaling property can be used with our proposal to cap-
ture unobserved inefficiency heterogeneity. This allows to decompose inefficiency into a
base component measuring natural managerial skills and other measuring the effect of
latent factors causing unobserved heterogeneity.
Regarding our second proposal, we find that modeling random coefficients for the
inefficiency covariates captures firm-specific effects which remain unidentified under the
regular fixed coefficients models. That is, the random coefficients model identifies inef-
ficiency drivers that result as not relevant in models with fixed coefficients. Moreover,
some of these heterogeneity variables are found to be very important explaining ineffi-
ciency for some firms. Also, the magnitude of the effects of these covariates may change
among firms. These effects remain unobserved if they are not modeled and affect the
posterior efficiency estimations. Overall, this specification distinguishes firms in terms
of the effects of inefficiency drivers and separates unobserved heterogeneity related to
these effects from efficiency.
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3.4 Appendix
A. MCMC results for the unobserved random parameter τ
As described in Section 3.1.1, we identified very slow convergence in the MCMC sim-
ulations for the unobserved random parameter τ . We present in Figures 3.9 and 3.10
plots of the MCMC chains for the hyper-parameter τ at three different starting points
for the models preserving the scaling property (Model A in Section 3.1.2.1 for the WHO
application and Model C in Section 3.1.2.2 for the airlines application). In the empirical
applications we used a starting value equal to zero.
Figure 3.9: MCMC iterations for different initial values of parameter τ - WHO application
- Model A
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The conclusion we got in both cases is that the parameters are identifiable but the
convergence is very slow. In fact, the parameters started to converge around 40,000
iterations and we also found a high autocorrelation of order around 20. Therefore, we
decided to consider a thinning equal to 25, to discard the first 50,000 iterations and run
a total of 550,000 iterations. This implies that we retain data from 20,000 iterations as
in models without the random parameter.14 When the time-varying specification is used
14In those cases we remain running 50,000 with a thinning equal to 2 and discarding the first 10,000.
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Figure 3.10: MCMC iterations for different initial values of parameter τ - Airlines appli-
cation - Model C
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the main difference is that the dispersion of the MCMC iterations is higher. This was
observed in all the models containing this parameter.
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B. WinBUGS code a truncated normal model with a random parameter
capturing unobserved heterogeneity - WHO application
model {
for (i in 1:N) {
m[i]<- mu*exp(tao[firm[i]])
sigmau[i] <- (1/sqrt(lambda))*exp(tao[firm[i]])
#In case of using also observed covariates:
#z[i]<- gamma[1]*z1[i]+gamma[2]*z2[i]+gamma[3]*z3[i]
#m[i]<- mu*exp(z[i]+tao[firm[i]])
#sigmau[i] <- (1/sqrt(lambda))*exp(z[i]+tao[firm[i]])
nu[i]<-1/(sigmau[i]*sigmau[i])
u[i] ~ djl.dnorm.trunc(m[i],nu[i],0,1000)
eff[i] <- exp(- u[i]) }
for ( i in 1:N ) {
mp[i] <- alpha - u[i]+beta[1]*x1[i]+beta[2]*x2[i]+beta[3]*x3[i]+beta[4]*zp1[i]
+beta[5]*zp2[i]+beta[6]*ze1[i]+beta[7]*ze2[i]+beta[8]*ze3[i]
+beta[9]*ze4[i]+beta[10]*ze5[i]+beta[11]*ze6[i]
y[i] ~ dnorm(mp[i], prec) }
mu <- psi/sqrt(lambda)
psi ~ dnorm(0.0,1)
lambda~dgamma(5,lambda0)
lambda0 <- 5*log(rstar)*log(rstar)
#In case of using also observed covariates:
#for (i in 1:6) {
#gamma[i] ~ dnorm(0.0, 0.1) }
#Alternative prior for gamma:
#for (i in 1:6) {
#gammastar[i] ~ dnorm(0.0, 0.1)
#gamma[i] <- gammastar[i] / sqrt(lambda) }
alpha ~ dnorm(0.0, 1.0E-06)
for (i in 1:5) {
beta[i] ~ dnorm(0.0, 1.0E-06) }
#For firm specific random parameter:
for (i in 1:K){
tao[i] ~ dnorm(mutao,prectao) }
mutao ~ dnorm(0.0, 0.1)
prectao~ dgamma(0.5, 0.5)
prec ~ dgamma(0.001, 0.001)
sigmasq <- 1 / prec }
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C. WinBUGS code for a model with random inefficiency coefficients -
Banks risk-taking application
model{
for (i in 1:N) {
z[i]=gamma[1]*z1[i]+gamma[2]*z2[i]
zstar[i]=gammai[1,firm[i]]*z3[i]+gammai[2,firm[i]]*z4[i]+gammai[3,firm[i]]*z5[i]
+gammai[4,firm[i]]*z6[i]
lambda[i]<-exp(gamma0+z[i]+zstar[i])
u[i] ~ dexp(lambda[i])
eff[i]<- exp(-u[i]) }
for (i in 1:N) {
#+u for costs and -u for profit
mu[i] <- alpha - u[i]+ beta[1]*lny1[i]+beta[2]*lny2[i]+beta[3]*lny3[i]
+delta[1]*lnp1[i]+delta[2]*lnp2[i]+betamn[i]+deltars[i]
+etamr[i]+kappa[1]*t[i]+0.5*kappa[2]*t[i]*t[i]+tcross[i]
betamn[i] <- 0.5*betam[1]*lny1[i]*lny1[i]+betam[2]*lny1[i]*lny2[i]
+betam[3]*lny1[i]*lny3[i]+0.5*betam[4]*lny2[i]*lny2[i]
+betam[5]*lny2[i]*lny3[i]+0.5*betam[6]*lny3[i]*lny3[i]
deltars[i] <- 0.5*deltar[1]*lnp1[i]*lnp1[i]+deltar[2]*lnp1[i]*lnp2[i]
+0.5*deltar[3]*lnp2[i]*lnp2[i]
etamr[i] <- eta[1]*lny1[i]*lnp1[i]+eta[2]*lny1[i]*lnp2[i]+eta[3]*lny2[i]*lnp1[i]
+eta[4]*lny2[i]*lnp2[i]+eta[5]*lny3[i]*lnp1[i]+eta[6]*lny3[i]*lnp2[i]
tcross[i] <- phi[1]*t[i]*lny1[i]+phi[2]*t[i]*lny2[i]+phi[3]*t[i]*lny3[i]
+varphi[1]*t[i]*lnp1[i]+varphi[2]*t[i]*lnp2[i]
y[i] ~ dnorm(mu[i], prec) }
lambda0 <- -log(rstar)
gamma0<-log(expgamma0)
expgamma0~dexp(lambda0)
for (j in 1:2) {
gamma[j]<- log(expgamma[j])
expgamma[j] ~ dexp(lambda0) }
for (j in 1:4) {
gammastar[j]~dexp(lambda0)
for (i in 1:K) {
expgammai[j,i]~dexp(gammastar[j])
gammai[j,i]<- log(expgammai[j,i]) } }
alpha ~ dnorm(0.0, 0.001)
70
3.4 Appendix
for (i in 1:3) {
beta[i] ~ dnorm(0.0, 0.001) }
for (i in 1:2) {
delta[i] ~ dnorm(0.0, 0.001) }
for (i in 1:6) {
betam[i] ~ dnorm(0.0, 0.001) }
for (i in 1:3) {
deltar[i] ~ dnorm(0.0, 0.001) }
for (i in 1:6) {
eta[i] ~ dnorm(0.0, 0.001) }
for (i in 1:2) {
kappa[i] ~ dnorm(0.0, 0.001) }
for (i in 1:3) {
phi[i] ~ dnorm(0.0, 0.001) }
for (i in 1:2) {
varphi[i] ~ dnorm(0.0, 0.001) }
prec ~ dgamma(0.01, 0.01)
sigmasq <- 1 /prec }
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Chapter 4
Inefficiency Heterogeneity in
Dynamic Models∗
The decision making process followed by producers is dynamic in nature. Technology and
environment change continuously and variations with respect to their current production
conditions have to be considered by firms. However, firms face restrictions and costs in
the adjustment process. Regulation, quasi-fixed or indivisible inputs, and transaction,
information and other adjustment costs are important factors preventing firms from
making free and instant adjustments towards optimal conditions. In this context, firms
may not only be inefficient at some point, but this inefficiency may persist from one
period to the next, and firms may find it optimal to remain partly inefficient in the
short-run.
This issue has been little studied in the efficiency measurement literature but has
recently become an important concern. In stochastic frontier models, we can find two
alternative approaches to deal with time dependent inefficiencies. The first of these de-
fines deterministic time specifications for the evolution of efficiency. As examples we
find the proposals by Kumbhakar (1990) and Battese and Coelli (1992) where a time
invariant inefficiency measure is multiplied by a parametric function of time, the model
by Cornwell et al. (1990) that defines producer specific parameters, and the proposal by
Lee and Schmidt (1993) where time dummies are used. These models have the problem
of imposing arbitrary restrictions on the short-run efficiency and are not able to model
∗Part of the work in this chapter has been accepted for publication in the European Journal of
Operational Research (see Gala´n et al., 2014c).
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firm-level dynamic behaviour. A more recent approach involves the dynamic behaviour
of inefficiency by considering models that estimate long-run efficiency. These models
recognize a persistence effect of firms’ inefficiency over time and specify its evolution as
an autoregressive process. In this context, Ahn et al. (2000) defined an error structure
intended to capture the relationship between the short and long-run dynamics. This
pioneer proposal has been criticized for its economic foundations and for modeling au-
toregressive processes on nonnegative variables. An alternative proposal that avoids this
problem and argues that improvements on efficiency depend on the costs of adjustment
was introduced by Tsionas (2006). This model was applied to a sample of US banks
and very high inefficiency persistence was found out, suggesting the presence of high
adjustment costs in the banking sector.
In this context, the model proposed by Tsionas (2006) becomes very relevant in
accounting for inefficiency persistence. This model presents two main characteristics: It
assumes a constant persistence parameter for all firms in the sector, and it allows the
inclusion of observed heterogeneity in the inefficiency. However, unobserved sources of
heterogeneity may also affect efficiency estimations under a dynamic framework. In this
chapter we present an extension of the dynamic SFA specification in Tsionas (2006) in
order to account for unobserved sources of heterogeneity. In particular, firm specific
inefficiency persistence and unobserved technological heterogeneity. Finally, we also
study the effects of including observed covariates in or out the inefficiency dynamics and
propose a general specification able to model these differences.
This chapter is composed of three sections. Section 4.1 presents a dynamic SFA
model able to capture unobserved sources of heterogeneity. We apply the proposed
model to the electricity sector by using a sample of Colombian distribution utilities.
Section 4.2 presents a inefficiency specification that allows modeling observed covariates
in and out the inefficiency dynamics. The effects on the efficiency posterior distributions
are assessed using a sample of Colombian banks during the last decade. Empirical results
in both applications are of great interest not only for understanding the effects of the
treatment of heterogeneity in dynamic models, but also for regulators and firms in these
sectors. Finally Section 4.3 concludes the chapter.
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4.1 A Dynamic Model with Unobserved Heterogeneity1
We propose a dynamic stochastic frontier model that accounts for both observed and
unobserved heterogeneity sources. This is mainly an extension of the model introduced
by Tsionas (2006) that combines it with other recent proposals in the literature of dy-
namic SFA models. In particular, the proposed specification accounts for observed firm
characteristics in the inefficiency dynamics, as in Tsionas (2006), but also captures two
additional sources of unobserved heterogeneity: the first one is related to differences in
the adjustment costs among firms. It is possible that firms with different characteristics
face different costs of adjustment. This would introduce a source of unobserved hetero-
geneity among firms which may have relevant effects on the efficiency estimations (see
Gala´n et al., 2014c).
The second unobserved heterogeneity source is related to technological heterogeneity
and we model it in a similar way to the dynamic model in Emvalomatis (2012). This
author presented a dynamic model with no observed covariates in the inefficiency where
unobserved technological heterogeneity is introduced. His findings reveal important
biases in the efficiency estimations when this unobserved effects is not considered. The
general model is given by the following equations:
yit =αi + xitβ + vit − uit, vit ∼ N(0, σ2v) (4.1)
log uit =ω + zitγ + ρi log ui,t−1 + ξit, ξit ∼ N(0, σ2ξ ), t = 2...T (4.2)
log ui1 =
ω + zitγ
1− ρi + ξi1, ξi1 ∼ N
(
0,
σ2ξ
1− ρ2i
)
, t = 1. (4.3)
Equation (4.1) represents the stochastic frontier, where in the case of a production
function yit is the output for firm i at time t, αi is the firm specific parameter intended to
capture unobserved technological heterogeneity, xit is a row vector of the input quanti-
ties, β is a vector of parameters, vit is the idiosyncratic error assumed to follow a normal
distribution, and uit is the inefficiency component. The dynamic specification for the
inefficiency is represented by (4.2), where ω is a constant term, zit is a row vector of
firm specific heterogeneity variables, γ is a vector of parameters, ρi is the heterogeneous
1Much of the work in this section is joint work with Professor Michael Pollitt from University of
Cambridge (see Gala´n and Pollitt, 2014a).
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persistence parameter capturing, for every firm, the proportion of inefficiency that is
transmitted from one period to the next, and ξit is a white noise process with constant
variance σ2ξ , which may capture unobserved random shocks in the dynamic component.
Finally, equation (4.3) represents the specification of the inefficiency in the first period
and is intended to initialize a stationary dynamic process.
Stationarity is imposed by requiring the persistence parameters to satisfy |ρi| < 1.
This is important in order to avoid possible divergence of log uit to positive or negative
infinity, which would lead to efficiencies equal to zero or to one. These results are not
desirable since in the first case they would mean that completely inefficient firms remain
in the market, and in the second case that firms may be fully efficient, contradicting the
adjustment cost theory behind the formulation. In general, if a firm has a value of ρi
close to 1 it would suggest that this firm presents high adjustment costs, which translates
into a high proportion of inefficiency being transmitted from one period to the next. On
the other hand, if this value is close to 0, a low proportion of inefficiency is persistent in
time, implying that the firm may move quicker towards more optimal conditions.
The general model in (4.2) and (4.3) allows to evaluate different specifications by
imposing restrictions over some parameters. If αi = α is assumed, then unobserved
technological heterogeneity is not accounted for. If ρi = ρ is imposed, homogeneous
persistence is assumed for all companies in the sector. If ρ = 0 the model reduces to a
static model where the inefficiency follows a log-normal distribution with firm specific
mean. Finally, if no inefficiency covariates are observed, then γ = 0 would be assumed.
4.1.1 Bayesian inference
Inference of the model in (4.1) till (4.3) is carried out using the Bayesian approach as
earlier. In general, we assume non-informative but proper prior distributions for all
the parameters. For the parameter capturing unobserved heterogeneity in the fron-
tier we define a hierarchical structure where αi ∼ N(α, λ−1αi ) and the hyperparameter
α ∼ N(0, λ−1α ). Priors for the precision parameters λ are set to 0.1 and 0.001 for the
firm specific parameters and the hyperparameter, respectively. For parameters in β we
assume a normal prior distribution β ∼ N(0,Λ−1β ) where Λβ is a precision diagonal
matrix with priors set to 0.001 for all parameters. The variance of the idiosyncratic
error component is assumed to follow an inverse gamma distribution σ2v ∼ IG(a, b) with
priors set to 0.01 and 100 for the shape and scale parameters.
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The inefficiency component as defined in (4.2) follows a log-normal distribution where
uit|ui,t−1, ω, zit,γ, ρi, σ2ξ ∼ LN(ω + zitγ + ρi log ui,t−1, σ2ξ ) for t = 2...T . For t = 1, the
inefficiency is distributed ui1|ω, zi1,γ, ρi, σ2ξ ∼ LN
(
ω+zi1γ
1−ρi ,
σ2ξ
1−ρ2i
)
.
Regarding the parameters in the inefficiency, the distribution for the common con-
stant term is ω ∼ N(µω, λ−1ω ) with priors set to −1.5 and 1 for the mean and precision
parameters, respectively. The distribution for the parameters of observed heterogene-
ity is: γ ∼ N(0,Λ−1γ ) where Λ−1γ is a diagonal matrix of precisions with priors set to
0.1 for every precision parameter. For the persistence parameters, we impose |ρi| < 1
to assure stationarity and we define a hierarchical structure with ρi = 2ki − 1, where
ki ∼ β(k, 1− k). The hyperparameter is distributed k ∼ β(r, s) with priors set to 0.5 for
shape parameters. The variance of the inefficiency component is assumed to follow an
inverse gamma distribution where σ2ξ ∼ IG(n, d) with priors set to 10 and 100 for the
shape and scale parameters, respectively.2
Sensitivity analysis is performed on priors in the inefficiency component. Different
values are used for prior parameters in the distributions of ω, k and σ2ξ and posterior
results are found to converge to approximately the same values.3 We also found posterior
results to be robust to the use of a truncated normal distribution for parameters ρi and
ρ.
The specification proposed accounts for firm specific effects in the frontier and the
inefficiency persistence. However, firms in the sector share a common long-run dynamic
component ω, common elasticities for the covariates given by γ, and are linked through
common parameters ρ and α that are present in the hierarchical structures defined.
As earlier, the models are run using the WinBUGS package. For all the estimated
models we use 5,000 iterations for posterior inference. The MCMC algorithm involves
50,000 iterations with 10,000 discarded in a burn-in phase and a thinning equal to 8 is
used to remove autocorrelations.
Model choice is carried out using DIC3 and LPS as in the previous chapters.
4.1.2 Application to Colombian electricity distribution utilities
The electricity market reform introduced in Colombia in 1994 established a new struc-
ture of the sector and new conditions for private participation and competition. The
2This is the same prior used by Tsionas (2006) and Gala´n et al. (2014c).
3The priors used centre the efficiency prior distributions at 0.8.
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reform was mainly motivated by an energy crisis suffered in 1992-1993 that caused major
blackouts as a consequence of extreme droughts. This situation revealed the inefficiency
and inability of the state-owned industry to satisfy an increasing demand and to deal
with weather events. The regulatory reform adapted a version of the UK model with
the creation of a pool where prices are settled in a bidding process. The Electric Law of
1994 created the regulatory commission Comisio´n Reguladora de Energ´ıa y Gas (CREG)
and split the traditional vertically integrated and monopolistic system into the activi-
ties of generation, transmission, distribution and retailing. As a consequence, the seven
major public holdings in charge of multiple activities from generation to distribution
previous to the reform were divested into eleven companies performing only one of these
activities and two companies involved in both generation and distribution. Although
generation and distribution were allowed to be performed by the same company, limits
to the amount of electricity that the distributor could buy from its own generation firm
were set and separate managerial and accounting procedures were required.
However, privatization and competition have been slow processes in Colombia. After
the reform only two of the new companies were fully privatized and, although in the fol-
lowing years several companies were open to private capital, in most of the cases private
investors are minority shareholders and firms remain under the control of municipalities
and regional governments. Certainly, privatization and competition have been identified
as pending issues in Colombia in previous studies analyzing the effects of the first years
of the reform (see Larsen et al., 2004; Pombo and Taborda, 2006).
Nevertheless, these processes have accelerated in recent years. From 2010 to 2012,
the number of generating and retailing firms has increased by 23% and 32%, respectively,
and most of the companies involved in these activities are classified as private-owned. In
distribution, companies with a majority of public capital account for 62% of total firms
and serve 51% of the total users. Currently there are 54 generation, 33 distribution and
85 retailing companies. Of the generation firms, 12 are also involved in distribution and
15 combine generation exclusively with retailing activities.4
In general, the effects of the reform have been positive in terms of the ability of the
electricity sector to overcome extreme weather conditions and to satisfy the increasing
4Information provided by the national supervisory agency of public services Superintendencia de
Servicios Pu´blicos Domiciliarios (SSPD) in 2013.
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demand. Since the reform, Colombia has not experienced blackouts in spite of some se-
vere droughts that have affected the region during the 1997-1998 and 2009-2010 periods,
and that have seriously affected neighbor countries. Moreover, Colombia has become
an electricity exporter to Ecuador and Venezuela and it is currently planning to export
electricity to other Central American and Caribbean countries.5
On the other hand, the effects of the reform in terms of energy losses and service
quality have not been successful until recent years. During the first ten years of the
reform, energy losses and electricity interruptions did not present reductions and were
even higher than previous to the reform. Colombia also exhibited very bad performance
in these aspects when compared to other countries in the region (see Dyner et al., 2006;
Larsen et al., 2004). Only from 2008, can important reductions in energy losses be
observed. In terms of the length of interruptions, although it is possible to identify some
improvements since 2005, it is only until 2011 that significative reductions are evident.
In both cases, these improvements are consequence of changes in the regulation, as is
discussed further below.
Meeting the quality requirements and satisfying the increases in electricity consump-
tion and users has required distribution companies to make important investments. In
fact, capital and operational expenses have increased by more than 30% during the pe-
riod 1998 - 2012. This suggests the need to study the effects of the reform and the
latest regulations established by CREG on efficiency. Concerning this issue, some few
previous studies have quoted the effects on efficiency of the reform in Colombia and no
major gains have been identified. Pombo and Taborda (2006) use Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA) to perform an analysis of technical efficiency of Colombian distribution
firms during the period from 1985 to 2001. The authors find no major changes during
the period and highlight that the most efficient firms previous to the reform continue
to be in the best-practice frontier but firms which were inefficient have not been able
to change this condition and present even lower efficiency scores. A similar result was
found by Melo and Espinosa (2005), who measure the technical efficiency of Colombian
distributors from 1999 to 2003 using Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). The authors
find out that public companies perform better than those privately owned but that there
have not been major changes in technical efficiency in the immediate years after the re-
form. This Colombian evidence contrasts with the effects of the electricity reforms on
5In 2011, Colombia exported 1.740 GWh. Information from the Ministry of Mines and Energy.
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performance in other South American countries (see Mota, 2003; Pe´rez-Reyes and Tovar,
2009; Pollitt, 2004, 2008, for the cases of Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Peru, respectively.)
Findings from these studies may suggest the presence of high adjustment costs in the
Colombian distribution sector that imply inefficiency to be highly persistent in time. In
this context, it is costly for firms to move towards optimal conditions and they may find
it optimal to remain inefficient in the short-run. These studies have also evidenced the
existence of important differences among firms with different characteristics in terms of
their performance.
Therefore, this application has two main aims: first, to identify the presence of ad-
justment costs in the distribution sector after the reform and distinguish heterogeneity
in the technology and the inefficiency among Colombian distributors; second, to estimate
measures of efficiency that consider costs and quality of service in the Colombian elec-
tricity sector and their evolution from the first years after the reform into the following
fifteen years. In particular, we focus on the last five years, when most of the changes in
terms of quality, demand and costs have occurred.
4.1.2.1 The Colombian electricity distribution sector
The activity of electricity distribution in Colombia is defined by CREG as the trans-
portation of electricity from the national transmission system, which operates at voltages
above 220 Kv, to the final user. There are four different levels of tension operated by the
distributor. That is, from level 1, which involves tension levels below 1 Kv, to level 4 with
tension levels between 57.5 Kv and 115 Kv. CREG follows a cost of service type of reg-
ulation and establishes the pricing formula for distributors for each of the tension levels
considering demand, investments, and administration, operation and maintenance costs.
The length of the price review is five years and the first pricing period was 1998-2002.6
Besides prices, service quality and energy losses have also been under regulation. In
1998 CREG established maximum values for both duration and number of interruptions
by tension level, as well as compensations to users when companies exceeded these
maximums.7 However, small and slow improvements motivated CREG to modify this
scheme in 2008. The new regulation introduced quality incentives in the pricing formula
6CREG resolution 031 of 1997.
7CREG resolution 070 of 1998.
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Figure 4.1: Average CHL and EL ratio per firm
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and compensations for the most affected users.8 Under this model, an index of service
discontinuity is calculated quarterly and three ranges of values for this index are set:
if distribution companies exceed an acceptable range their pricing formula is revised
down; if they perform better than the acceptable values their formula is revised up;
and if their discontinuity index is within the acceptable range their formula does not
change. The implementation of this mechanism has been postponed and only from 2011
have all companies had to report this index. The effects of this last regulatory scheme
are still uncertain. In the literature, some studies have found this direct mechanism of
incentive regulation to have negative effects on quality of service (see Ter-Martirosyan
and Kwoka, 2010). However, the most important reductions in the length of interruptions
have occurred since then. This can be observed in Figure 4.1, where the evolution in
customer hours lost (CHL) and energy losses (EL) from 1998 to 2012 is presented for
the sample of distribution companies described in Section 4.1.5.
Regarding energy losses, new regulations were also set by CREG in 2008 by estab-
lishing a program for reducing losses and setting upper limits for the percentage of losses
recognized by users via tariff.9 The effects of this regulation also seem to be positive
(see Figure 4.1).
8CREG resolution 097 of 2008.
9CREG resolutions 199 and 121 of 2007.
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Figure 4.2: Average number of customers and electricity consumption per firm
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During the period 1998-2012, the electricity consumption and the number of con-
nected users have also presented important increases (27% and 51%, respectively). Fig-
ure 4.2 presents this evolution for the same firms above. We can observe that, after
a period characterized by economic recession and low growth rates (1999-2003), con-
sumption and customers exhibit an upward trend with high growth in the most recent
years.
Satisfying the demand and meeting the quality requirements have had effects on the
costs of distribution firms. Figure 4.3 presents the evolution of capital and operational
expenses in real US dollars of 2012 for the same companies in the figures above. We
observe important increases, mainly in operational expenses, from 2007, when relatively
higher capital expenses were made. The overall increase in real total expenses from 1998
to 2012 was 31%.
Higher distribution costs have had an impact on the tariff for the final user. Figure
4.4 plots the evolution of the tariff per kWh by decomposing it into each of their com-
ponents. Although almost all the components of the tariff have increased in real terms,
the proportion of the distribution component has raised from 33% to 40% during the
period, with a particular increase in 2011 and 2012.
Regarding tariffs, it is important to remark that CREG establishes their value only
for regulated users. After the reform, customers were separated into regulated and
non-regulated users, which are differentiated in terms of their power demand and con-
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Figure 4.3: Average operational and capital expenses per firm
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sumption. Since 2000, CREG has defined regulated users as those with power demands
under 0.1 MW and monthly consumption below 55 MWh.10 Non-regulated users are
allowed to negotiate sale prices with retailing companies.
4.1.3 Heterogeneity in the electricity sector
Accounting for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity in stochastic frontier models
is still a concern since efficiency estimations are sensitive to the modeling of sources of
heterogeneity. In the case of observed heterogeneity, previous applications to the electric-
ity distribution sector have studied the effects of including different types of covariates
in the frontier, in the inefficiency or both. Hattori (2002) found out that heterogene-
ity sources related to the load factor, customer density and consumption density affect
both, the shape of the frontier and the level of technical efficiency. Goto and Tsutsui
(2008) found only customer density to have impacts on the technical efficiency of U.S.
electricity distribution firms in a model that also includes consumption density, time and
a deregulation index in the inefficiency distribution. In a recent study, Growitsch et al.
(2012) considered weather factors and found them to be influential on costs but having
limited effects in the efficiency estimations.
However, Growitsch et al. (2012) achieved more sensitivity in the efficiency estima-
tions when unobserved heterogeneity is included by using a True Random Effects (TRE)
10CREG Resolution 131 of 1998.
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Figure 4.4: Evolution of tariff per kWh in Colombia in real terms of 2012
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model as proposed by Greene (2005). Other recent studies in electricity distribution have
also been found to be relevant to considering this latent source of heterogeneity in SFA
models. Kopsakangas-Savolainen and Svento (2011) perform a good analysis of the ef-
fect of observed and unobserved heterogeneity and warn of the high changes produced
in rankings of cost efficiency under different models.
In the context of dynamic inefficiency models, Emvalomatis et al. (2011) studied the
effect of including technological unobserved heterogeneity in an application to power
generation plants in the US. Their findings reveal high persistence of inefficiency over
time but also biases in the efficiency estimations when unobserved factors are not con-
sidered. However, it is also possible to think of heterogeneity regarding the persistence
parameters. This would be related to possible differences in the adjustment costs among
firms. The only studies considering this issue have been applications to the banking
sector, where this type of heterogeneity has been found to be relevant (see Gala´n et al.,
2014c; Huang and Chen, 2009).11
11Huang and Chen (2009) include firm specific persistence parameters in the context of models with
forward-looking rational expectations while Gala´n et al. (2014c) include them in relation to the theory
of adjustment costs.
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4.1.4 Stochastic input distance function
Given that electricity distributors do not have control over electricity consumption and
the number of users, which are their natural outputs, it is only possible to use input-
oriented models for measuring technical efficiency. In this context, we assume that
distribution firms use an N × 1 vector of inputs x = (x1, x2, . . . , xN )′ to provide an
M × 1 vector of outputs q = (q1, q2, . . . , qM )′. Thus, we define an input set as follows:
Lg(q) = x : x and technology g can produce q, (4.4)
where the technology g satisfies the axioms of closeness, boundedness, strong dispos-
ability and convexity as described by Fa¨re and Primont (1995). This technology can be
represented by an input distance function, which is defined as:
DI(x,q, g) = sup
λ
{λ : x/λ ∈ Lg(q) ≥ 1}, (4.5)
where λ denotes the maximum amount by which an input vector can be radially con-
tracted while the output vector remains constant. We assume that every distribution
firm employs the best available technology in each period. Thus, the Debreu-Farrell
input-oriented measure of technical efficiency (TE) for firm i in period t is:
TE(xit, qit, t) ≡ 1/DI(xit, qit, t). (4.6)
The input distance function has the following features: it is homogeneous of degree
one, a non-decreasing concave function of inputs, and a non-increasing quasi-concave
function of outputs (see Fa¨re and Primont, 1995). Linear homogeneity implies that it
is possible to normalize all the inputs in the distance function by an arbitrarily chosen
input xNit :
1/xNit = DI(xit/xNit , qit, t) exp(−uit), (4.7)
where uit ≡ lnDI(xit/xNit , qit, t) ≥ 0. Then, a firm is technically efficient if and only if
uit = 0 or similarly, TE(xit, qit, t) = 1.
Regarding the technology representation, we use a translog functional form to param-
eterize the distance function. So, we define vit ≡ lnDI(xit/xNit , qit, t)−TL(xit/xNit , qit, t),
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where TL(.) is the translog function. In this case, (4.7) becomes:
yit = TL(xit/xNit , qit, t) + vit − uit, (4.8)
where yit ≡ − lnxNit . If any outputs or normalized inputs are stochastic then vit is
stochastic and (4.8) becomes a standard translog stochastic frontier model. For estima-
tion purposes, the random noise term vit is assumed to follow a normal distribution and
the inefficiency component uit is assumed to follow a nonnegative distribution. Using
the results for individual inefficiencies, TE in each period is calculated as:
TEit = exp(−uit). (4.9)
Changes in productivity may also be computed from a stochastic distance func-
tion (see Balk, 2001; Orea, 2002, for a parametric approach to the computation of the
Malmquist productivity index). In this context an input-oriented Malmquist produc-
tivity index can be computed and decomposed into technical efficiency change (TEC),
technical change (TC), scale efficiency change (SEC) and an input mixed effect (IME)
as follows:
MPItI = TECI · TCt,t+1I · SECtI ·MEtI , (4.10)
where I denotes the input orientation, and the four components can be defined using a
parametric translog specification as:12
TECI =
DI(x
t, qt, t)
DI(xt+1, qt+1, t+ 1)
(4.11)
TCt,t+1I =
DI(x
t+1, qt+1, t+ 1)
DI(xt+1, qt+1, t)
(4.12)
SECtI =
D˘I(x
t, qt, t)
D˘I(xt, qt+1, t)
· DI(x
t, qt+1, t)
DI(xt+1, qt, t)
(4.13)
MEtI =
D˘I(x
t, qt+1, t)
D˘I(xt+1, qt+1, t)
· DI(x
t+1, qt+1, t)
DI(xt, qt+1, t)
, (4.14)
12Lovell (2003) defines the combined effect of SECtI and ME
t
I as the volume effect.
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where D˘I stands for an input distance function associated with constant returns to scale
(see Pantzios et al., 2011, for the derivation using the translog input oriented model).
4.1.5 Data and empirical model
Information on expenses, consumption, users, network length and quality indicators was
collected for a sample of 21 electricity distribution firms during the period 1998 - 2012.
The main data sources are CREG, SSPD and annual reports of the companies. Firms in
the sample distributed 81% of the total consumed KwH in Colombia during the period
and share 98% of total customers in the country. The data set is an unbalanced panel
with a total of 246 observations. Table 4.4 presents a summary of statistics of the main
variables. Monetary values are expressed in thousands of US dollars in real terms of
2012 after deflating by the consumer price index.
Table 4.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Residential consumption (MWh) 785,665 1,118,006 13,499 4,687,938
Non-residential consumption (MWh) 729,120 1,138,132 9,069 5,637,621
Residential customers (#) 405,457 491,828 34,365 2,247,024
Non-residential customers (#) 40,672 57,430 2,935 294,734
Network length (Km) 16,587 15,673 232 70,795
Customer hours lost (hours) 89.12 101.94 6.20 580.89
Energy losses (%) 16.25 7.45 4.02 38.57
Consumption density (kWh/user) 2,836 1,120 436 6,642
Customer density (users/Km) 43.41 45.42 9.85 194.42
Total Expenses (thousands USD) 239,034 363,063 1,395 1,768,163
From these variables two outputs and three inputs are selected for the specification
of the input distance function. Consumption and number of customers are the standard
outputs in electricity distribution; however, they are usually highly correlated (0.95 in
our sample) and one of them should be chosen to avoid collinearity problems. In our
case, we select the number of users divided into residential (y1) and non residential users
(y2). Inputs are total expenses (x1), energy losses (x2) and customer hours lost (x3).
Total expenses is the sum of operational and capital expenses. The former include ad-
ministrative, operative and maintenance expenditures and the latter corresponds to the
value of new investments in network cables, lines, ducts, tunnels and other machinery,
plant and equipment. Considering overall total expenses is desirable for benchmarking
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electricity utilities (see Giannakis et al., 2005). Moreover, since we also account for qual-
ity measures, including total expenses recognizes that distribution firms adopt different
strategies mixing capital and operating investment inputs in order to improve quality of
service (see Jamasb et al., 2012). We also include energy losses and the length of inter-
ruptions as inputs where reductions are desirable. This approach has been used before
in applications to the electricity sector using SFA models with distance functions (see
Growitsch et al., 2009; Tovar et al., 2011; von Hirschhausen et al., 2006). Giannakis et al.
(2005) and Yu et al. (2009) have also found these variables to be relevant in performing
electric utilities benchmarking analysis explicitly including quality of service. Energy
losses is the percentage of energy lost due to technical reasons and customer hours lost
is the duration of service interruptions measured in hours per customer. We also include
the network length measured in kilometers (km) as a characteristic of the output which
is not directly under the control of firms.
Finally, we consider two inefficiency heterogeneity variables. These are consumption
density (z1) and customer density (z2). Consumption density is measured as the number
of KwH consumed per customer and customer density is measured as the number of
users per kilometer. Both variables are expected to affect the inefficiency negatively in
the sense that firms serving areas with low customer and consumption density may face
a higher input-output relationship and more managerial difficulties in providing optimal
service quality and resources allocation. Previous studies have also modeled these vari-
ables in the inefficiency distribution. Hattori (2002) and Goto and Tsutsui (2008) found
these density characteristics to be relevant technical inefficiency drivers in the US and to
produce changes in the results when they are omitted from the inefficiency distribution.
Growitsch et al. (2009) found similar effects for eight European countries when includ-
ing customer density in the mean of a truncated normal distributed inefficiency. In the
case of Colombia, Melo and Espinosa (2005) have tested the inclusion of both density
variables in the frontier and the inefficiency and have concluded about relevant effects
of these variables as inefficiency drivers.
We use a translog representation of the technology for the input distance function
derived in (4.8). The estimated model with the dynamic specification presented in (4.1)
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till (4.3) is the following:
− lnx1it = αi +
∑2
m=1 βm ln ymit + βm+1 ln kmit +
∑2
r=1 δr ln
(
xrit
x1it
)
+12
∑2
m=1
∑2
n=1 βmn ln ymit ln ynit +
1
2
∑2
r=1
∑2
s=1 δrs ln
(
xrit
x1it
)
ln
(
xsit
x1it
)
+
∑2
m=1
∑2
r=1 ηmr ln ymit ln
(
xrit
x1it
)
+ κ1 t+
1
2 κ2 t
2 +
∑2
m=1 φmt ln ymit
+
∑2
r=1 ϕrt ln
(
xrit
x1it
)
− uit + vit
log uit = ω +
∑2
p=1 γpzpit + ρi log ui,t−1 + ξit; ξit ∼ N(0, σ2ξ ); t = 2...T
log ui1 =
ω+
∑2
p=1 γpzpi1
1−ρi + ξi1; ξi1 ∼ N
(
0,
σ2ξ
1−ρ2i
)
; t = 1.
(4.15)
Total expenses are used as a numeraire to accomplish linear homogeneity in inputs
and cross-effects symmetry is imposed by requiring βmn = βnm and δrs = δsr.
4.1.6 Estimation Results
We estimate four different models derived from (4.15). The first three models do not
account for unobserved technological heterogeneity, that is, αi = 0. In addition, model
(S) restricts ρi = 0, so the model becomes static and the inefficiency term follows a log-
normal distribution with observed heterogeneity in its location parameter. The second
model (D) restricts ρi = ρ, which implies a dynamic model with fixed persistence pa-
rameter. The third model (DPH) allows heterogeneous persistence through ρi. Finally,
the fourth model (DPUH) is the complete model in (4.15), which is dynamic and allows
for heterogeneous persistence and unobserved heterogeneity. Results of the estimations
are presented in Table 4.5.
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Table 4.2: Posterior mean and standard deviation of parameter distributions
Parameters Model S Model D Model DPH Model DPUH
αi = α, ρi = 0 αi = α, ρi = ρ αi = α, ρi 6= ρ αi 6= α, ρi 6= ρ
Parameter Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
ID function
α -13.4149 1.2091 -12.6924 0.7935 -11.4653 0.6624 -11.4045 0.5543
β1(ln y1) -0.1902 0.1215 -0.0379 0.0257 -0.0346 0.0219 -0.1082 0.0266
β2(ln y2) -0.0968 0.0991 -0.1200 0.0806 -0.0712 0.0530 -0.0463 0.0248
β3(lnx2) 0.0115 0.0087 0.0244 0.0135 0.0060 0.0050 0.0149 0.0134
β4(lnx3) 0.0116 0.0088 0.0485 0.0168 0.0232 0.0197 0.0075 0.0056
β5(ln km) -0.3494 0.0739 -0.3265 0.1074 -0.1265 0.0491 -0.1413 0.0625
β6(t) -0.1724 0.1217 -0.0932 0.1336 -0.0616 0.0808 -0.0730 0.0684
β7(t
2) 0.0032 0.0010 0.0046 0.0012 0.0049 0.0006 0.0050 0.0005
φ1(1/2 ln y
2
1) -1.0098 0.3705 -1.3391 0.5202 1.6021 0.7925 1.5440 0.6968
φ2(ln y1 ln y2) 0.4733 0.3262 0.8353 0.5289 -1.4377 0.6969 -1.3677 0.6227
φ3(1/2 ln y
2
2) 0.1132 0.3291 -0.2584 0.5504 1.2588 0.6821 1.2503 0.6303
φ4(1/2 lnx
2
2) 0.0868 0.0463 0.0470 0.0450 0.0105 0.0362 0.0005 0.0346
φ5(lnx2 lnx3) -0.0951 0.0224 -0.0652 0.0321 -0.0160 0.0147 -0.0037 0.0147
φ6(1/2 lnx
2
3) 0.0302 0.0174 0.0209 0.0194 0.0164 0.0112 0.0138 0.0124
δ1(ln y1 lnx2) -0.2636 0.1341 -0.2488 0.1303 0.2395 0.1451 0.1911 0.1275
δ2(ln y2 lnx2) 0.4149 0.0977 0.3551 0.1001 -0.2212 0.1136 -0.1622 0.0967
δ3(ln y1 lnx3) 0.0175 0.0822 -0.0168 0.0767 -0.0375 0.0563 0.0140 0.0554
δ4(ln y2 lnx3) -0.2235 0.0728 -0.1163 0.0623 0.0371 0.0542 0.0035 0.0525
κ1(t ln y1) 0.0252 0.0211 0.0353 0.0238 0.0192 0.0157 0.0175 0.0141
κ2(t ln y2) -0.0238 0.0196 -0.0233 0.0211 -0.0142 0.0138 -0.0150 0.0126
κ3(t lnx2) -0.0063 0.0075 0.0032 0.0074 0.0020 0.0047 0.0004 0.0041
κ4(t lnx3) 0.0064 0.0040 0.0045 0.0040 0.0022 0.0025 0.0025 0.0022
Inefficiency
ω -1.4049 0.8467 0.0205 0.0050 0.0017 0.0002 0.0028 0.0002
ρ 0.8366 0.0846 0.6532 0.0850 0.6507 0.0868
γ1(ln z1) -0.3443 0.1008 -0.0424 0.0081 -0.0317 0.0024 -0.0314 0.0168
γ2(ln z2) -0.4407 0.0838 -0.1277 0.0394 -0.1258 0.0553 -0.1009 0.0452
σv 0.1653 0.0315 0.1314 0.0194 0.0943 0.0017 0.0977 0.0018
σ 0.1610 0.0517 0.0613 0.0023 0.0406 0.0038 0.0347 0.0029
Mean eff. 0.5173 0.5841 0.6478 0.6373
SD eff. 0.1205 0.1551 0.2600 0.2420
DIC3 -119.12 -253.28 -339.49 -349.86
LPS 35.79 21.06 9.74 6.53
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We observe that the more flexible is the model in terms of accounting for dynamic
effects and heterogeneity, the better the values obtained for DIC3 and LPS. Lower
values for these criteria suggest better fit and predictive performance. Moreover, high
inefficiency persistence is estimated by the dynamic models suggesting the presence of
important adjustment costs in the Colombian distribution sector. Model D estimates
around 84% of the inefficiency being transmitted from one period to the next, which is
very similar to the average firm specific persistence estimated under models DPH and
DPUH.13 It can be also seen that not only is the average technical efficiency in the whole
sector higher in the more flexible models, but also its dispersion. This may suggest
that introducing dynamic effects and unobserved heterogeneity sources distinguishes
the presence of adjustment costs and heterogeneity from technical inefficiency and also
differentiates firms depending on their specific characteristics. These effects can also be
observed in Figure 4.5, where the evolution of efficiency over time under the four models
is plotted. We can also observe that the dynamic models accounting for persistence
heterogeneity (DPH and DPUH) identify larger improvements in TE during the period.
Figure 4.5: Evolution of posterior mean TE under different models
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In order to understand better the effects of the different specifications on the effi-
ciency estimates, we analyze the results at firm level and their evolution over time by
comparing the models derived from (4.15) from the most to the least restrictive. In Fig-
ure 4.6, we compare the posterior efficiency distribution for a firm with median values for
13Recently, Poudineh et al. (2014) found also very high inefficiency persistence in an application of a
dynamic model to Norwegian electricity utilities.
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customer and consumption density in 2012 under static and dynamic formulations. We
observe that introducing dynamic effects alter not only the location of the distribution,
by estimating higher values for technical efficiency, but also that the dispersion is lower,
which allows more certainty on the individual efficiency estimations.
Figure 4.6: Posterior efficiency distribution for a representative firm in 2012
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These differences in the posterior distributions also affect the estimation of the evo-
lution of technical efficiency over time. Figure 4.7 presents the posterior mean efficiency
estimations during the period for two firms, Electrificadora del Quindio (EDEQ) and
Empresas Pu´blicas de Medell´ın (EPM). We observe that for EDEQ, the dynamic spec-
ification estimates gains in technical efficiency that are not identified under the static
model. This may suggest that the improvements made by this firm during the period
are more important in relative terms given the presence of high adjustment costs in the
sector. In the case of EPM, results imply that, given the adjustment costs faced by all
firms in the sector, this firm did not improve enough to identify efficiency gains.These
findings are important from the point of view of the regulator because they suggest that
firms could not explain poor performance on the basis of modelled adjustment costs.
The dynamic model analyzed assumes that all distribution firms face the same ad-
justment costs in terms of being able to adjust the same proportion of inefficiency from
one period to the next. However, firms with different characteristics may present dif-
ferent adjustment costs, so Model DPH allows for firm specific persistence parameters.
Figure 4.16 in the appendix exhibits the 95% probability intervals for the persistence
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Figure 4.7: Evolution of posterior mean efficiencies for EDEQ and EPM
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estimations of every firm. Important differences in the individual posterior estimations
of persistence are found, ranging from 0.31 to 0.99. This suggests large heterogeneity in
the adjustment costs of electricity distributors that could be related to certain charac-
teristics of these firms and the incentive regulation that they have faced, as is discussed
further below. These findings illustrate the importance of accounting for firm specific
persistence parameters, which have implications for the efficiency estimations and their
evolution over time as is observed in Figure 4.5.
Finally, the full model in (4.15) is estimated accounting not only for heterogeneous
persistence but also for unobserved technological heterogeneity. Although the evolution
of efficiency is similar to that estimated under Model DPH (see Figure 4.5), Model
DPUH identifies unobserved firm effects that distinguish them in terms of the estimated
efficiency. Figure 4.8 compares the posterior efficiency distributions for a low and a
high efficient firm under models DPH and DPUH.14 We observe that their posterior
distributions move and shrink, implying a reduction in the uncertainty of the individual
estimations. It is also important to notice that estimations of firm specific persistence
parameters do not present important changes compared to those obtained in Model
DPH.
14The selected firms are Central Hidroele´ctrica de Caldas (CHC) and Empresa Distribuidora del
Pac´ıfico (DISPAC).
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Figure 4.8: Posterior efficiency distributions for CHC and DISPAC
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Focusing on our preferred model (DPUH), we can identify some links between dif-
ferences in adjustment costs and firm characteristics. We plot in Figure 4.9 the average
posterior distributions of the persistence parameter by groups of firms. In general, we
observe that firms with a higher proportion of rural and small customers present lower
adjustment costs than those which are mainly urban and serve larger customers. In
contrast, by type of ownership and number of customers, no major differences can be
observed between firms in terms of inefficiency persistence. This would imply that ru-
ral firms and those with small customers have been able to adapt more easily towards
optimal performance.
Differences between groups of Colombian utilities are also observed in terms of effi-
ciency. Figure 4.10 exhibits the average posterior technical efficiency during the period
by groups of firms. We observe that mainly urban distributors and firms serving high
consumption customers have been more efficient during the period than their coun-
terparts. Although differences are smaller, this is also the case of private and large
distributors.
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Figure 4.9: Average posterior distribution of ρi by groups of firms
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Figure 4.10: Average posterior distribution of efficiency by groups of firms
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However, what it is more interesting in our dynamic analysis is the change that these
firms have exhibited from 1998 to 2012 in terms of efficiency and productivity. We
compute the MPI and its decomposition as described in (4.10) till (4.14) and present the
results by group of firms in Table 4.3. We observe that all types of firms except those
urban and serving high consumption customers have increased their productivity during
the period. This improvement has been driven in all the cases by increases in technical
efficiency, which has compensated the technological regress suggested by the results for
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technical change for all firms. Regarding scale efficiency change, only private, rural and
firms with low consumption customers exhibit some improvement in terms of operating
at the efficient scale. Finally, the input-mix effect exhibit values very close to 1 for all
groups which suggest that changes in the input mix during the period have kept scale
efficiency almost unaltered.
Table 4.3: Decomposition of the Malmquist Productivity Index by groups of firms
Firms TEC TC SEC ME MPI
Private 1.0930 0.9399 1.0167 0.9956 1.0445
Public 1.1694 0.9417 0.9736 1.0023 1.0722
Small 1.2714 0.9419 0.9753 1.0024 1.1680
Large 1.1932 0.9386 0.9572 0.9996 1.0720
Rural 1.4723 0.9384 1.0343 1.0007 1.4290
Urban 1.0396 0.9407 0.9694 1.0058 0.9480
Low cons 1.4701 0.9440 1.0102 0.9987 1.4019
High cons 0.9986 0.9387 0.9666 1.0073 0.9061
Total 1.2161 0.9388 1.0332 0.9972 1.1795
In general, rural firms and those serving low consumption customers exhibit very
important increases in productivity during the post-reform period explained by improve-
ments in their scale efficiency but mainly due to large increases in technical efficiency.
These firms are also those exhibiting lower inefficiency persistence and therefore those
with higher scope for improvement.
This relationship between inefficiency persistence and changes in technical efficiency
is presented in Figure 4.11, where the average posterior inefficiency persistence is plotted
against their average posterior TE in 1998 and 2012 for every group of firms. We observe
that firms with high inefficiency persistence has barely presented changes in TE. This is in
particular noticeable for urban distributors and firms with high consumption customers.
On the other hand, rural companies and firms with more small customers seem to catch
up with their counterparts in terms of efficiency during the period.15 This suggests
that incentives introduced by the regulator during the period, mainly in terms of service
quality, have helped distributors with low consumption customers and in rural areas
to improve their efficiency but that they have not been effective for their counterparts,
which in absence of new incentives may become stuck in terms of technical efficiency.
15In Table 4.7 of the Appendix we present these results for each firm along with other firm charac-
teristics.
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Figure 4.11: Inefficiency persistence and technical efficiency by groups of firms (1998 and
2012)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
TE
In
ef
fic
ie
nc
y
pe
rs
is
te
nc
e
1998
 
 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
TE
In
ef
fic
ie
nc
y
pe
rs
is
te
nc
e
2012
 
 
Private
Public
Small
Large
Rural
Urban
Low cons.
High cons.
Average
persistence
Average TE
4.1.7 Empirical implications
The electricity reform in Colombia introduced the separation of activities in the elec-
tricity sector and set the conditions for privatization and competition. In general, the
reform has had positive effects on the ability of the sector to overcome extreme weather
conditions and meet demand requirements. However, for distribution companies, com-
petition and privatization have been slow processes and the users did not benefit from
improvements in service quality for the first ten years after the reform. In fact, previous
studies measuring consequences of the reform on efficiency have not found evidence of
improvements, although large differences in efficiency have been found among firms.
This may indicate the presence of high adjustment costs in the sector in Colombia and
important heterogeneity factors among distributors. We include these conditions in a
stochastic frontier model that accounts for dynamic effects and unobserved heterogeneity.
Our findings suggest high inefficiency persistence in the sector that could be related to
adjustment costs and inadequate incentive regulation. However, important differences
are found among firms. In particular, firms operating mainly in rural markets and
serving small customers present lower adjustment costs than firms with the opposite
characteristics. This condition has allowed these firms to catch up urban firms and firms
serving large users, which should draw the attention of the regulator because they seem
to be stuck in terms of technical efficiency. In fact, customer density and consumption
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density are found to be important inefficiency drivers in the sector and unobserved
heterogeneity sources to be relevant in distinguishing heterogeneity from inefficiency
and identifying differences among firms.
Our findings may be helpful for the Colombian regulator and the Ministry of Mines
and Energy, which have been recently working on the composition of groups of distribu-
tion firms that would share the same prices.16 These groups have been formed following
geographical criteria. However, our results suggest that the design of these groups should
mainly consider the inefficiency persistence level of each firm and their characteristics in
terms of customer density and consumption density.
Overall, efficiency in the Colombian distribution sector has been found to exhibit
improvements. However, efficiency gains can only be clearly identified in the last five
years. This period coincides with the main reductions in the length of interruptions and
energy losses, and the highest rates of increase in the number of customers. Although
very preliminary, these results may favour the recent incentive regulation policies for
improving quality of service and reducing energy losses. Nevertheless, the last five years
have also been characterized by important increases in the electricity tariff for regulated
users. Not only the tariff per kWh has presented important increases during the period,
but also the proportion derived from distribution costs has increased relative to the other
tariff components. This implies that Colombian users are now receiving a better service
but that they are paying the costs of these improvements via higher tariffs.17 These
results suggest that incorporating willingness to pay into the efficiency analysis of the
Colombian distribution sector would be of interest for future research.
4.2 Separating Heterogeneity from Inefficiency Dynamics
The inclusion of variables that capture firm characteristics in the inefficiency component
is important to distinguish properly heterogeneity from inefficiency but they do not nec-
essarily capture inefficiency adjustment processes or have persistent effects. This can be
particularly important in a dynamic framework, since including covariates as inefficiency
drivers in an autoregressive specification implies that they have persistent effects over
16CREG resolution 058 of 2008 and Ministry of Mines and Energy resolutions: 182306 of 2009, 181347
of 2010, 180686 of 2011 and 180574 of 2012.
17In fact, for the case of UK, Yu et al. (2009) have found the social cost of outages to be considerably
higher than the utilities’ incentives.
98
4.2 Separating Heterogeneity from Inefficiency Dynamics
time. In this context, it would mean that the effects that these firm characteristics and
environmental conditions produce on inefficiency can not be easily adjusted by firms.
This would be the case of a public bank that is less efficient because of attending ru-
ral customers in remote places. This characteristic may not be easily altered and may
consequently induce high adjustment costs. However, changing other conditions such
as some managerial practices or the risk exposure of short- run investment portfolios
may be easier to adjust. In these cases, heterogeneity sources should be allowed to be
inefficiency drivers but modeled out of the dynamic specification.
We propose a specification for the inefficiency in the context of dynamic stochastic
frontier models that is flexible in terms of the treatment of heterogeneity. The first char-
acteristic is the separation of two components within a log-linear specification for the
inefficiency. One component, which is unobserved, will follow an autoregressive process
that captures the portion of inefficiency that is transmitted from one period to the next.
The second component is a vector of observed covariates driving the inefficiency level.
In this sense this could be seen as an extension of the model by Gala´n et al. (2014b)
where an unobserved random parameter is modeled in the inefficiency distribution along
with observed covariates, but where the unobserved part follows a first order autore-
gressive process. This component can also include observed variables that will capture
persistent effects of heterogeneity in the inefficiency as in the specification followed by
Tsionas (2006) for the whole inefficiency. The second characteristic is that we account
for heterogeneity in the adjustment costs by allowing the persistence parameter to be
firm-specific as in the model in the previous section (see Gala´n and Pollitt, 2014a).
The model is given by:
yit = xitβ + vit − uit, vit ∼ N(0, σ2v) (4.16)
log uit = θit + zitγ + ξit, ξit ∼ N(0, σ2ξ ) (4.17)
θit =ω + hitψ + ρi θi,t−1 + ηit, ηit ∼ N(0, σ2η), t = 2...T (4.18)
θi1 =
ω + hi1ψ
1− ρi + ηi1, ηi1 ∼ N
(
0,
σ2η
1− ρ2i
)
, t = 1. (4.19)
The stochastic frontier is represented by (4.16) where yit represents the output for firm
i at time t, xit is a row vector that contains the input quantities, β is a vector of pa-
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rameters, vit is an idiosyncratic error assumed to follow a normal distribution, and uit
is the inefficiency component. Equation (4.17) is the log-linear specification for the inef-
ficiency where θit represents the dynamic component, zit is a row vector of firm specific
heterogeneity variables, γ is a vector of parameters and ξit is a white noise process with
constant variance σ2ξ . The unobserved dynamic component θit follows an autoregressive
process represented by (4.18) where ω is a constant, hit is a row vector of observed
covariates, ψ is a vector of parameters, ρi is the firm specific persistence parameter mea-
suring the proportion of the dynamic part of the inefficiency that is transmitted from one
period to the next for every firm, and ηit represents unobserved random shocks in the
dynamic component and follows a normal distribution with variance σ2η.
18 The dynamic
process is assumed to be stationary and (4.19) initializes it.
Stationarity ensures that the dynamics of the log-inefficiency do not diverge to nega-
tive or positive infinity. If this condition is not imposed, efficiency scores could be equal
to one or zero in the long-run. The first case would contradict the adjustment costs
theory that motivates the dynamic formulation and the second case would imply that
totally inefficient firms do not exit the market. Therefore, the persistence parameters are
required to satisfy |ρi| < 1. A value close to 1 for this parameter means high persistence
of the inefficiency dynamic component and slow adjustment of firms towards optimal
conditions.
Modeling firm specific persistence parameters imply that even when no covariates
are included, firms may present differences in their adjustment of common factors and
therefore different long-run inefficiencies. However, as we present in Section 4.2.1 we
model these parameters using a hierarchical structure common in Bayesian statistics
that links them to a common parameter for the whole sector. Moreover, firms in the
sector share also a common long-run dynamic component ω and common elasticities for
the covariates given by the vectors ψ and γ.
The proposed dynamic specification given by equations (4.17) till (4.19) encompasses
other models in the literature and permits us to compare some assumptions by including
restrictions. For instance, homogeneous costs of adjustments for all banks can be studied
by imposing ρi = ρ. If ρ = 0 the model is reduced to a static formulation with no
18It can be noticed that if unobserved random shocks are only allowed to affect the inefficiency via
the scale parameter of its distribution, then ηit = 0 and the inefficiency can be modeled following other
nonnegative distributions with firm specific and time-varying mean. However, other distributions can
change the interpretation of the inefficiency parameters.
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adjustment costs but where an unobserved component θit captures latent inefficiency
heterogeneity as in Gala´n et al. (2014b). Additionally, if ηit is also equal to 0, the model
takes the form of the Battese and Coelli (1995) static formulation. Finally, if ρi = ρ,
ξit = 0 and γ = 0 the model reduces to the dynamic model in Tsionas (2006).
4.2.1 Bayesian inference
We assume proper but relatively disperse prior distributions throughout. In particular,
the distributions assumed for the parameters in the distance function are: β ∼ N(0,Σβ)
where Σ−1β is a diagonal matrix with precision priors set to 0.001 for all coefficients. The
variance of the idiosyncratic error term is inverse Gamma distributed, that is equivalent
to σ−2v ∼ G(a, b) where the priors for shape and rate parameters are set to 0.01.
The specification in (4.17) implies that the inefficiency follows a log-normal dis-
tribution. Then uit|θit, zit,γ, σ2ξ ∼ LN(θit + zitγ, σ2ξ ), where the location component
is composed of the unobserved dynamic parameter and the observed heterogeneity
component. The distribution for the unobserved parameter modeling the dynamics is
θit|θi,t−1, ω,hit,ψ, ρi, σ2η ∼ N(ω + hitψ + ρi θi,t−1, σ2η) for t = 2...T . Given stationar-
ity we have θi1|ω,hi1,ψ, ρi, σ2η ∼ N
(
ω+hi1ψ
1−ρi ,
σ2η
1−ρ2i
)
. The distribution for the common
constant ω is normal with priors set to −1.5 and 1 for the mean and precision.19 The
distribution of the parameter vector of the observed covariates in the dynamic compo-
nent is: ψ ∼ N(0,Σψ) where Σ−1ψ is a diagonal matrix with precision priors set to
0.1. Finally, the distribution for the firm characteristic parameters in the inefficiency
are: γ ∼ N(0,Σγ) where Σ−1γ is a diagonal with priors set to 0.1 for every precision
coefficient.
Regarding the persistence parameters, we assume |ρi| < 1 to assure stationarity.
Since the persistence parameters are allowed to vary across firms, we define a hierarchical
structure where ρi = 2ki − 1 and ki ∼ β(k, 1 − k) with k ∼ β(r, s) and priors for these
parameters set to 0.5. In the case that the homogeneous persistence restriction ρi = ρ
is imposed, we assume ρ = 2k − 1 with k defined as previously.
The variances are assumed to follow inverse gamma distributions where σ−2η , σ
−2
ξ ∼
G(n, d) with priors set to n = 10, d = 0.01 and n = 0.5, d = 0.005, respectively.20
19These values center the efficiency prior distributions at 0.8 similar to other Bayesian empirical
applications in banking.
20The first is the same prior used by Tsionas (2006) for the random shocks variance in the inefficiency
equation and the second is that suggested by West and Harrison (1997) for the state equation of Bayesian
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Sensitivity analysis was performed by allowing changes in the priors of the parameters
in the inefficiency component. In particular, different priors for ω imply different priors
on the efficiency but in our experiments, no important differences were obtained in the
posterior distributions. For the persistence parameter ρ we studied the sensitivity to the
use of a truncated normal distribution and posterior results were also found to be robust
to the use of this alternative. Small changes in the values of n and d in the priors of σ−2η
and σ−2ξ were also examined with no evidence of posterior sensitivity. Finally, we also
checked the posterior distribution of the idiosyncratic errors v to check the normality
and non autocorrelation assumptions. We found no evidence of non-normality or of
autocorrelation in this case. Note however that in cases where the idiosyncratic errors
do not appear to be normal, one possibility is to model using a heavy tailed distribution
such as student-t (see Griffin and Steel, 2007, for the implementation of this assumption
under a Bayesian framework). In the case of autocorrelation, it is also possible to think
of an autoregressive structure for this component.
The implementation of the models were carried out using WinBUGS with an MCMC
sample of 50.000 iterations discarding the first 20.000 and a thinning of 6 to remove
autocorrelations. As model comparison criteria we use DIC3 and LPS as earlier.
4.2.2 Application to the Colombian banking sector
We apply the new specification to a sample of Colombian banks during the last decade.
Inefficiency persistence in the banking sector has been precisely identified by Tsionas
(2006) in his application to US banks. His findings reveal very high inefficiency persis-
tence, suggesting the presence of high adjustment costs in the banking sector. Previ-
ous studies have also found evidence of inefficiency persistence in financial institutions.
Tortosa-Ausina (2002), in an analysis of transition probabilities of efficiency, found that
most of Spanish banks remain in the same state of relative inefficiency in consecutive
periods.
In particular, the Colombian banking sector is of interest since it has been charac-
terized by the arrival of foreign institutions and several mergers and acquisition (M&A)
processes that have increased the differences in terms of size among banks during this
period.
dynamic linear models.
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Certainly, the effects of foreign ownership, size and M&A on banks efficiency have
been studied previously under static formulations. Regarding foreign ownership and
size, divergent results have been obtained previously. On the one hand, using Bayesian
stochastic frontiers, Tecles and Tabak (2010) and Assaf et al. (2013) found foreign and
large banks to be more cost and profit efficient in Brazil and Turkey, respectively. Using
nonparametric methods, Ray and Das (2010) and Sathye (2003) also found positive
effects of foreign ownership on efficiency in Indian banks. On the other hand, negative
effects of foreign ownership have been found by Lensik et al. (2008) in a study including
a sample of 105 countries; while, a negative impact of size was found by Hartman and
Storbeck (1996) for banks in Sweden, and no size effects were concluded for the case of
Brazil by Staub et al. (2010). In the dynamic context, Tsionas (2006) identified size to
have persistent effects on cost efficiency of US banks. Concerning M&A, previous studies
have found none or very little improvement on input-oriented technical efficiency or cost
efficiency (see Amel et al., 2004, for a review). However, merged banks have been found
to present different time patterns than non-merged institutions and their efficiency to
be highly dependent on time (see Cuesta and Orea, 2002). In this context, introducing
time dependency into a dynamic structure and allowing merged banks to follow their
own dynamics may lead to different conclusions.
In particular, we have two main aims with this application: firstly, to evaluate the
impact of adding more flexibility to the persistence parameter and separating hetero-
geneity from the dynamics on efficiency estimations; secondly, to identify the effects of
size, foreign ownership and M&A on input-oriented technical efficiency of Colombian
banks.
4.2.2.1 The Colombian banking sector
The Colombian banking sector has experienced major changes in the last thirty years. It
passed from a high regulated and low competitive system in the eighties to a more flexible
and foreign capital open system in the nineties. From 1998 to 2002 the country suffered
a deep financial crisis that lead to a rearrangement of the banking sector. This implied
a reduction of the number of banks and a concentration of commercial and mortgage
activities under the same institution. This reorganization process occurred during the
period 2002 till 2009, which was characterized by an environment of economic recovery,
high foreign capital flows and an increase of the services provided by banks. During
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these years, several M&A processes took place leading to a reduction of the number
of financial institutions, which passed from more than forty mortgage and commercial
banks in the mid 90’s to less than twenty in 2009. Foreign capital banks had also played
an important role in Colombia during the period of study and they accounted for almost
40% of the banking entities in 2009.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, previous efficiency studies of Colombian banking sys-
tem have mainly evaluated costs and profit efficiency and have focused on the crisis
and immediate post-crisis periods (see Janna, 2003, for a review on applications to the
Colombian banking sector). All of these studies have shown similar results in terms of
an increase in the efficiency of the sector during the mid-nineties, decreases in efficiency
during the crisis period and a recovery on these indicators in the following years. The ef-
fect of bank mergers in Colombia has been studied by Estrada (2005) for the 1994−2004
period who found gains in cost efficiency specially for relatively inefficient pre-merger
banks. Clavijo et al. (2006) also studied M&A from 1990 to 2005 finding decreases in
efficiency in the subsequent periods to the processes. However, most of these occurred
during the crisis period.
4.2.2.2 Data and model specification
As the sample presented in Chapter 3, the data set used in this section is also from the
local central bank and the supervisory agency and contains most of the banks in the
application presented earlier. However, some of them are different as well as the period of
study. For this application the data set contains information from thirty one commercial
banks, which represents 87% of the total assets in the Colombian banking sector. This
is an unbalanced panel data set of quarterly data from 2000 to 2009. During the period,
nineteen M&A processes were carried out involving banks in the sample and here, we
shall consider post-merged institutions as different banks. Regarding ownership, nine
banks in the sample are foreign-owned and only one is public-owned.
As in the application in Chapter 3, we use the intermediation approach in Sealey
and Lindley (1977). However, here we represent the technology in (4.16) with an input
distance function. This allows us to consider input quantities while accounting for mul-
tiple products and avoiding using firm specific prices. The derivation of the stochastic
input distance function is the same presented in Section 4.1.4.
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We select three inputs and two outputs. Inputs are quantities of deposits (x1), labor
(x2) and physical capital (x3), including premises and other fixed assets. As outputs we
consider the total loans (y1), including consumer, industrial, commercial and real state
loans; and the total investments and other securities (y2). All monetary variables are
expressed in thousand of millions of pesos and are in real terms of 2009 by deflating
by the consumer price index. Regarding the inefficiency heterogeneity variables, they
are included either inside the dynamic inefficiency component or out of it but the same
variable is not simultaneously included in both parts. These variables are the log of total
banks assets (z1/h1), its square (z2/h2) and foreign ownership (z3/h3). Public ownership
is not considered since the sample contains only one bank with public capital. Table 4.4
reports summary statistics of these variables.
Table 4.4: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Deposits 3 886 117.8 4 661 207.2 146 005.1 29 600 000
Labor 2 984.5 2 676.6 79 20 780
Physical Capital 93 036.7 101 070.5 5 359.075 710 837.1
Loans 3 305 469.4 4 195 981.4 132 508.6 27 900 000
Investments 1 357 952.7 1 472 720.2 32 466.74 8 277 268
Assets 5 643 177.9 6 576 929.2 319 757.3 41 700 000
Input x3 is used as a numeraire to accomplish linear homogeneity in inputs and
a translog input distance function derived from (4.8) is used. The estimated model
including the dynamic specification in (4.17) to (4.19) for the inefficiency distribution is
the following:
− lnx3it = β0 +
∑2
m=1 βm ln ymit +
∑2
r=1 δr ln
(
xrit
x3it
)
+ 12
∑2
m=1
∑2
n=1 βmn ln ymit ln ynit
+12
∑2
r=1
∑2
s=1 δrs ln
(
xrit
x3it
)
ln
(
xsit
x3it
)
+
∑2
m=1
∑2
r=1 ηmr ln ymit ln
(
xrit
x3it
)
+κ1 t+
1
2 κ2 t
2 +
∑2
m=1 φmt ln ymit +
∑2
r=1 ϕrt ln
(
xrit
x3it
)
− uit + vit
log uit = θit +
∑3
p=1 γpzpit + ξit; ξit ∼ N(0, σ2ξ )
θit = ω + ρiθi,t−1 +
∑3
p=1 ψphpit + ηit; ηit ∼ N(0, σ2η); t = 2...T
θi1 =
ω+
∑3
p=1 ψphpi1
1−ρi + ηi1; ηi1 ∼ N
(
0,
σ2η
1−ρ2i
)
; t = 1.
(4.20)
In addition to linear homogeneity in inputs, we impose cross-effects symmetry by
requiring βmn = βnm and δrs = δsr.
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4.2.2.3 Estimation results
Using the specification in (4.20) we estimate four different models by adding some restric-
tions. Model I follows the same inefficiency specification in Tsionas (2006) by including
all three heterogeneity variables in the inefficiency dynamics. Therefore, ρi = ρ and γ1,
γ2, γ3 and ξit are all equal to 0. Model II consider all heterogeneity variables out of the
dynamic component but still restricts persistence to be common for all banks. Thus,
ρi = ρ and ψ1, ψ2 and ψ3 are equal to zero. Model III combines heterogeneity variables
in and out the dynamic component. In particular, following results in models I and II,
we set γ3, ψ1, and ψ2 equal to zero and we keep ρi = ρ. Finally, Model IV uses the
same combination of heterogeneity variables in Model III but allows for bank specific
persistence parameters (ρi 6= ρ).
Table 4.5 presents the estimation results for all models. If we compare Model I to
Model II we observe two main relevant results. First, Model II exhibits lower values for
DIC3 and LPS suggesting better fit and prediction performance when heterogeneity
is modeled out of the inefficiency dynamics. Second, variables regarding size become
relevant as technical inefficiency drivers and seem to present negative but decreasing
effects. This would suggest that size affects the inefficiency level at every period but
that its effects can be rapidly adjusted. On the other hand, foreign ownership presents
relevant negative effects in technical inefficiency under both models. Consequences of
these differences in the technical efficiency estimations are explored by selecting banks
with different characteristics in terms of size and ownership.
Figure 4.12 compares the posterior technical efficiency distributions for two banks
with different sizes obtained from both models. One bank from the first quartile (Bank
A) and one bank from the fourth quartile (Bank B) of the sample are selected in terms
of assets level. We observe that while in Model I the posterior distributions of the
technical efficiencies of both banks are almost undistinguishable, in Model II Bank B
seems to have a high probability of being more efficient than Bank A. This shows that
size becomes important for differentiating banks in terms of their technical efficiency only
when it is modeled out of the dynamic component. This warns us of the possibility of
biases in efficiency estimations and wrong conclusions about the effects of heterogeneity
variables in dynamic inefficiency models when their effect is only considered as part of
the dynamics.
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Table 4.5: Posterior mean and standard deviation of parameter distributions
Parameter Model I Model II Model III Model IV
ψ1, ψ2, ψ3 = 0 γ1, γ2, γ3 = 0 ψ1, ψ2, γ3 = 0 ψ1, ψ2, γ3 = 0
ρi = ρ ρi = ρ ρi = ρ ρi 6= ρ
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Distance function
β0 -5.3801 0.3807 -5.3883 0.3813 -5.4324 0.2145 -5.2458 0.3438
β1(ln yi) -0.0216 0.0010 -0.0443 0.0021 -0.0344 0.0019 -0.0167 0.0013
β2(ln yc) -0.0065 0.0027 -0.0029 0.0012 -0.0061 0.0005 -0.0080 0.0007
β3(ln dep) 0.1290 0.0169 0.2284 0.0299 0.2240 0.0560 0.1773 0.0260
β4(ln l) 0.1029 0.0243 0.1172 0.0277 0.1198 0.0341 0.0947 0.0272
β5(t) 0.0206 0.0097 0.0283 0.0133 0.0153 0.0070 0.0193 0.0031
β6(t
2) -0.0004 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001
φ1(1/2 ln y
2
i ) -0.0808 0.0232 -0.0844 0.0243 -0.0857 0.0200 -0.0873 0.0234
φ2(ln yi ln yc) 0.0734 0.0225 0.0713 0.0218 0.0692 0.0179 0.0644 0.0153
φ3(1/2 ln y
2
c ) -0.1429 0.0223 -0.1458 0.0227 -0.1346 0.0219 -0.1343 0.0153
φ4(1/2 ln dep
2) -0.2878 0.0988 -0.3098 0.1064 -0.3230 0.0491 -0.4601 0.0433
φ5(ln dep ln l) 0.1136 0.0491 0.1334 0.0577 0.1293 0.0379 0.1572 0.0569
φ6(1/2 ln l
2) -0.0699 0.0437 -0.1004 0.0628 -0.0753 0.0299 -0.0380 0.0158
δ1(ln yi ln dep) -0.0332 0.0367 -0.0296 0.0327 -0.0122 0.0164 -0.0163 0.0175
δ2(ln yi ln l) -0.0088 0.0123 -0.0187 0.0260 -0.0251 0.0157 -0.0360 0.0127
δ3(ln yc ln dep) 0.1530 0.0306 0.1707 0.0342 0.1420 0.0165 0.1486 0.0233
δ4(ln yc ln l) -0.0171 0.0244 -0.0170 0.0244 -0.0118 0.0123 -0.0460 0.0130
κ1(ln yit) 0.0007 0.0012 0.0011 0.0018 0.0004 0.0011 0.0028 0.0047
κ2(ln yct) -0.0050 0.0022 -0.0058 0.0025 -0.0043 0.0010 -0.0054 0.0018
κ3(ln dept) 0.0096 0.0054 0.0092 0.0051 0.0097 0.0028 0.0117 0.0074
κ4(ln lt) -0.0068 0.0037 -0.0062 0.0034 -0.0068 0.0027 -0.0016 0.0114
Inefficiency
ω 0.0022 0.0003 0.0024 0.0002 0.0015 0.0002 0.0012 0.0002
ψ1(ln assets) -0.0001 0.0003
ψ2(ln assets
2) 0.0000 0.0001
ψ3(foreign) -0.0033 0.0008 -0.0041 0.0003 -0.0032 0.0003
ρ 0.9954 0.0172 0.9749 0.0168 0.9670 0.0183 0.8867 0.0452
γ1(ln assets) -0.0245 0.0011 -0.0189 0.0010 -0.0458 0.0017
γ2(ln assets
2) 0.0002 0.0001 0.0009 0.0002 0.0023 0.0007
γ3(foreign) -0.2061 0.0162
σ2v 0.0012 0.0008 0.0011 0.0007 0.0013 0.0009 0.0017 0.0009
σ2η 0.0006 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0007 0.0002 0.0010 0.0002
σ2ξ 0.0005 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
DIC3 -2789.60 -2949.20 -2961.52 -3094.10
LPS -213.72 -253.48 -261.79 -295.63
Note: In Model IV the values reported for ρ correspond to the posterior means of the individual ρi’s
Foreign ownership is found to be a relevant inefficiency driver when it is included
both in and out of the dynamic component. Thus, we explore the consequences for the
efficiency estimations of a foreign bank under both models and in two different periods.
Figure 4.13 shows that posterior efficiency distributions are quite similar in both models
in the first period but that they become different at the end of the sample period. Since
the value of the variable for this bank is the same during all the sample, this may suggest
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Figure 4.12: Posterior technical efficiency distribution for a small and large bank
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that the effect of including a covariate in the inefficiency dynamics could be cumulative
after many periods despite of the lower estimate for the coefficient. A possible reason is
that given that persistence is very high, most of the effect of the covariate is transmitted
to the next period, where once more it affects the inefficiency.
Figure 4.13: Posterior technical efficiency distribution of a foreign bank
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Since the location of foreign ownership may lead to different efficiency estimates,
we estimate a third model. Model III includes foreign ownership in the inefficiency
dynamics while keeps the assets variables out of this component. Results in terms of
fitting performance and prediction improve compared to those of the previous models
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and the coefficient for the variable remains relevant as inefficiency driver. This suggests
that foreign-owned banks present lower technical inefficiency and that the effects derived
from this type of ownership are persistent over time.
In general, inefficiency persistence is found to be very high in all models. This result
is very similar to that obtained by Tsionas (2006) for US banks. However, we explore
differences among banks by including a firm-specific persistence parameter in Model IV.
We observe that this model exhibits lower DIC3 and LPS values compared to Model
III, which suggests that recognizing heterogeneous costs of adjustment may improve the
fit and predictive performance of the model and have effects on the evolution of the
efficiency if the estimated persistence parameters are very different among banks. In
order to identify these differences, in Figure 4.14 we plot the posterior mean and 95%
probability intervals for ρi. We classify banks in three main categories: foreign and
domestic banks, large and small banks, and merged and non-merged institutions.21 We
observe differences in the average posterior mean between all complementary groups. In
particular, foreign, large and merged banks are more likely to present lower adjustment
costs than their counterparts. However, the persistence parameters between merged
and non-merged institutions are those with the highest probability of being different
as suggested from the very small overlapping between both probability intervals. The
average posterior mean for ρi among merged banks (0.71) is the lowest compared to
those of the other groups and it is not only far from that estimated for non-merged
banks (0.94) but also from that estimated for ρ in Model III (0.97) when the parameter
is assumed to be common to all banks.
These differences may have important effects in the dynamic behavior of inefficiency
over time between both groups of banks. To illustrate these effects we plot in Figure
4.15 the evolution of the mean posterior technical efficiency estimated from models III
and IV for merged and non-merged banks. It is observed that efficiency of merged banks
decreases immediately in both models after these processes are carried out. However,
Model IV identifies a rapid recovery of the efficiency of merged banks that starts around
three years after the merging process and reaches the non-merged efficiency levels after
five years. This pattern is totally different from that identified in Model III, where
technical efficiency of merged institutions seems to remain lower than that of non-merged
banks.
21We define small and large banks as those below and above the median of assets level, respectively.
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Figure 4.14: Posterior median and 95% probability intervals for firm specific persistence
parameters by type of bank
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These results contrast with those of previous studies that measure the effect of banks
M&A whether on cost or input-oriented technical efficiency (see Amel et al., 2004, for
a review on studies in developed countries). However, the pattern on the evolution of
input-oriented technical efficiency that we see for Colombian merged banks in Model IV
is similar to that identified by Cuesta and Orea (2002) in a study of output-oriented
technical efficiency of Spanish merged banks. In that study, technical efficiency was
found to exhibit a concave pattern with negative but decreasing effects during the first
six years after mergers, and positive increasing effects after that point. Although the
model estimated by Cuesta and Orea (2002) is not dynamic in nature, it allows merged
banks to follow a different temporal pattern to that of non-merged institutions. This
may suggest that mergers lead to different evolution processes of the inefficiency and
that models recognizing these differences are more appropriate.
With respect to the inefficiency drivers in the Colombian banking sector, foreign
ownership and size are found to have positive effects on technical efficiency. However, the
impact is decreasing for size. Moreover, we identify that the effects of size on inefficiency
can be rapidly adjusted by Colombian banks, while the advantages presented by foreign
banks are difficult and costly to reach or adjust.
Finally, we compare TE, TC and RTS by groups of banks following the results
from Model IV. Table 4.6 summarizes these findings. We observe that foreign banks
in Colombia present higher technical efficiency than domestic institutions, as well as
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Figure 4.15: Evolution of mean posterior efficiencies for merged and non-merged banks
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higher technical change during the last decade. These findings coincide with those
reported in other recent studies for developing countries using non-dynamic models (see
Claessens and Horen, 2012). Beyond managerial practices, the reasons could be related
to more diversification, parents expertise, or access to cheaper and multiple sources
of financial resources (see Chen and Liao, 2011). In contrast to domestic institutions,
foreign banks also present increasing returns to scale, suggesting that these institutions
have more room to raise their production scale and possibly to take M&A decisions.
Foreign banks in Colombia are characterized for being specialized in corporate clients,
offer complex products and have few branches with low operations. In a recent study,
Das and Kumbhakar (2011) also found similar scale economies for foreign banks in India.
Table 4.6: TE, TC and RTS by type of bank
Bank type TE TC RTS
Foreign 0.6011 0.0307 1.0986
Domestic 0.5476 0.0251 0.9180
Large 0.5853 0.0285 0.9202
Small 0.5304 0.0278 1.0316
Merged 0.5076 0.0326 0.9021
Non-Merged 0.5512 0.0267 1.0633
In terms of size, we find that large banks present higher TE and TC than small
institutions during the period. However, large institutions are found to operate at de-
creasing returns to scale in contrast to small banks. Higher efficiency of large banks
and potential scale gains for small banks were also recently found by Tabak and Tecles
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(2010) and Tecles and Tabak (2010) in India and Brazil, respectively. In particular,
in Colombia most large domestic banks are those involved in merger processes. Since
merged institutions also present decreasing returns to scale, this may suggest that these
processes led banks to be oversized. Also, on average, merged banks exhibit lower tech-
nical efficiency than non-merged institutions. However, they are found to present lower
adjustment costs that allow them to adjust quicker towards optimal conditions. Thus,
they would be able to present higher efficiency after some periods. Finally, technical
change is also found to be higher for merged than for non-merged banks and it can be
a consequence of the reorganization processes implied by mergers.
4.2.2.4 Empirical implications
Our findings suggest that modeling covariates in and out of the inefficiency dynamics
have implications on the identification of inefficiency determinants and on the efficiency
estimations. In particular, we find that foreign ownership has negative and persistent
effects in technical inefficiency of Colombian banks. This may suggest that some char-
acteristics of foreign banks such as country diversification and access to cheaper funding
sources can be difficult and costly to obtain or change. On the other hand, the effects
of bank size on technical inefficiency are found to be rapidly adjusted.
Colombian banks are also found to present very high inefficiency persistence, coincid-
ing with previous findings in the US and Spanish banking sectors (see Tortosa-Ausina,
2002; Tsionas, 2006, respectively). However, important differences are observed among
banks with different characteristics when firm specific persistence parameters are mod-
eled. Foreign, large and merged institutions are found to present lower adjustment costs
than their counterparts. This suggests that these institutions may benefit from diversifi-
cation or economies of scale when carrying out adjustments in their short-run operations
as these are costly for domestic, small and non merged banks. This finding is particu-
larly important for merged banks since this characteristic allows them to recover rapidly
from efficiency losses observed after merger processes.
These results are of interest not only for financial institutions, but also for regulators
given the importance that M&A have had in the sector in recent years and the role
of foreign banks in developing countries. In particular, although, our findings reveal
important decreases in efficiency of merged institutions during the initial years after
these processes are carried out, the lower inefficiency persistence of banks involved in
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M&A and the non-persistent effects of size on inefficiency may validate these processes
in the mid-term. However, the Colombian regulator should be aware of the results on
economies of scale, which leave little margin for non-merged institutions to increase their
size and reveal decreasing returns for merged and large banks. Exploring market power
considerations would be also of interest for future policy decisions in the sector. In
general, bank efficiency may be a useful indicator for financial stability considerations
given that banks with low efficiency have been found to be more prone to future defaults
(see Berger and DeYoung, 1997). In this regard, those banks with high inefficiency
persistence should be drawn to the attention of the regulator.
4.3 Conclusions
In the presence of adjustment costs, firms do not find it optimal to adapt their processes
towards efficiency. This behaviour can be captured through a dynamic specification for
the inefficiency term. One of the most relevant contributions in this context is that
by Tsionas (2006) where the inefficiency is allowed to have persistent effects over time
and to be driven by inefficiency covariates. In this work we have extended this idea in
order to recognize heterogeneity in the adjustment costs among firms and non-persistent
effects of observed heterogeneity.
Our findings suggest that accounting for unobserved sources of heterogeneity is also
very relevant under a dynamic framework. In particular, allowing the inefficiency persis-
tence parameter to be firm-specific recognizes differences in the adjustment costs among
firms, which drive the posterior efficiency estimations. In both applications, firm-specific
persistence parameters are found to be very different among firms with different charac-
teristics. This allow us to identify differences in the way firm characteristics affect the
evolution of individual efficiencies and important implications for regulators and firms
in the electricity and banking sectors.
Modeling covariates in and out of the inefficiency dynamics was also found to have
relevant effects on the identification of inefficiency determinants and on the efficiency
estimations. This points out the implications of including observed firm characteristics
in dynamic specifications.
Overall, the proposed specifications encompass other models in the literature and
adds more flexibility in terms of considering inefficiency heterogeneity in a dynamic
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context. This improves the fit and predictive performance of the models and allows
us to capture effects that have not been previously identified. Extensions of dynamic
inefficiency models such as using alternative distributions for the inefficiency are aspects
of interest for future research.
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4.4 Appendix
A. Complimentary results from the electricity distribution application
Figure 4.16: 95% probability intervals for firm specific persistence parameters under Model
DPH
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Note: See Table 4.7 for the list of firms and acronyms
Table 4.7: Average posterior mean estimations of TE and inefficiency persistence (IP)
under model DPUH, customer density (users/km) and consumption density (kWh/user) by
firm for the period 1998-2012
Firm TE IP Cust. Dens. Cons. Dens.
Central Hidroele´ctrica de Caldas S.A. E.S.P. (CHC) 0.5520 0.9713 31.199 341
Centrales Ele´ctricas de Narin˜o S.A. E.S.P. (CEDENAR) 0.3045 0.9651 23.072 474
Centrales Ele´ctricas del Norte de Santander S.A. E.S.P. (CENSA) 0.6118 0.9872 13.996 94
CODENSA S.A. E.S.P. (CODENSA) 0.9894 0.9981 47207 830
Compan˜´ıa de Electricidad de Tulua´ S.A. E.S.P. (CETSA) 0.9892 0.9996 47.355 2116
Compan˜´ıa Energe´tica del Tolima S.A E.S.P (ENERTOLIMA) 0.4667 0.3120 13.205 77
Electrificadora de Santander S.A. E.S.P. (ESSA) 0.4624 0.4096 33639 152
Electrificadora del Caqueta´ S.A. E.S.P. (ELECTROCAQUETA) 0.4977 0.6700 20.120 209
Electrificadora del Caribe S.A. E.S.P. (ELECTRICARIBE) 0.4506 0.6960 40.553 336
Electrificadora del Huila S.A. E.S.P. (ELECTROHUILA) 0.4720 0.3862 16.663 94
Electrificadora del Meta S.A. E.S.P. (EMSA) 0.5033 0.8584 39.699 261
Empresa de Energ´ıa de Arauca E.S.P (ENELAR) 0.4260 0.7571 21.334 981
Empresa de Energ´ıa de Boyaca´ S.A. E.S.P. (EBSA) 0.9960 0.9999 21.356 237
Empresa de Energ´ıa de Casanare S.A. E.S.P. (ENERCA) 0.3677 0.9615 13.352 110
Empresa de Energ´ıa de Cundinamarca S.A. ESP (EEC) 0.4760 0.5221 42.579 153
Empresa de Energ´ıa de Pereira S.A. E.S.P. (EEP) 0.4913 0.6509 21.193 299
Empresa de Energ´ıa del Quind´ıo S.A.E.S.P. (EDEQ) 0.6487 0.9930 33.337 452
Empresa de Energ´ıa del Pac´ıfico S.A. E.S.P. (EPSA) 0.7303 0.9959 50.925 269
Empresa Distribuidora del Pac´ıfico S.A. E.S.P (DISPAC) 0.4233 0.8853 22.464 475
Empresas Municipales de Cali E.I.C.E E.S.P (EMCALI) 0.7328 0.9895 61.707 2331
Empresas Pu´blicas de Medell´ın E.S.P. (EPM) 0.9015 0.9988 82.735 389
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B. WinBUGS code for a dynamic model with unobserved inefficiency
and technological heterogeneity - Colombian electricity distribution ap-
plication
model {
#K=number of firms
#N=number of observations
#M=N-K
#obs=N*1 vector with numbers of observations from 1 to N
#obsK=K*1 vector with the number of the first observation of every firm
#obsM=M*1 vector with the number of the rest of observations of every firm
#Inefficiency specification for the first observation of every firm:
for (i in 1:K) {
log(u[obsK[i]])<-(c/(1-rhofirm[obs[obsK[i]]]))+z[obsK[i]]+eta[obsK[i]]
z[obsK[i]] <- gamma[1]*lnz1[obsK[i]]+gamma[2]*lnz2[obsK[i]]
tao1[i] <- tao*(1-rhofirm[obs[obsK[i]]]*rhofirm[obs[obsK[i]]])
eta[obsK[i]] ~ dnorm(0,tao1[i]) #(c),(d) }
#Inefficiency specification for the rest of observations of every firm:
for (i in 1:M) {
log(u[obsM[i]])<-c+rhofirm[obs[obsM[i]]]*log(u[obsM[i]-1])+z[obsM[i]]
+eta[obsM[i]]
z[obsM[i]]<-gamma[1]*lnz1[obsM[i]]+gamma[2]*lnz2[obsM[i]]
eta[obsM[i]] ~ dnorm(0,tao) }
for (i in 1:N) {
mu[i] <- alphafirm[obs[i]]- u[i]+ beta[1]*lny1[i]+beta[2]*lny2[i]+beta[3]*lnx2[i]
+beta[4]*lnx3[i]+beta[5]*lnkm[i]+beta[6]*t[i]+beta[7]*(t[i]*t[i])+tl[i]
+tlcross[i]+tlt[i]
tl[i] <- 0.5*phi[1]*(lny1[i]*lny1[i])+phi[2]*(lny1[i]*lny2[i])
+0.5*phi[3]*(lny2[i]*lny2[i])+0.5*phi[4]*(lnx2[i]*lnx2[i])
+phi[5]*(lnx2[i]*lnx3[i])+0.5*phi[6]*(lnx3[i]*lnx3[i])
tlcross[i] <- delta[1]*(lny1[i]*lnx2[i])+delta[2]*(lny2[i]*lnx2[i])
+delta[3]*(lny1[i]*lnx3[i])+delta[4]*(lny2[i]*lnx3[i])
tlt[i] <- kappa[1]*(t[i]*lny1[i])+kappa[2]*(t[i]*lny2[i])+kappa[3]*(t[i]*lnx2[i])
+kappa[4]*(t[i]*lnx3[i])
lnx1[i] ~ dnorm(mu[i], prec)
eff[i]<- exp(-u[i]) }
c ~ dnorm(-1.5, 1)
for (i in 1:2) {
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gamma[i] ~ dnorm(0.0, 0.1) }
for (k in 1:K) {
hfirm[k]~ dbeta(h,h1)
rhofirm[k] <- 2*hfirm[k]-1
alphafirm[k]~ dnorm(alpha, 0.1) }
h ~ dbeta(0.5,0.5)
h1<-1-h
rho <- 2*h-1
tao ~ dgamma(10,0.01)
alpha ~ dnorm(0.0, 0.001)
for (i in 1:7) {
beta[i] ~ dnorm(0.0, 0.001) }
for (i in 1:6) {
phi[i] ~ dnorm(0.0, 0.001) }
for (i in 1:4) {
delta[i] ~ dnorm(0.0, 0.001) }
for (i in 1:4) {
kappa[i] ~ dnorm(0.0, 0.001) }
prec ~ dgamma(0.01, 0.01)
sigmasq <- 1 /prec }
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C. WinBUGS code for a dynamic model with heterogeneous persistence
and separating heterogeneity from the inefficiency dynamics- Colombian
banking sector application
model{
#K=number of banks
#N=number of observations
#M=N-K
#obs=N*1 vector with numbers of observations from 1 to N
#obsK=K*1 vector with the number of the first observation of every bank
#obsM=M*1 vector with the number of the rest of observations of every bank
#Inefficiency specification for the first observation of every bank:
for (i in 1:K) {
log(u[obsK[i]])<-theta[obsK[i]]+z[obsK[i]]+xi[obsK[i]]
theta[obsK[i]]<-((c+s[obsK[i]])/(1-rhof[obs[obsK[i]]]))+eta[obsK[i]]
z[obsK[i]]<-gamma[1]*z1[obsK[i]]+gamma[2]*z2[obsK[i]]
s[obsK[i]]<-omega*z3obsK[i]]
tao1[i]<-tao*(1-(rhof[obs[obsK[i]]]*rhof[obs[obsK[i]]]))
eta[obsK[i]]~dnorm(0,tao1[i])
xi[obsK[i]]~dnorm(0,lambda) }
#Inefficiency specification for the rest of observations of every bank:
for (i in 1:M) {
log(u[obsM[i]])<-theta[obsM[i]]+z[obsM[i]]+xi[obsM[i]]
theta[obsM[i]]<-c+s[obsM[i]]+rhof[obs[obsM[i]]]*theta[obsM[i]-1]+eta[obsM[i]]
z[obsM[i]]<-gamma[1]*z1[obsK[i]]+gamma[2]*z2[obsK[i]]
s[obsM[i]]<-omega*z3[obsM[i]]
eta[obsM[i]]~dnorm(0,tao)
xi[obsM[i]]~dnorm(0,lambda) }
for (i in 1:N) {
mu[i]<-alpha - u[i]+ beta[1]*lnyi[i]+beta[2]*lnyc[i]+beta[3]*lndep[i]
+beta[4]*lnl[i]+beta[5]*t[i]+beta[6]*(t[i]*t[i])+tl[i]+tlcross[i]+tlt[i]
tl[i]<-0.5*phi[1]*(lnyi[i]*lnyi[i])+phi[2]*(lnyi[i]*lnyc[i])
+0.5*phi[3]*(lnyc[i]*lnyc[i])+0.5*phi[4]*(lndep[i]*lndep[i])
+phi[5]*(lndep[i]*lnl[i])+0.5*phi[6]*(lnl[i]*lnl[i])
tlcross[i]<-delta[1]*(lnyi[i]*lndep[i])+delta[2]*(lnyi[i]*lnl[i])
+delta[3]*(lnyc[i]*lndep[i])+delta[4]*(lnyc[i]*lnl[i])
tlt[i]<-kappa[1]*(t[i]*lnyi[i])+kappa[2]*(t[i]*lnyc[i])+kappa[3]*(t[i]*lndep[i])
+kappa[4]*(t[i]*lnl[i])
lnx1[i]~dnorm(mu[i], prec)
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eff[i]<-exp(-u[i]) }
c~dnorm(-1.5,1)
for (i in 1:2) {
gamma[i]~dnorm(0.0,1) }
omega~dnorm(0.0,1)
lambda~dgamma(0.5,0.005)
h~dbeta(0.5,0.5)
rho<-2*h-1
tao~dgamma(10,0.01)
h1<-1-h
for (k in 1:K) {
hf[k]~dbeta(h,h1)
rhof[k]<-2*hf[k]-1 }
alpha~dnorm(0.0,0.001)
for (i in 1:2) {
beta[i]~dnorm(0.0,0.001) }
for (i in 3:4) {
beta[i]~dnorm(0.0,0.001) }
for (i in 5:6) {
beta[i]~dnorm(0.0,0.001) }
for (i in 1:6) {
phi[i]~dnorm(0.0,0.001) }
for (i in 1:4) {
delta[i]~dnorm(0.0,0.001) }
for (i in 1:4) {
kappa[i]~dnorm(0.0,0.001) }
prec~dgamma(0.01,0.01)
sigmasq<-1/prec }
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Chapter 5
Discussion and further research
In stochastic frontier analysis the inefficiency component may be erroneously estimated
when firm characteristics are not taken into account. These firm characteristics induce
heterogeneity that might result in different firm frontiers, or may have an impact directly
on the inefficiencies. This issue has been widely studied before. However, unobserved
inefficiency heterogeneity has been little explored. In this thesis, we have put forward
the modeling of heterogeneity in a Bayesian context by capturing both observed and
unobserved heterogeneity in the inefficiency distribution under static and dynamic for-
mulations.
The first of our proposed methods captures unobserved heterogeneity in the ineffi-
ciency by modeling a random parameter in the inefficiency distribution, which can be
allowed to be whether time invariant or time-varying. Our findings suggest that unob-
served inefficiency heterogeneity can be properly captured by this random parameter.
Models including this parameter whether alone or simultaneously with observed covari-
ates improve in terms of fit and predictive performance as long as latent heterogeneity
remains unidentified. In this sense, it can be used to distinguish unobserved hetero-
geneity from inefficiency and to validate the suitability of observed covariates to capture
it.
Also, the effects of including both types of heterogeneity in different parameters of
the inefficiency distribution were studied. Differences in efficiency rankings and mean
scores were observed when inefficiency heterogeneity was included in different parame-
ters of the one-sided error distribution. This was found to be related to effects in the
posterior efficiency distributions. In particular, considering firms’ heterogeneity in the
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location parameter of the inefficiency has an effect on separating the firm specific pos-
terior efficiency distributions from each other, which leads to more reliable rankings.
On the other hand, when heterogeneity affects only the scale parameter of the ineffi-
ciency, an important shrinking effect is observed on the individual posterior efficiency
distributions. This results in less uncertainty around mean individual efficiency scores.
Finally, including the heterogeneity in both parameters of the inefficiency distribution in
models that preserve the scaling property leads to both separating and shrinking effects.
This allows less overlapping of the posterior efficiency distributions and provide both
more reliable efficiency scores and rankings. These results are consistent whether we use
observed covariates or our proposal to model unobserved heterogeneity.
Our second proposal introduces random firm specific coefficients for covariates in the
inefficiency. It was found that allowing random coefficients for the inefficiency covariates
captures firm-specific effects which remain unidentified under the regular fixed coeffi-
cients models. This specification distinguishes firms in terms of the effects of inefficiency
drivers and separates unobserved heterogeneity related to these effects from efficiency.
This was found to have relevant implications for regulation an policy making.
We extended the study of observed and unobserved heterogeneity to dynamic SFA
models. This is a topic with relative little attention within the frontier literature. Here
previous proposals were extended in order to capture two possible sources of unobserved
heterogeneity. One related to heterogeneity in the inefficiency persistence and the sec-
ond one related to unobserved technological heterogeneity. Both unobserved sources
were found to be very relevant in an empirical application to electricity distribution
utilities. In particular, heterogeneity in the inefficiency persistence was found to be very
important in explaining inefficiency and its evolution over time. Finally, the implica-
tions of including observed covariates in dynamic models were studied by mean of an
inefficiency specification that allows separating observed inefficiency heterogeneity from
the dynamic process. The model allows identifying those firm characteristics that may
have persistent effects in the inefficiency from those that can be rapidly adjusted. In
general, location of observed covariates was found to have important implications in the
identification of inefficiency drivers and posterior efficiency estimations.
Overall, new specifications to model both observed and unobserved heterogeneity
in stochastic frontier models have been proposed in a Bayesian context. These models
identify effects that are not captured with other models in the literature, which are
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shown to be very useful for firms, regulators, and policy maker in different sectors, from
health to electricity and banking.
We identify interesting future research lines from both empirical and theoretical
standpoints. Applications of the proposed models to any regulated sector are of rel-
evance due to important concerns on accounting for unobserved heterogeneity sources
when comparing firms in these sectors. Also applications to less explored areas such as
investment funds performance may have important implications. Models proposed here
can be easily implemented in the identification of persistence effects in the efficiency of
the risk-return relationship of funds and the differences among types of firms.
Theoretically, we think that extending our models to include common time specific
factors as in Bai (2009) would be interesting in order to account for spillover spatial
effects. This would allow to model heterogeneity related to geographical aspects. Also,
an extension of the dynamic models to the use of Bayesian vector autoregressive and
state space representations would allow to model endogeneity issues in a more proper
way (see Mastromarco and Woitek, 2012a,b, for the use of these techniques in efficiency
measurement). Finally, modeling inefficiency heterogeneity in nonparametric SFA mod-
els is an area of great interest. These models have the advantage of adding flexibility to
the inefficiency component while preserving an stochastic error term. In this context,
there are some recent contributions from both the frequentist and Bayesian approaches,
but modeling inefficiency heterogeneity and studying its implication in these models is
still an open topic.
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